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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM DEFINED
Preliminary Comments
To no small degree this dissertation is a thought
experiment.

It consists of a somewhat self-imposed

theoretical puzzle regarding a specific problem in the
philosophy of art.

Having an interest in and preference for

nominalism as an ontological perspective along with an
interest in and some occasional experience with musical
composition and performance, I have wondered whether the two
interests could be combined into a coherent position:
nominalistic theory of musical compositions.

a

Therefore, it

should be made quite clear from the beginning that I am not
searching for a conclusion, I already have one in mind; nor
do I have pretensions of settling the question, What is
the ontological status of musical works of art?.
purposes are, I believe, more modest.

My

I am simply

addressing the challenge of constructing an ontology of
musical works that might be satisfying to those with a
nominalistic bent or outlook. The question this dissertation
seeks to resolve is this:

if someone were inclined to

believe that musical works are individuals, and that as
individuals, they are, furthermore, better understood as
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concrete particulars, what shape might a theory take in
order to account for such presuppositions?
The hypothetical character of this thesis should not
be taken as implying any lack of seriousness of motive on my
part, nor should it be thought to imply that I do not think
what follows is a viable theory.

But it is important that

readers recognize the actual goals of this essay.
starting point is a nominalistic perspective.

The

I do not hope

to convert non-nominalists to such a position; however, a
greater measure of sympathy for the view would be desirable.
It might be said then, that the minimal goal for this
dissertation is providing a plausible ontology of music that
is reasonably consistent with both nominalism and actual
musical practice.

The maximal goal for these efforts is

developing a better theory than the alternatives, that is,
determining what might be a "correct" description of musical
compositions.
Thus, this dissertation seeks to be an investigation
into the possibility and character of a nominalistic
ontology of musical works.

More specifically, this is a

proposal for a theory of musical compositions that construes
them as concrete particulars.

A nominalistic ontology is,

in simplest terms, a theory that countenances the existence
of individuals only; or alternatively, it denies the
existence of any sort of non-individual abstract entities or
universals other than general words.1

Therefore,

th~
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proposed theory that follows will characterize musical
compositions as individuals.

But in addition and in keeping

with the proposed notion of concrete particular and
consistent with their status as artworks, compositions will
also be regarded as physical or sensory artifacts, i.e.,
publically observable objects made by some person or
persons.
In saying that concrete particulars of the sort I
shall be discussing are physical objects, I am indicating
that such an entity exists objectively in space and time.
In saying that these concrete particulars are sensory (or
phenomenal) objects, I am indicating that they are
perceivable with the senses by perceivers.

Thus,

compositions, as concrete particulars, are entities existing
independently and objectively of those who perceive them.
Compositions qua compositions are therefore not imaginary
nor conceptual entities.

.,,,.,

Dreams or hallucinations, for

example, are phenomenal without being physical, (except as
chemical or electrical brain phenomena, I suppose); whereas
atoms are physical without being phenomenal, (under "normal"
sensory conditions).
Another point regarding the claim that concrete
particulars are physical and phenomenal has to do with the
recognition that entities of the sort I am concerned with
are describable in at least two basic ways.

A physical

description of something is an account of its extension in
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space and related qualities.

A phenomenal description of

the same thing would amount to a report of someone's sensory
experiences of the thing.

For example, a musical

performance described physically would be in terms of sound
waves of certain frequencies; while a phenomenal account
would be in terms of adjectives like "loud",
"high pitched".

"sonorous", and

Therefore, compositions, since they are

concrete particulars which are physical and phenomenal
objects, can be described in either of these two ways.
A nominalistic ontology has little difficulty in
accomodating the notion of concrete particular.

Whether or

not so-called "abstract particulars" are acceptable to
nominalism is not so clear, and so this shall be left an
open question,

(although I shall touch on it later,

especially in Chapter V).

The present objective includes

the development of a theory of compositions construed as
concrete particulars.

Under the view presented here, to say

that something is concrete is to assert that it is
non-abstract and "combined with, or embodied in matter,
actual practice, or a particular example"2; it is spatially
and temporally identifiable and is fundamentally describable
as physical and/or sensory.

To say that something is a

particular is to assert further that it is non-universal and
not general, it is a specific individual entity
distinguishable and separable from other individuals. It is
a singular entity that, unlike what is general or universal,
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cannot exist as some sort of common nature or feature of
something other than itself.

A concrete particular has no

existence prior to or independent of its spatial and
temporal location.

Thus, a nominalistic ontology of musical

artworks, as developed in this dissertation, will construe
them as a unique, physical and/or sensory individuals, and
will avoid any description of them in terms of abstract or
conceptual ontological categories.
Although some might insist that all artworks are
essentially conceptual or abstract rather than physical or
sensory,

(for reasons to be discussed later in this

chapter), others are likely to acknowledge that at least
some of the arts are comprised of works of art that are each
concrete particulars.
painting.

A paradigmatic example would be

Paintings are usually regarded as unique

individuals consisting of pigments on an actual physical
surface,

(e.g., canvas, wood, paper, plaster, etc.).

They

are each one-of-a-kind spatial and visible objects, whose
basic aesthetic properties are visual.

Other arts such as

sculpture and architecture are likewise often taken to be
comprised of artworks which are the physical artifacts we
perceive as before us; i.e., statues and buildings.
In music,

(as well as with others of the arts, e.g.,

dance, film, literature, drama, printmaking), the situation
appears to be quite different.
is a musical work of art?

What sort of thing or object

Paintings, sculptures, and
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buildings are physical objects, pieces of matter, but
musical compositions and performances are not so clearly
material in this way.

Musical sounds are thoroughly

transient, and the works made of these transitory items lack
the relative permanence that the other sorts of artworks
mentioned above possess.

We cannot point at musical works

in the way we can point at paintings, sculptures, and
buildings.

Whereas daVinci's "Mona Lisa" exists in one

place at a time, and Giacometti's "Standing Youth" and Frank
Lloyd Wright's "Heller House" are likewise spatially and
temporally identifiable; can we refer to Beethoven's "D
Minor Symphony" in this manner?
First of all, Beethoven's symphony, taken as his work
of art, his composition, is usually distinguished from any
particular performance of it.

A performance quite clearly

consists of sensory experiences, and is spatially and
temporally identifiable.

But in what sense is Beethoven's

work itself identifiable and sensible?

Does it even make

sense to ask such a question about such a thing as a musical
composition?

It is generally recognized that this symphony

can be performed an indefinite number of times in an
indefinite number of places.

Does this imply that there are

an indefinite number of "D Minor Symphonies"?; is any given
performance actually Beethoven's work of art anyway, or do
we never hear Beethoven's genuine work of art?;

and what

about the score, is there any sense in which this paper
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filled with notations is the work of art?

These and a host

of other difficulties associated with music will be examined
later in this dissertation.
These sorts of considerations have led some
philosophers to conclude that the genuine musical work of
art, the composition, is fundamentally some kind of abstract
entity.

One direction taken has been to regard the

ontological status of the work as essentially conceptual,
mental, or imaginary.

Any physical or sensory manifestation

of music, i.e., performances,

(actual sound sequences), or

scores, (notated symbols on paper), is merely a means of
conveying the essential work to audiences.

The "true" work

is the object of mental aesthetic contemplation: either the
artist's or the spectator's internal experience; or it is
the intelligible form or design of the work.

Another

direction taken has been to construe the work as some sort
of universal; that is, as something capable of multiple
instantiations.

From this perspective the work is evident

in any number of individual performances, scores,
recordings, etc., but none of these particular objects is
the actual work itself.

Musical compositions may then be

comparable to other universals like "Redness", "Chair", or
"Justice".

Under this view, compositions, as with

universals generally, are not only non-physical and
non-corporeal, but they do not require physical embodiment
in order to exist.

A version of each of these two
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directions will be addressed at length in Chapter IV of this
dissertation.
It is my intention here to argue against such
conceptions of musical works, and for, rather, a conception
which construes them nominalistically as concrete
particulars. The musical work will be described as an
individual sensory object,

(perceivable as sights, sounds,

etc., depending on the medium in which it exists), and as a
particular physical artifact made by some person or persons.
This artifact is the sort of thing that can be copied or
imitated in a variety of ways and in diverse media.

Such

copying of a physical artifact will be distinguished from
such non-nominalistic descriptions as 'instantiating' or
'being an example of' as the fundamental relationship
between composition and performance.
Therefore, under my proposal, a particular performance
of Beethoven's "D Minor Symphony", for example, is not,
strictly speaking, Beethoven's artwork, nor is it properly
regarded as an instance or occurrence of his composition.
Rather, such a performance is understood to be a new, yet

v

only partly original, artifact derived from Beethoven's
original work.

A performance of the "D Minor Symphony" uses

a copy of Beethoven's manuscript score as a set of
instructions, a description, or a guide towards making some
musical sound occurrence.

The performance "earns" the title

"D Minor Symphony" on the basis of an historical conriection
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with Beethoven's original musical composition.

Chapter III

will attempt to spell out these issues.
An assumption of this dissertation related to the
larger theory will be the claim that not all works of art
are admired in and of themselves or for their intrinsic
sensory qualities. The significance of this subsidiary
thesis may be seen in relation to the aesthetic value of
manuscript scores as artworks.

Paintings and sculptures are

often taken to be aesthetically interesting and valuable for
their immediate sensory characteristics:
texture, etc.

color, shape,

But they may be valued also for their

references, meanings, and representations beyond these
directly experienced qualities.3

That a painting represents

the Crucifixion or incorporates various symbols, for
example, is usually taken to be somehow aesthetically
relevant, if not essential, to an adequate appreciation of
such pieces.

In admitting this, someone may yet justifiably

claim that the physical painting remains as the actual
artwork.
Similarly, musical performances are quite clearly
aesthetically important, in large measure, because of their
directly experienced audial qualities.

Whether musical

sounds and their arrangements can be or are meaningful
beyond this sensory level is a matter of great controversy.
But let us set that issue aside for the moment and note that
musical works in manuscript form,

(i.e., notational

~ymbols
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on paper), are most often aesthetically admirable for what
they can do or be used for rather than for their intrinsic
sensory properties.

Very rarely, if ever, is a manuscript

contemplated for the dots and lines that comprise its visual
qualities,

(in fact, to do so would probably amount to

treating the manuscript like a painting or a print rather
than as a musical score).

Some people can "read" manuscript

scores and imagine music consistent with the notation.
situation does not undermine the point here.

This

A case of

imagining music "in one's head" based upon a composer's
manuscript should not be confused with a case of admiring
the sensory qualities of the manuscript.

The former is a

case of using the score for something else, namely,
imagining music. The essential point here is that the
notational symbols derive their aesthetic value primarily
from their ability to refer to or represent actual musical
sound occurrences which are aesthetically valuable for
themselves.
Compositions are the products of certain acts of
composing.

One of the chief tasks of the dissertation will

be to describe how the making of compositional artifacts
bears upon the ontological issues at stake.

Composing is,

most simply, the selecting and arranging of what I shall
call "musical elements".

Musical elements will be presented

as existing in two basic forms:
sounds.

sounds or symbols for

These symbols may be notational or linguistic; that
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is, they are either written inscriptions or verbal
expressions.
sounds,

Those musical elements that are musical

(as well as sound correlates such as silences and

accents), are generally associated with certain conventional
names and these names can be written in symbols, (i.e.,
dots, lines, etc. on a staff), letters, (e.g., B, G#, etc.),
or words, (e.g. "Key of C", "crescendou, "F Major chord",
etc.).

These names may be spoken as well as written.

Later, they will be described as functioning in a manner
comparable to other general words, and consistent with a
nominalistic interpretation.
The artifact that is the result of certain acts of
composing, namely the musical composition, is that object
constructed from whatever musical elements that are chosen
by the composer.

Thus, the artifactual object of musical

art-making is most often either a rather short-lived,
transient sound sequence or a written manuscript having a
considerably longer life-expectency.4

In either case, the

artwork is this concrete individual.
Obviously, not all musical occurrences are
compositions. Compositions are original works of art, while
performances and scores as such are usually, in some way or
other, copies or derivations of compositions.

Spelling out

this fundamental and crucial distinction between composition
and performance provides another important task for this
dissertation.

In addition, the relationships betweeri
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composition, score, and performance, as well as
understanding the place of improvisation in these
considerations will have to be addressed.

I shall argue

that all performances are themselves musical works; but
while some performances are compositional works of art, most
are not.

I shall also argue that it is usually the case

that improvisations should be regarded as genuine musical
compositions.
Composing is not just any occasion of selecting and
arranging musical elements--some selecting and arranging is
not composing.

Transcribing into notation a heard

performance involves, strictly speaking, selecting and
arranging notational musical elements, but this is not
composing.

Performing a piece of music from a score is an

occasion for selecting and arranging musical elements,
(i.e., making decisions about which sounds to make on or
with a musical instrument or voice), but again this is not
composing.

A genuine compositional work is the product of

some person's (a composer) intention to make original
selections and arrangements.

That is to say, there must be

a belief on the part of the composer that the work under
construction is, to some extent, original.

The degree of

intentional originality required is probably not clearly
specifiable, but I shall look into this question at the
appropriate point in my presentation.

A rough-and-ready

characterization of musical compositions, to be spelled out
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in Chapter III, will thus be that they are intended
originals consisting of selected and arranged musical
elements.
Before I explain in further detail this nominalistic
theory of musical compositions, I shall attempt to
accomplish two preliminary tasks:

(1) provide a sense of

context by setting the specific issues of this dissertation
within the broader context of ontology and the arts; and (2)
examine nominalism as an ontological perspective.

The first

of these will be the focus of what remains of this chapter;
the latter task will be presented in Chapter II.
Work of Art:
Evaluative and
Classifactory Senses
Among George Dickie's many valuable contributions to
the philosophy of art is his clarification of two senses of
the phrase "work of art".

He distinguishes what he calls a

classificatory sense from an evaluative sense.5

This

distinction is helpful and important not only because it
clarifies a significant ambiguity in the use of this phrase,
but also because it effectively identifies a fundamental
division between areas of inquiry in the philosophy of art.
I shall discuss this division shortly; first, let us briefly
consider Dickie's distinction.
The difference between the evaluative and
classificatory senses of "work of art" is fairly
straightforward.

The evaluative sense of "work of ar·t"
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refers to uses of the phrase concerning judgments of
aesthetic value.

To say of a thing that it is a work of art

in an evaluative sense is to say that it is aesthetically
valuable.

The evaluative sense is, to a certain extent,

honorific or complimentary.

It is not uncommon for someone

to say of some painting, for example, "Now that is a work of
art."

The purpose of the statement is to acknowledge the

noteworthy aesthetic value of the painting. In calling the
painting a "work of art" the speaker is not merely
identifying what sort of thing is hanging on the wall;
rather, she is making, for the most part, a value judgement
to the effect that the painting is somehow "good" from an
aesthetic point of view.

"Work of art", used in this way,

is thus evaluative since it expresses an evaluation, and a
positive one at that, of the object to which it refers.
The classificatory sense of the phrase "work of art",
on the other hand, refers to uses that do not make such
evaluative attributions.

This sense is essentially

descriptive; it identifies what something is; it classifies
the thing as an art object rather than something that is not
an art object.

Under this use of the phrase, if someone

says of the painting, "Now that is a work of art.", the
speaker's purpose might be only to single out the piece as
an example of an artwork or to inform someone that the thing
before them is an artwork and not something else.
evaluative assertion is intended.

No
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Dickie points out that classificatory and evaluative
senses may be operative in a single statement.

If someone

says, "This Rembrandt is a work of art," "the expression
'this Rembrandt' would convey the information that its
referent is a work of art in the classificatory sense, and
'is a work of art' could then only reasonably be understood
in the evaluative sense."6
A partial justification for this distinction between
descriptive and normative senses of work of art is evident
in our readiness to talk about "good art" as opposed to "bad
art".

If "work of art" had only an evaluative sense of the

sort described, then the phrase "a good work of art" would
be redundant and the phrase "bad work of art" would appear
to be self-contradictory.

A junior high school art show may

have no items of aesthetic merit, yet this does not conspir•
against its status as an art show.

We might say then that

it is an art show in the sense that it exhibits works of/art
in the classificatory sense.
Clarifying this distinction between senses of
art is important on a number of counts.

wor~

of

Disagreements

following on the exclamation, "You call that a work of
art!", may be more profitably pursued if care is given to
noting whicn sense of "work of art" is being used. The
statement might be a value judgement expressing disapproval
of the purported work's positive aesthetic value.
exclamation is just another way of saying, for

Thus, the

exampl~,
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"That painting is ugly."

In this way, an effective response

to the speaker's charge should address criteria of aesthetic
value.
Alternatively, if the speaker's intention consisted in
taking "work of art" in a classificatory sense, any
subsequent debate would best consider the nature or
definition of art.

For example, the speaker may be

attending a photography exhibit and actually believe that
the photograph before her is quite beautiful, but she does
not believe, (for whatever reason), that photography is a
legitimate artform.

An appropriate interpretation of the

exclamation would then be something to the effect that,
"Photographs cannot be works of art."

The point of her

utterance is not to make a value judgement as such, but to
deny the photograph's classification as an artwork.
Interestingly enough, probably the most common use of
the above exclamation includes both senses of work of art.
Controversial works of art are often indicted by the
exclamation, "You call that a work of art!"

for both

lacking in aesthetic value and for not being the sort of
thing that can be an artwork.

For example, Duchamp's

"readymades" such as "Fountain", (a manufactured urinal),
have been criticized by some people for being aesthetically
unappealing and also for not being the appropriate sorts of
objects or subject matter for legitimate works of art.
This dissertation will make use of the phrase

"~ork

of
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art",

(as well as "artwork" and "work"), in the

classificatory sense exclusively.

Whether or not an given

musical composition or performance is aesthetically good is
not my concern here.
I said that Dickie's distinction of senses identifies
a fundamental division of problems within the philosophy of
art. The point I would like to make is this:

just as there

are these two distinct senses of "work of art", there are
two distinct contexts for aesthetic inquiry which parallel
these senses.

An evaluative approach to works of art

inspires questions such as "what is good art?", or "what
features of artworks make them aesthetically valuable?", or
"what is the nature of aesthetic value judgements?"

In

other words, quite clearly the philosophy of art consists
partly of an inquiry into evaluative considerations of art,
questions of aesthetic value.

But the philosophy of art is

also concerned with what might be called "classificatory"
issues, or questions involving the nature of artworks
independent of evaluative considerations.
Classificatory uses of the phrase "work of art" serve
primarily, as we have already noted, to distinguish artworks
from non-artworks.

Following on this understanding such

questions as "what is art?", or "how are artworks different
from thing$ that are not artworks?", or "is there a
definition of art?" arise.
In connection with these fundamental questions·
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associated with the classificatory sense of "work of art" an
additional set of questions emerge.
to as "ontological" questions.

These may be referred

Once we have decided which

things we wish to regard as genuine works of art we may be
interested in questions such as, what or where is the
artwork?, what sort of thing is an artwork?, in what sense
do artworks exist?; are artworks necessarily embodied public
objects?, is the actual artwork that which we experience
with our senses or is it something essentially mental,
something imagined?

A complex web of problems and issues

revolve around such ontological considerations, as we shall
see.
Ontological questions involve the classificatory sense
of work of art because they are not directly concerned with
evaluative claims about the artworks they examine.

They are

concerned with the nature of works of art whether they are
"good" works or "bad" works, whether aesthetically valuable
or valueless, and anything in between.

Thus, in an

ontological context, references to works of art may or may
not imply anything with respect to the work's value.
Ontological investigations may proceed regardless of the
work's evaluative qualities.
This is not to say that classificatory contexts,
including ontological considerations, are irrelevant to
evaluative contexts.

What I wish to make clear is that in

the ontological investigations that follow, the focus will
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be on works of art in a classificatory sense.

I am not

concerned here with questions r·egarding which artworks or
artforms are aesthetically superior, nor do I

intend to

discuss criteria for aesthetic evaluation or interpretation.
As interesting as these issues are, I shall attempt to keep
them separate from the present analysis.
It should also be made clear that the ontological
considerations I shall be concerned with are not
classi·f icatory in the sense that they aim towards a
definition of art or determining what distinguishes artworks
from non-artworks as such, although it may draw from or
contribute to such considerations.

What I wish to emphasize

is that ontological questions are classificatory since they
are essentially descriptive, rather than evaluative or
interpretive.

We may proceed ontologically from the

position that there is an already established fund of
artworks, a large group of things accepted as works of art.
These may or may not have been determined on the basis of
some sort of explicit classificatory theory which lays out
the critical necessary and sufficient conditions for
arthood.

The ontological project I propose to undertake, in

effect, begins after such definitions and determinations
have been made and however they have been made.

The

proposed theory should be able to accommodate all musical
works, regardless of whether their status as works is widely
accepted or highly controversial.

This project proceeds
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under the assumption that there are musical works of art,
and then attempts to clarify and articulate a description of
their ontological status regardless of the controversies
surrounding them.
Ontology and the Arts
That works of art exist is not controversial.

The

controversies begin once we attempt to describe how or in
what sense works of art exist.

Are works of art physical

objects or are they some kind of abstract entities?

Are

they particulars or something more akin to universals?
Where is the art object to be located:

the artist's

experience, the physical stimulus, or the spectator's
experience?7

Can a distinction be made between the "art

object", (the physical, phenomenal, or public thing we
observe), and the "aesthetic object", (that which we admire
or to which we attribute aesthetic value, and is thus, the
"real" work of art)?

What is the relationship between works

of art and copies, reproductions, performances, etc. of
them?

In what sense can works of art be created or

destroyed?

The questions and problems are many.

The question of the ontological status of works of art
in general may not be amenable to a single answer anyway.
Painting, sculpture, architecture, literature, music, dance,
drama, photography, and film all appear as quite diverse
modes of artistic expression.

They differ so significantly
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from one another that a single ontology applying to all
artworks may be inappropriate if not impossible.

On first

reflection, we may be inclined to distinguish the arts
ontologically simply in terms of their different physical
media.

Paintings are made of paint; sculptures are made of

clay, metal, wood, and other solid materials; literature
consists of words spoken or written; music of sounds;
photography and film are visual images produced by certain
chemical reactions to light.

From these distinctions of

media an ontologist might conclude that the ontological
status of a given work of art is a function of its medium of
presentation, i.e., the physical or sensory object of a
viewer's or listener's or reader's attention.

The pigment

on canvas is the work of art in painting; the sounds heard
in the concert hall make up the symphonic work of art; the
words printed on the page are, taken together, the literary
artwork; and so on.
What lends some initial plausibility to this
physicalist/phenomenalist interpretations is the generally
acknowledged expectation that artworks be publicly
accessible. In other words, it is usually thought that it is
not enough for artists merely to have aesthetic ideas, they
must make something that people can experience.

Therefore,

a number of philosophers of art have regarded artifactuality
as a necessary condition for status as an artwork.
think of artists as people who create things,

We often

(sculptures,
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poems, films, songs, etc.), for aesthetic appreciation.

Few

if any artworks require the presence of the artist in order
to be experienced; rather, the artwork is an object distinct
and separate from the artist herself.

It does not require a

great logical leap to identify the object experienced as the
artist's work of art.

This is just another way of

recognizing that artworks usually, if not always, exist in
some medium or other.

The physicalist thesis amounts then

to the claim that the work of art is identical with its
medium, or

~hat

the work of art is the artist's physical

artifact.
Consider the way in which we identify a work of art in
terms of title and artist.

We say, for example, "This

painting is called 'Composition with Two Lines' and it was
painted by Mondrian."

It is easy enough to regard the work

of art as the painting which is a particular physical object
located in space and time, composed of paint applied in a
certain way to a flat, rectangular piece of canvas, as
something that can be pointed to and experienced with the
senses, and the product of some individual person's
intentional efforts occurring at a definite place during a
specific time.

This is shown, to some extent, in the way we

can and do sometimes talk about artworks:

"The 'Two Lines'

fell off the wall today."; or "The 'Two Lines' was stolen,
but has since been recovered."; or "Mondrian's painting has
been destroyed by fire."

Each of these statements

i~
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literally meaningful; and the title of the work seems to be
identified with the physical artifact.

Such talk would be

very peculiar, if not impossible, if the 'Two Lines' were
not a physical object.
fall off walls.

Physical objects, but not ideas, can

Physical objects can be stolen and then

recovered, but not ideas.

And it's not clear how anything

other than a physical object can be destroyed by fire.
Now such a conception is not without its problems and
detractors,

(I shall return to these later); but let us

assume for the moment that this ontological description of
paintings is adequate.

Can a physicalistic ontology extend

to other sorts of artworks?

Consider woodcut prints, an

artform not terribly distant from painting in terms of its
artifactual product, (often a two-dimensional image on a
flat surface), although the process of making the artifact
is significantly different.

The artist carves out areas of

a block of wood, applies ink to the carved surface, and then
presses the block to paper, or similar material, leaving the
desired impression. Typically, the artist makes a run of
these impressions ranging from a single print to an
indefinite number of them.
case?

What is the work of art in this

Seldom, if ever, is the wood block put on display or

admired for it aesthetic qualities, this is because it is
usually not considered to be the work of art as such.

What

is commonly taken to be the work is a print made from the
block.

If someone or some museum possesses an impression or
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two of Ourer's "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse", each
of these is spoken of as a work of art, each is displayed
under the title and referred to as "The Four Horsemen of the
II

Apoca 1 ypse .

It would seem then that there are many works

of art with the same title, but we can no longer speak of
~

work of art as an individually identifiable object in

these circumstances. If a print of the "Four Horsemen" is
destroyed by fire, Durer's work with this title is not
considered lost. If the wood block from which the
impressions were made is destroyed or lost the work itself
is not considered lost or destroyed.
The situation in the case of literature appears even
more problematic.

John Updike wrote Rabbit, Run in 1960,

presumably with some writing implement, (pencil, pen,
typewriter, or whatever), on paper; this artifact is
referred to as his manuscript.

(An author could even

dictate his work into some recording device, or type it into
a word processor; this would further intensify the problems
to be discussed below.)

This manuscript was prepared and

typeset by a publisher and thousands of copies of the novel
were printed and distributed. Now what is Updike's work of
art?

Not only are we again confronted with a problem of

identity and diversity as with woodcuts, (is each copy of
the book equally a work of art?; are they each to be
identified as a work of art?; is the original manuscript the
only genuine artwork?, if so, what is the status of an
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individual copy of the novel?; do we have access to the work
of art without the manuscript?); but an additional and
somewhat different ontological problem gains prominence.
The physicalistic/phenomenalistic interpretation does not
seem quite so amenable to literary artworks as it did to
painting or even woodcut prints.

This is so because, in

literature, it is not so much the visible inscriptions on
the page that we take as the object of our aesthetic
interests or attention, but instead what some might call the
meanings of the words, or even more abstractly, the story
that is told with the words.

In other words, the medium of

literature does not seem to be a physical or sensory one.
What further complicates the matter is the possibility of
translations of the novel into other languages, languages
the author probably does not even know.

What permits us to

refer to each copy of the book and each translation as
Rabbit, Run?
Thus, two sorts of ontological issues can be seen
emerging with respect to works of art:

1) identifying or

locating the actual works of art, i.e., where they exist;
and 2) determining what artworks are made of, i.e., how they
exist.

If paintings are taken as relatively unproblematic

in this regard, a physicalist's response to the two
ontological questions might go something like this:

1)

Mondrian's work of art known as "Two Lines" is an individual
object painted in 1931 and is presently hanging on a wall at
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the stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam; and 2) "Two Lines"
consists of patches of pigmented oil paints arranged on the
surface of an approximately 40° square piece of canvas.

Can

a comparable response be given to questions concerning
literary works such as Updike's Rabbit, Run?

If it is

possible, it is certainly more complicated and difficult.
How would we answer questions like, where is John Updike's
literary work Rabbit, Run?, and what is it made of?

The

most likely response would be that such questions are
somewhat nonsensical since a novel is not the kind of thing
that can be identified in this way; its ontological status
is significantly different from that of a painting,
sculpture, or a building.

Not only does literature seem to

be comprised of artworks that are not individual objects,
but the aesthetically relevant characteristics of these
works do not appear to be sensory or physical.
The so-called performance arts, drama, dance, and
music, for example, provide further complications for the
ontologist. In these arts a credible distinction can be made
between a work and a performance ot it.

The object the

artist makes, a script, score, or set of choreographic
instructions, is not usually thought to be the actual
artwork.

These artforms are sometimes described as

consisting of two-stage artworks:
performance.

the instructions and the

Scripts and scores are somewhat incomplete as

artworks; they require some performer or performers to act
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or sound them out.

But the performances themselves are not

the complete artwork either.

The character of their

phenomenal features largely depend upon the script or score
produced by the artist.

What then is the work of art in

~

these cases if not the script or score nor any particular
performances of them?

We speak of performances as "a

v

performance of the artwork 'Hamlet'"; and we speak of
scores as "a score of the artwork 'D Minor Symphony'".
The implication seems to be that neither performances nor
their instructions are the actual works of art.

Attempting

to describe artworks within the so-called performi.ng arts in
terms of individual physical objects does not seem
plausible.
Each of the various artforms has its own attendant
ontological problems.

I have touched on a few, and it

should be quite obvious that there are many more.

Various

theoretical proposals have been offered to provide either a
general, unified theory accounting for all artworks in all
artforms, or specific theories aimed at satisfying the
ontological requirements peculiar to particular artforms.
An approach to a general theory that is an alternative
to a physicalist theory might begin by making a distinction
between the work of art and its artifactual embodiment.

The

"aesthetic objectM is considered the true work of art,
whereas the artifact, the physical/sensory object is merely
a means of presenting, conveying, or communicating the
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essentially non-physical artwork to a spectator or audience.
This view, in effect, denies that artworks are physical
objects and so attempts to avoid whatever ontological
difficulties arise from this interpretation.

For example,

if the work of art is not a physical object, then the
problem of identifying its spatial and temporal location is
removed.

Artforms are distinguishable from each other

partly in terms of the different kinds of aesthetic ideas
they seek to convey, and partly in terms of the different
media they use to embody the work itself.

But any given

embodiment or form of embodiment is not to be confused with
the actual work of art.

Neither the manuscript nor any

printed copy of Rabbit, Run is the literary work; each of
these items is important for experiencing the work, but they
only serve to reveal the work, to put it in a publically
accessible form, not to be the work. The work itself stands
somewhat independently of these physical manifestations, and
so is not lost or destroyed if the manuscript or any printed
copy is lost or destroyed.
symmetrical.

The relationship is thus not

Under this view, the work can exist without

physical embodiment, but the physically manifested artifact
cannot exist without a previously existing work of art.
Aspects and variations of this kind of approach will be
critically examined in Chapter IV.
Another important proposed solution to the ontological
difficulties associated with the arts is an application of
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the type/token distinction to this context.9

Under this

view, works of art are essentially types of which any number
of individual tokens may exist.

This is what permits

copies, reproductions, performances, prints, etc. to each be
called examples of a specific work of art.

In talking about

v

a print of Durer's "The Four Horsemen• as having a tear in
the left corner or being printed on deteriorating paper, we
are referring to a token of the work, an individual copy.
But if we say that "The Four Horsemenn is dynamic or
comprised of exceptional detail revealing great skill on the
part of the artist, we are talking about the type, i.e., the
work itself.
Musical compositions, as types, may have not only
numerous individual tokens, but these may also exist in a
wide range of media:

sound performances, notational scores,

recordings, verbal descriptions, etc.

The view I propose

will not adopt either the language or the categories of
types and tokens to characterize the ontological status of
compositions and there performances, scores, etc.

First of

all, since my intention is to construct an account of
compositions which is admittedly physicalistic, and since
the notion of a type precludes construing it as a physical
object, the concept of type must be ruled out as a viable
category within the theory. Secondly, type is the sort of
abstract notion which I am seeking to avoid.
points later.

More on these

v
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Music and Nominalism
The problems and perplexities resulting from
ontological examinations of works of art are clearly many
and widely diverse.

This diversity is largely a result of

the great variety of art media and artistic practices.
has been written

abou~

Much

this, and I have only touched on a

few examples. My purpose in what has preceded has been
primarily to give some sense of perspective to the specific
intentions of this dissertation:

an ontological analysis of

musical works of art, especially compositions.

In what

follows, I do not propose a unified theory applicable to all
the arts; instead, I intend to focus on music, or more
precisely, musical artworks.
Music, it seems, is fundamentally a matter of sounds.
To listen to music is to listen to certain sounds.
music is make certain sounds.

To play

Sounds are, physically

speaking, waves of moving air; sensorially speaking, they
are audial experiences had by beings capable of hearing.
Sounds also have the character of events.

They are

transient, they happen, they can be measured for duration in
time, but presumably not for extension in space, (at least
not in the ways we typically do so).

Although they occur in

specific places, they are not enduring spatial objects,
(except as moving particles of air); they are quite
short-lived.

Since music is made of sounds, the ontological
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characteristics of music might seem to be reducible to the
ontological characteristics of sounds and events.

If this

were the case, music could be treated merely as a species of
sound.
If the art of music consisted of nothing other than
making and listening to musical sounds, then the ontology of
musical works might be fairly straightforward.

Musical

works would be certain sound-sequence-events occurring at a
specifiable time and place.

Their ontological status would

be comparable to other sorts of sound-sequence-events; we
would only need to determine criteria for distinguishing
musical from non-musical sequential sound occurrences.
musical practice is not quite that simple.

But

Music, as a form

of artistic activity, is not only the making and hearing of
musical sounds.
For example, we often speak of someone 'writing' music
or 'reading' music.

Such reading and writing does not

directly involve sounds.

These uses of the term 'music'

reflect practices in music which permit associating musical
sounds with symbolic notation.

Notating music seems

desirable because it allows for the possibility of repeating
certain musical sound-sequence-events or communicating
musical ideas to others. Since musical sounds are transient,
the only way to 're-experience' aesthetically satisfying
musical sound-events is to make similar sounds.

Before the

development of sound recording and reproducing devices,
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symbolic notation provided an effective way, beyond the use
of memory alone, of communicating and 're-making' certain
desired musical sound-events.
Notation also allows for music to be created without
actually making sounds.

Since persons can imagine sounds,

and since these sounds can be associated with symbols,
creators of music can write out musical 'scripts' or scores
instructing other persons how to make musical sound-events.
Complex music, (multiple musicians, diverse instruments,
longer sequences, etc.), may be facilitated through the use
of this standardized notation.

Music does not have to

remain solely a matter of improvization, (making it up on
the spot as it is being played), or of remembering
previously occurring musical events.
Reading and writing music thus amounts simply to
making use of the symbolic notation of music.

But what are

the statuses of these notational arrangements in the
ontological scheme of things?

We say of the musical artwork

'D Minor Symphony' that it has been written by Beethoven.
If he had had nothing to do with any particular sounding of
this work, we would not cease to refer to it as his artwork.
Therefore, it appears that, given the way we talk about
music, making musical works of art is not dependent upon the
maker of the work making musical sounds.

Furthermore, what

we call musical artworks need not consist of sounds.

And

so, the ontology of music cannot be reduced solely to the
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ontology of sounds.
Nor can music be reduced solely to its symbolic
notation.

A great deal of music is never notated; often

musical sounds and works are made without the use of
notation; and 'reading' musical notation alone is not
generally regarded as the preferred way of aesthetically
appreciating music.

Actual sound-events remain as the

central elements in music and music making, but not the only
ones.
Sound recording and reproduction technology permit
repeated sound-events that are quite similar to previously
occurring sound sequences.

Music produced in this way

consists of sounds occurring in an identifiable time and
place; but these sound-sequence-events are a few steps
removed from the playing of musical instruments,
voices).

(including

Musical instruments are similar to electronic

playback equipment in that both can produce musical sounds
under certain circumstances, and both can be used to produce
sound-events very similar to others that have occurred
before.

The former requires a competant musician to

properly play the appropriate musical instrument, whereas
the latter requires a copy of a recording,

(magnetized

plastic tape, grooved vinyl disc, etched light-reflecting
disc, etc.), made from some original sound-event caused by a
musical instrument.

Although the two methods of producing

facsimiles of a previous sound-event may result in very
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similar audial experiences, the processes are obviously
quite different.

I shall explore some of the ontological

relevancies of these differences in subsequent chapters
Recording media and techniques also provide another
approach to making musical works of art.

Multi-track tape

equipment allows composers to construct musical works by
manipulating and combining sounds with far greater control
than otherwise possible.

For example, a composer may play,

by himself, each and every musical instrument required for
the sounding of a musical work.

These individual soundings

may then be played back together forming the complete work.
A composer can thereby construct a multi-instrumental work
without dependence upon other musicians.

In this way, not

only is a composer able to provide a sounding of the work,
but the compositional work is composed through the use of
actual sounds rather than notational symbols.

Thus,

composers may compose musical works of varying degrees of
complexity without the use of notation, and they may do so
by the direct use of sounds.

This phenomena of 'writing'

music with sounds will also be explored for its ontological
significance.
The practice of virtually every art involves an artist
who makes an artwork.

In music, composers are the artists

who make artworks referred to as compositions.

But music

also accomodates another sort of artist, the performer who
makes performances.

Often the activities of composers,
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(e.g., writing on paper), and performers, (e.g., playing a
musical instrument), are quite different; and usually the
artworks produced by these activities are also quite
different, (notational scores and musical sounds
respectively).

But sometimes, as we shall see, the composer

and performer of a work may be the same person; and
sometimes compositions may be performances, (e.g.,
improvisation).
Another important feature of most art making is the
identification of an artist's artwork by and with a title.
The artist is associated with the artwork as its
creator/maker, and the title, in effect, sets off the work
from other works.

That is, a work of art is distinguished

from others partly in terms of who made it and partly in
terms of its 'name' or title.

A central problem facing this

dissertation is the determination of the ontological
character of titled musical artworks, (as well as so-called
"Untitled• works).

An important dimension of this

determination is an analysis of this practice of naming or
titling musical artworks.

This effort must inevitably

address the process of making musical compositions, the
process by which a particular musical work is associated
with a particular composer, and the process by which it is
set off from other compositions through naming.
As has been noted earlier, musical compositions are
closely associated with performances of them.

An
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interesting feature of performances, from an ontological
point of view, is the way in which they are given the same
name or title as the composition.

This is largely a matter

of a dependency relationship that typically holds between
performances and compositions.

The ways in which

performances are usually dependent upon compositions will be
examined in some detail in Chapter III
Not only do performances of compositions share names
with the original compositions themselves, but written
scores and sound recordings do as well.

In addition, if

someone merely imagines the sound of a composition "in
his/her head", this too is referred to by the same name.

We

say such things as,
"Beethoven composed the 'D Minor Symphony' during the
early nineteenth century."
"I listened to the 'D Minor Symphony' last night at
Orchestra Hall."
"The teacher played the 'D Minor Symphony' on the school's
new sound system."
"We studied the 'D Minor Symphony' from an old German
textbook."
What permits each of the referents (a composition, a
performance, a recording, and a score respectively) to
warrant the title 'D Minor Symphony'?

Are we speaking

accurately when we call each of these items 'D Minor
Symphony'?
Performances, scores, and recordings are fairly
uncontroversially considered to be individuals.

What is
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controversial is the

~tatus

of the composition.

My claim is

that they too are individuals; but others hold that
compositional works are the sorts of things that can have
multiple instantiations, or that they are somehow abstract
in a way that precludes identifying them as in any way
individual.

Composers create or make compositions, but just

what sort of thing do they make such that they appear to be
capable of having performances, capable of being written out
in symbolic notation, and capable of existing or being
present in diverse recorded media?

The nominalist, as

someone committed to accepting only individuals as genuine
existents, must show just how it is that compositional works
are themselves individuals, and how the association of
performances, scores, and recordings with a compositional
work is fundamentally understandable in terms of language
and individuality, rather than some essential relationship
based on universality or in terms of abstract entities.
Before proceeding with the proposed nominalistic
theory of musical compositions, I shall briefly discuss
nominalism as a general ontological perspective.

CHAPTER II
NOMINALISM AND ONTOLOGY
Introduction
In this chapter I shall explain in general terms what
nominalism is and how this conception will provide the
background for my theory of musical compositions as concrete
particulars.

I shall not attempt to defend nominalism as a

comprehensive ontology, nor shall I provide a systematic
survey of the historical development of nominalistic
positions.

Instead, my purpose will be to characterize a

nominalistic perspective that will be applied later to a
specific group of entities, namely musical compositions and
performances.
Naturally this effort will involve some defense of
nominalism as a point of view, as an approach to
philosophical problems, but the adequacy of nominalism as a
complete and all-encompassing ontological theory cannot be
addressed within the scope of this paper.

The reason for

this is that the present essay has as its primary obiective
an examination of the phenomena of musical compositions and
performances in ontological terms.

An analysis of

nominalism provides some of the background for this
examination, but is not itself the central subiect of this
38
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dissertation.

Therefore, I shall leave the fuller defense

of nominalism to others or for another time.
I do believe though that an important part of the
larger philosophical project concerned with spelling out a
complete and adequate nominalism is the development of
plausible nominalistic characterizations of certain
problematic entities.

In light of this, the chief objective

of this dissertation is an explication of how a nominalist
might understand the ontological makeup of a certain part of
the world; i.e., musical compositions.

This is thus one

proposal for a conception of musical artworks as
individuals.

Seeing each and every part of the world as

individual is a nominalist's fundamental ontological
commitment, and so, I shall attempt to present musical
compositions in a way that is consistent with this
commitment.
I am particularly interested in exploring at this time
some of the ontological problems associated with music and
to determine what a nominalistic theory of compositions
might be like.

As stated in the Introduction. I do not aim

at converting non-nominalists to such a perspective; but I
do hope to contribute a reasonable theory to the ranAe of
possible ontologies of music and to provide one that would
be satisfying to the nominalistically-minded.
Nominalism is not a single, unified doctrine.

Rather

it represents a range of positions that cluster around some
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basic ontological commitments or preferences.

Some versions

of nominalism are highly complex, formal, and technical in
their formulation and application.

But generally speaking,

put one way, nominalism is an ontological perspective
asserting that anything that can be said to exist is an
individual.

Put another way, a nominalist may prefer to

emphasize a negative version of this thesis by rejecting the
notion of any actually existing universals, abstract
entities, classes, kinds, or any other non-individual.
Alternatively, nominalism might be expressed as the view
that all uses of universal, general, or abstract terms are
devoid of reference.

That is, although such words may serve

a function in a language, they do not name or identify or
refer to any existing thing.

My own nominalistic approach

regards all of these alternative conceptions acceptable and
sufficiently compatible with one another as far as the
present thesis is concerned.
In order to flesh out these broader characterizations
in greater detail, I shall develop my presentation of
nominalism by examining the following general descriptions
of nominalistic systems and approaches.

A nominalist might

explicitly ascribe to all of these claims or to some varying
combination of them.
construed as,

In any event. nominalism might be

(1) a form of skepticism about what there is.

often emerging from empirical tendencies; (2) a
philosophical temperament expressing a preference for· some
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notion of ontological individuality; (3) a negative theory
denying the existence of universals and/or abstract
entities; (4) a positive theory affirming that all existents
are individuals; and/or (5) a limiting theory describing the
far extent to which particularity can be emphasized in an
ontological system.

Uy own view is that taken together

these comprise the key features of an overall nominalistic
outlook.

In the first part of this chapter I shall explain

what I mean by each of these variations on nominalistic
themes.

Later I shall describe how ontological problems

arise in aesthetic contexts and how nominalism is relevant
to them.
Nominalism as Skepticism
First, nominalism can be understood as a form of
skepticism; that is, it may consist of a skeptical attitude
towards existence claims regarding any purported
non-individual entity.

In general, skepticism is the view

that either all knowledge claims or at least those of
specified sorts are impossible, unreliable, or dubious.
Skeptics differ from one another in terms of the scope and
objects of their skeptical attitudes. but all tend to
sharply limit what counts as genuine knowledge.
Nominalism is skeptical about ontological claims
regarding universals, abstract entities, kinds. classes. or
any other non-individual.

Can there be knowledge of
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existing universals?
exist?

Can any abstract entity be known to

Is there sufficient evidence that the terms

•universal" or "abstract entity" refer to any knowable
thing?

A nominalist would tend to answer no to these

questions.

Minimally, the nominalist as skeptic is an

agnostic with respect to the conclusiveness of arguments for
the existence of universals.

Although most versions of

nominalism, as will be seen later, go beyond this skepticism
to conclude that such entities simply do not exist, cannot
be believed to exist, or cannot be meaningfully referred to
as existing, a cautious nominalist might wish simply to
suspend judgement and remain skeptical about certain types
of existence claims.

The point is that, at the very least,

nominalism consists in a doubtful attitude toward the
existence of universals.
Empiricism and nominalism seem to be somewhat
comfortable concomitants in this regard.

Empiricism can

provide either an epistemological foundation for or a
motivation towards a nominalistic perspective: that is. a
nominalist may adopt empiricist arguments to defend his
ontology or an empiricist may develop a nominalist ontology
as an outgrowth of her empiricist commitments.

Since most

versions of empiricism are generally critical of claims
involving non-experiential evidence or conclusions. and
since universals and abstract entities are usually taken to
be non-experiential and non-corporeal sorts of

things~

43
••Piricism may share with nominalism an uneasiness about
such entities.
Quite clearly, empiricism is a wide ranging
epistemological perspective, with many versions and
variations.

Some forms may straightforwardly imply a

nominalistic outlook; others, in a decidedly opposite
fashion, may actually be used to provide a basis for
accepting universals and abstract entities as genuine
existents.

But, to the extent that a nominalism might be in

search of an epistemology, it may adopt some sort of
empiricist point of view.

More importantly for the present

discussion, empirical commitments may serve as the
motivation for a nominalistic skepticism.
Universals and abstract entities are usually
understood, by those who affirm their reality, as
essentially non-sensory and non-corporeal.

Thus, an

epistemology that discourages accepting claims that are not
justifiable in terms of sensation and experience would tend
to be skeptical about claims affirming the existence of
universals and abstract entities.

This is not to say that

some empiricist might not infer the existence of such
entities from an experiential basis: rather, an emoiricism
may provide the justification for a skeotical attitude
towards universals and abstract entities, or it may be the
reason why someone is a nominalist in the first place.
nominalist can appeal to an empiricism that is skeptical

A
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about ontological assertions regarding such purported
entities.

Thus, for nominalists, existential claims

concerning real universals or common natures are not
considered to be legitimate candidates for knowledge claims,
or are at the very least open to serious reservations.
In this way, nominalism can be recognized as
reflecting the ontological implications of the sort of
empiricism which will not accept inferential knowledge of
universals and abstract entities.

It is a view as to what

entities can be affirmed by the epistemological theory and
what alleged entities cannot.

The limited claim that

whatever cannot be positively confirmed on acceptable
empirical grounds is unreliably believed is a large portion
of the skeptical dimension of a nominalist position.
I am not arguing that empiricism implies nominalism,
although some forms might; nor that all empiricists have
advocated nominalism, clearly this has not been the case.
Instead I am suggesting that nominalism can be easily
accommodated with an empiricist epistemology that endorses a
skeptical attitude towards the sorts of entities about which
nominalists are uneasy.

Further, it is probably the case

that many nominalists have maintained some version of
empiricist epistemology.

For example, William of Ockham,

recognized as one of the earliest nominalists, believed that
"the evidential base of all knowledge is direct experience
of individual things and particular events.•1

He argued
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that we have no experience of any non-individual, and so we
have no evidential basis for belief in anything other than
individuals.

Although Ockham's nominalism is more fully

argued from a logical analysis of terms, his empiricism does
initiate and support a certain degree of epistemological
skepticism regarding the existence of universals; Ockham's
epistemology and ontology seem consistent in this regard.
To the extent that empiricism generates
uncertainties or epistemological problems for accepting
abstract entities as genuine existents, it gives rise to the
sort of skepticism that may underlie or motivate the
development of a nominalistic perspective.

Nominalism

usually does not tend to remain merely a skeptical position.
As we will see later, nominalism is often a positive,
substantive theory that attempts to provide an adequate
account of existence in terms of individuals alone.
Skepticism and an accompanying negative theory critical of
abstract entities provides most of the impetus for the
development of such a positive ontology.

Before I address

the positive and negative characterizations of nominalistic
theories, I shall briefly discuss another perspective that
frequently accompanies or encourages a nominalistic outlook
or commitment.
Nominalism as a Philosphical Temperament
As some writers have pointed out, nominalism may be,
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rt what amounts to a "philosophical temperament". By
in P a '
philosophical temperament I mean something much like what
William James described in his essay "The Present Dilemma in
Philosophy".2

There he argues that lying behind much

philosophical reasoning is "no conventionally recognized
reason"3; rather there is a "bias" that "loads the evidence
for [the philosopher] one way or the other".4

Much of a

philosopher's efforts, under this view, aim at developing
reasons and theories that support or conform to a given
temperament.

A philosophical temperament is a bias, a

disposition, an intuition, a preference.

It is a

fundamental sense of what makes for an adequate
philosophical theory, and functions, to some extent, as the
starting point for much philosophizing.

As such, the

philosopher "trusts his temperament" and tends to regard
those with opposite temperaments to be misguided or "out of
key with the world's character."5
James appears a bit ambivalent about these
temperaments. On the one hand, they clearly do not
rationally justify a given philosophical approach or system;
on the other hand, he seems to think they are inevitable and
that we ought to acknowledge them and accept whatever
valuable insights they might provide.

He does not try to

explain the source of these preferences, only their presence
and apparent influence.
Although James does not discuss nominalism
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specifically, note what W. V. Quine and Nelson Goodman,
prominent twentieth-century nominalists, have to say about
their own nominalistic tendencies.
admit ... abstract objects ... ?

"Why do we refuse to

Fundamentally this refusal is

based on a philosophical intuition that cannot be
justified by appeal to anything more ultimate."6

In a

similar vein Goodman claims "a philosopher's conscience
gives him little choice in the matter."7

Elsewhere Quine

observes that some philosophers simply nhave a taste for
desert landscapesu,s alluding to the nominalist's emphasis
on and preference for ontological economy.
Whether or not such philosophical temperaments can or
should be avoided in sound philosophizing are interesting
and debatable questions, but not of concern here.

I wish

simply to recognize the role they may play in motivating
certain philosophical efforts, and to describe how a
philosopher's desire to defend a nominalisitic view of the
world and its constituents may originate in a philosophical
temperament.
the world.

Nominalism is, to some extent, a way of seeing
Reasons can and should be provided for such a

perspective; but what may often motivate the pursuit of such
reasons is an intuition, a general sense, that the world is
a "world of individuals".9
Nominalisms both affirm and deny something.

They

affirm that anything that can be said to exist is an
individual.

What is meant by this claim will be discussed

48

later.

At this point I shall attend to what nominalistic

views deny.
Nominalism as a Rejection of
Abstract Entities
Historically, nominalisms originated as theories
rejecting the existence of universals, or the need for them
in an adequate theory of knowledge or description of
reality.

In the medieval controversies over such matters,

the pole opposite the realists', those who affirmed the
notion of real universals, was the position represented by
nominalists such as Ockham.

The concept of a universal to

which these nominalists reacted extends back at least to
Plato and Aristotle.
For Plato universals represented true reality.
Universals, (also referred to as Forms or Ideas), were
essentially non-corporeal, non-particular, and non-sensible.
They existed independent of and prior to human thought and
to the particular things that were said to "participate" in
them. Thus, universals provided the necessary basis for
knowledge, language, and reality.
Aristotle also believed that universals were real.
i.e., actually existing, however, he did not think they
existed independently of the particulars they informed.
Whereas, for Plato ideas existed outside of particular
things, for Aristotle universals existed within individual
substances.

Aristotle defined a universal as "that whose
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nature is such that it may belong to many".10

A universal

was something that was common to many individuals, it was
something that could be predicated of various subjects. An
individual, on the other hand, was something that could not
be so predicated.
A host of problems concerning these conceptions of
universals were addressed during the medieval period.

At

this time, three main positions with respect to universals
developed, of which nominalism was one.

In order to clarify

the distinctions between these positions, let us consider
the following two questions that were of concern to the
medievals.

The first question was, "to what extent are

universals mind-dependent entities"?

The second question

radically challenged the whole tradition of Plato and
Aristotle:

"are universals real entities at all"?

The

three views that emerged from differing responses to these
questions are well known as realism, conceptualism, and
nominalism.
These perspectives on the problem of universals are
not thoroughly discrete doctrines.

Variations within each

and difficulties in characterizing boundary regions between
the views make distinguishing them clearly one from the
other somewhat controversial.

It is not my purpose to

settle any historical disputes over these matters; but it is
helpful nonetheless to demarcate generally the theoretical
territory concerning universals apparent at this time. since
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similar distinctions have persisted down to the present.

I

shall distinguish the three ontlogical positions in terms of
the two questions mentioned above.
Realism is the name for any view in this context that
regards universals as entities existing independently of the
mind.

The common or general features of reality are

discovered not constructed.

Whether universals exist only

within particulars or ultimately lie outside them is a
question that distinguishes types of realism, not realism as
such.

According to realists then, general words name

actually existing non-individual entities understood as
universals, kinds,

sp~cies,

etc.

Thus, realism answers the

second question, "are universals real?", by affirming the
existence of real universals; and answers the first
question,

"to what extent are universals mind-dependent?•,

by claiming that they exist independent of any minds.
Conceptualism alternatively answers the question
concerning the extent of mind-dependency on the part of
universals by claiming that generality is essentially a
product of mental abstraction.
wholly mind-dependent.

That is, universals are

They are thus essentially mental

entities, concepts constructed by and existing only in human
thought.

Some sort of objective basis in things is

typically acknowledged, but how this is to be understood
without returning to realism is the chief difficulty for
this position, and is treated variously by different
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conceptualist thinkers.

For conceptualists, although

universals are completely mind-dependent, nevertheless, it
can be properly said of universals that they exist.
Nominalism denies the existence of universals
altogether.

Only individuals exist.

Universals are nothing

other than general words or "syncategorematic" terms.

As

general words, universals do not refer to anything other
than the particulars to which they are applied. Ockham
regarded universal terms as mere signs; " ... every universal
is one singular thing.

Therefore nothing is universal

except by signification, by being a sign of several
things."11

As syncategorematic terms, universals do not

refer at all.

Such terms serve certain logical functions

within language, but do not themselves signify anything.
They are meaningless except insofar as they are associated
with or linked to categorematic terms, i.e., terms that do
refer to or signify something.

Thus, for nominalists,

universals are not existents, rather they are linguistic
devices devised in human thought.
We should note three principal reasons why Ockham, and
other medieval nominalists, reiected real universals.

First

of all, they are not evident to the mind in direct
experience. What is apprehended through experience by the
mind is always individual, and universals, (as conceived by
realists), are not individuals, therefore, experience cannot
give us knowledge of universals.
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Secondly, universals are not needed to explain how
individual things come to have the characteristics they
have, nor are they needed in order to have knowledge of
individuals and their descriptive features.
nominalists,

According to

language and reality can be adequately

accounted for with reference only to individuals,
(individual objects or individuals signs).

Such an ontology

is preferable, according to Ockham, because it is simpler.
Here is an important application of Ockham's famous "Razor"
to his own philosophical efforts.

Universals are

problematic partly because, it is argued, they unnecessarily
multiply the number of entities required to adequately
describe reality.

For the nominalist, there is a certain

number of individual green leaves, for example.

A realist's

universe has the same number of green leaves, but has in
addition a universal 'Leaf' and another universal 'Green';
increasing the size of the universe by two. But that is not
the end of it.

Additional constituents of the realist's

universe include the universal 'Color' and 'Plant Part', and
'Living Thing', and 'Physical Object'. and so on. and so on.
This sort of ever multiplying universe is unbearably complex
and unwieldy to Ockham and other similarly minded
nominalists.
Thirdly, realism apparently leads to various
self-contradictions.
thing or many things.

For example, a universal is either one
If it is one thing than it is an
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individual and cannot be common to many things.

If it is

many things than each thing is an individual and these
cannot be common either.12
Subsequent to the medieval period, nominalism or
nominalistic tendencies appeared regularly, often as a
rejection of universals or abstract entities.

Hobbes argued

that although certain names may be "common names",

(i.e.

they may apply to more than one individual), these do not
name any kind of entity other than the particulars to which
they are applied.

Thus, the only universals are words.

"What Hobbes really meant was that universals only come into
being with classifying, and that classifying is a verbal
technique."13
and unique.

The objects of the world are all individual
General words simply allow us "to speak of many

of them at one and the same time."14
The British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume,
whether they were, strictly speaking, nominalists or
conceptualists, rejected any notion of universals as
independent or outside of the mind.

Their reasons for this

rejection were largely born of their empiricism.

Locke held

"that general and universal, belong not to real existence of
things; but are the inventions and creatures of the
understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only
signs, whether words or ideas."15
Berkeley rejected abstract ideas as well as
universals.

He said, " ..• I deny that I can abstract from
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one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which
it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can
frame a general notion, by abstracting from
particulars ....

"16

He later adds, " ... it seems that a word

becomes general by being made a sign, not of an abstact
idea, but of several particular ideas ....

"17

For Hume, all ideas originate in impressions.
Impressions are particular and immediate sensations.
are copies or images of impressions.

Ideas

Therefore, as all

impressions are particular and definite, so all ideas must
be particular too.

Hume accounts for what are called

abstract general ideas by claiming that they are actually
particular images that "may become general in their
representation".18
Our various impressions of particualar dogs, for
example, recalled as ideas, appear as resembling each other
to some degree or other.

We refer to each of these

resembling ideas by using the same name, "dog" in this case.
When we consider the word "dog" we cannot think of every dog
or every idea we have of a dog; each of these is distinct
and individual.

Rather, it is a habit of the mind to bring

to mind some or any individual idea of a particular dog when
the general word is used.

The general word thus names only

individuals; and generality or universality is only a result
of a certain habit of the human mind and of language.
The rejection of universals has been motivated by or
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defended for various reasons.
OU t

1

As Rolf Eberle has pointed

"According to their temper, nominalists have tended to

rule out unwanted categories of entities on grounds that
positing their existence is contradictory, non-sensical,
devoid of explanatory power, lacking in simplicity,
unverifiable, or just plain suspicious."19

As this has been

the case historically, so it has been in this century.
Positivists rejected universals as meaningless
notions, since they are empirically unverifiable.
Philosophers of the latter half of this century have
continued the tradition.

0. F. Pears has argued that the

claim "universals exist" is not only an unverifiable
statement of fact, but also that realism is dependent on
circular reasoning in affirming the existence of
universals.20

Quine and Goodman, in "Steps Toward a

Constructive Nominalism" rejected all abstract entities.21
Later, Goodman revised his view , (as did Quine, but in a
different direction), to argue that "Nominalism ... consists
specifically in the refusal to recognize classes."22
Contemporary nominalists have also refused to accept,
or have been uneasy about, entities such as concepts,
meanings, propositions, and an infinity of objects.23
alternative ontologies countenence only individuals.
extent that these other alleged entities, (universals,
abstract entities, kinds, classes, meanings, concepts,
etc.), are not construed as individuals, they are not

Their
To the
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acceptable constituents of an adequate description of
reality.
My purpose in presenting this very brief review of
some historically significant nominalists is twofold:
first, to show how nominalism has been a perennial
perpective; and second, to indicate some of the general
reasons why some philosophers have rejected universals and
other purported non-individuals.

In summary, nominalisms

have rejected any notion of real universals or abstract
entities for the following basic reasons:
(1) only individuals can be experienced, therefore the
existence of universals cannot be verified, (this typically
presupposes some version of empiricist epistemology);
(2) universals are not needed in order to adequately
account for knowledge or existence, (it is argued that other
descriptions are possible);
(3) theories of universals needlessly multiply
entities, (such theories are at odds with various criteria
of simplicity or parsimony advocated by some philosophers as
marks of theoretical adequacy).
(4) theories of universals are purported to contain or
lead to contradictions, circularity, or infinite regresses
of undesirable sorts.
Nominalism does not end with its rejection of
universals, abstract entities, or the like.

A principal

program for nominalism is to account for what is in terms of
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individuals alone.

A nominalistic analysis of reality

determines not only that universals or abstract entities are
suspect or non-existent, but that whatever can be said to
exist is always an individual.

It may be said of a

nominalistic theory: to be is to be an individual, (or a
particular--I shall use the terms interchangeably in the
present context).
Nominalism Affirms the Existence of
Individuals Only.
The main challenge for the nominalist is to construct
an adequate ontology following on the conclusions that
universals do not exist and that what does exist is always
an individual. Nominalism must account for a crucial element
of our experience of the world, namely, the apparent
recurrence of qualities.24
The items of experience appear distinct and individual
largely because of their separation in time and space.
addition, they are described as having features,

In

(color,

shape, size, etc.), that further distinguish them one from
the other.

But it is readily apparent, in spite of the

obvious uniqueness that holds between the constituents of
our experience, that we also recognize recurrences of many
of the features we observe.
Our language reflects these observed recurrences.
General words provide us with terms that permit us to speak
of various individuals grouped together according to
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recognized recurrences.

The challenge for the nominalist is

to describe this linguistic practice and the experiences
that give rise to it with reference to individuals only.
The apparently recurrent "green" we speak of with
respect to the various leaves on a tree suggests different
interpretations.

Do we call each leaf "green" because they

each have some thing in common?

Or is this practice a

result of a recogition of some fundamental resemblance
between the experience of green in one leaf with that of
another?

Or is the "recurrence" ultimately reducible to the

general applicability of the word "green?
Each of these questions reflects a different view on
the matter.

The realist regards recurrences and the general

words that name them as referring to something both
objective and universal.

Objective in the sense of being to

some extent extra-mental; that is, the recurrences are part
of the way the world is, they are not mere mental
abstractions or creations of human thought.

They are

universal in the sense of being non-particular and having
the capacity to be common to many things.
recurrences of qualities that may be

0

individual things at the same time."25

Recurrences are

present in distinct
They are, in effect,

repetitions of essentially the same qualities.

The realist

approaches the issue of recurrence from the side of the
objects which reveal recurrences.
considered a phenomenon of objects.

In this way recurrence is
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At the other end of the spectrum is the nominalist who
approaches the issue of recurrence from the side of
language.
things.

Recurrence is a phenomenon of language not of
That is, the instances of a recurrent quality "are

related only by the fact that they are the objects of the
applicability of one and the same general word."26

The

principal task for the nominalist in this context is to
account for the applicability of general words.
One approach might be to leave this general
applicability of certain words unexplained, attributing
general use to nothing more fundamental than convention.
Such an explanation implies that groupings under general
terms are wholly arbitrary or, at most, merely practical.
Calling the leaves on the tree "green" and "leaf" is nothing
more than a convenient and customary way of referring to
more than one thing at a time.

This approach is not very

satisfying since it denies that there is any sense of
recurrence in our experience, and our experience certainly
seems to involve some sort of recurrence.

It also seems

implausible because it fails to account for our ability to
use general words in consistent ways when we encounter new
objects.

Our experience of what appear as recurrent

properties and our use of language in consistent and
predictable ways implies that what is going on is not
entirely arbitrary.
A more promising strategy for accounting for apparent
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recurrence is to show how all uses of general words can be
translated into discourse in such a way that reference to
universals or abstract entities is neither implied nor
needed. Two versions of this approach are worth examining.
Quine and Goodman have argued that all statements
using general words can be translated into equivalent
statements in which these general words occur as predicates.
It is maintained that these predicates are genuinely
meaningful but are not names.

That is, they do not refer,

as such, and thus do not commit us to the existence of any
entities.

As Quine has pointed out "being a name of

something is a much more special feature than being
meaningful."27

Something meaningful and true can be said of

a leaf when we say of it that it is green without also
claiming that "green• names some entity.

In this way, names

that purport to name attributes, universals, recurrences,
etc., can be regarded as predicates and converted into
descriptions.

"Whatever we say with the help of names can

be said in a language which shuns names altogether."28
Quine has argued that the ontological committment of a
theory is measured by the logic of our discourse.

That is,

we must accept as entities in our ontology only those items
the terms of which function as values of a variable in a
quantif icational translation of our language:

"a theory is

committed to those and only those entities to which the
bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring
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in order that the affirmations made in the theory are
true."29
"The leaf is green" is translated as "Something is a
leaf and is green", (3x)(Lx . Gx).

Such a statement commits

the speaker only to those entities that must be substituted
for the variable 'x' in order that the proposition above be
regarded as true.

Such a statement commits the speaker only

to individuals in this case because anything that is a green
leaf is an individual.

No committment is made, no

acknowledgment given to the existence of either "leafness"
or "greenness" insofar as these are taken to refer to
abstract entities.

The terms "green" and nleaf" are

regarded as syncategorematic terms; that is, terms which
serve a logical function in a language, are meaningful only
in a context that includes categorematic terms, (terms that
refer to objects),

but do not name anything.

Now consider the statement "Green is a color".

This

appears to commit the speaker to abstract entities since
this statement makes no reference to any individual but only
to general qualities "green" and "color".

The nominalist

addresses this seeming problem through a use of the
universal quantifier.

"Green is a color 0 is translated as

"Anything that is green is colored", or (x)(GX-31> Cx).

Again

such a statement commits the speaker only to individuals
since every instance of 'x' can be substituted with a
reference to an individual object.

In other words, saying
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•Green is a color" really amounts to saying that anything
that can be called green can also be called colored.
are only green things and colored things.

There

"Green" and

•color" do not refer to or name anything.
Not all statements are so easily dealt with by this
strategy.

For example, mathematics consists of various

statements that are not nearly so amenable to the sort of
translations that resist entailing committment to
universals.

A statement such as "There is a prime number

greater than one million", (3x)(Px • x<1,000,000), says that
"there is something which is prime and exceeds a
million; and any such entity is a number, hence a
universal."30
The project of characterizing mathematical statements
in purely nominalistic language is quite complicated and is
an ongoing one.

It is beyond the purposes of this paper to

analyze these developments, but it worth acknowledging some
of the ways in which nominalism has been only partially
successful in providing the means for translating different
areas of discourse.

But it should be quite obvious that

having not solved every problem is not the demise of a
theory. Three things can happen as a result of the
nominalist's efforts:

(1) success in nominalizing a realm

of discourse; (2) a setting aside of the problem area until
more promising methods or strategies are discovered or
developed; or 3) renouncing certain ways of speaking as

63
ontologically unacceptable.
For example, Quine apparently recognized the
significance of option (3) mentioned above when he remarked
that,

"bound variables for classes or relations or numbers,

if they occur in existential quantifiers or in universal
quantifiers within subordinate clauses, must be renounced by
the nominalist in all contexts in which he cannot explain
them away by paraphrase."31
Another important contribution to nominalistic theory
is Goodman's rejection of class-membership in favor of a
part/whole relationship as a description of general terms.
In an attempt to avoid appealing to universals as a way of
accounting for recurrences, some have proposed instead
making use of classes.

"Red" is thus understood as a name

referring to dthe class of red things".

To be called red is

to be recognized as a member of this class.

But for some

nominalists, classes are no less problematic than are
universals.

Interestingly enough, Goodman has actually

defined nominalism as that view which "consists specifically
in the refusal to recognize classes."32
formulations

Whereas in earlier

Goodman, along with Quine, defined nominalism

in terms of a rejection of abstract entities, later he
preferred •to characterize nominalism as renouncing all
nonindividuals"33; and indicating further that classes are
not genuine individuals.

Goodman develops his distinctive

position on this point by claiming that "while the
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nominalist may construe anything as an individual, he
refuses to construe anything as a class".34

And further

that, "whatever can be construed as a class can indeed be
construed as an individual, and yet a class cannot be
construed as an individual."35

To satisfy these

conclusions, Goodman has argued that what can be described
in terms of classes can be better described in terms of
discontinuous wholes.

For Goodman, an individual "need not

have personal integration".36
For example, instead of speaking of "the class of red
things", Goodman would have us recognize each red thing as
merely a part of the discontinous and scattered whole
individual "red".

As most any nominalist would have it,

"red" does not name any existing universal nor any abstract
entity such as a class.

But for Goodman "red" need not be

disregarded as a name, but can be understood rather as the
name of an individual comprised of many heterogenous and
widely separated parts.

This indicates something of the

meaning of his assertion that whatever can be construed as a
class can be construed as an individual.

The so-called

"class of red things" is fundamentally made up of individual
red things by means of the relation of membership.

The

notion of class depends upon this proposed relation between
class members.

Goodman replaces the relation of membership

with a part/whole relation and thus eliminates any reference
to classes.
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Goodman acknowledges that such a conception of
individuals may stretch the imagination, but he is not
willing to concede that it requires any more imagination
than that required to accept the "platonist's" thesis
regarding classes and universals.
Goodman's rejection of classes follows from what he
takes to be a fundamental nominalistic assertion:

no

distinction of entities without distinction of content.
That is, no "two different entities can be made up of the
same entities".37

The countenancing of classes allows for

the generation and multiplication of entities; in this case,
classes of classes.
The platonist, (Goodman's name for anyone who accepts
classes or any other nonindividual as an entity in his/her
system), and the nominalist may actually agree as to the
atoms, (basic individuals), that go to make up their
respective systems.

The nominalist recognizes as entities

all individual atoms and any sums of atoms forming
additional wholes, (construed as individuals).

As long as

each sum-whole is composed of different combinations of the
atoms, each is accepted as a legitimate entity in the
nominalist's ontology.

These are all and the only entities

the nominalist's system can "generateu.
The platonist, on the other hand, recognizes these
same individuals, except the platonist construes the sums as
classes.

So far so good for both nominalist and platonist;
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that is, the sizes of their respective universes are
essentially the same, and neither party has any significant
objection to the other's conception of the universe.

But

the nominalist objects to what the platonist's system is now
capable of generating; namely, additional entities comprised
of the same basic atoms.

The platonist countenances the

generation, by means of the membership relation, of
additional classes out of the initial classes formed of the
system's atoms:

classes of classes.

And what is more,

these classes of classes may generate classes of classes of
classes, and, at least theoretically, so on ad
infinitum.
Such a populous universe not only offends the
nominalist's minimalistic temperament, but, more
importantly, it results in a virtual infinity of
non-individuals which are, in terms of content, essentially
indistinguishable from one another.

As we have seen, from a

nominalist's point of view such as Goodman's, there can be
no distinction of entities made up of the same atoms; this
is redundant and unparsimonious.

To permit classes of

classes is to permit entities made up of the same atoms.
Therefore, the nominalist should not accept classes as
constituents of her ontological system.
I should like to describe one final approach to
translating language which refers to recurrences.

Such an

approach attempts to rephrase all statements containing
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general words in terms of "names of particular objects,
forms of the verb 'to resemble', and the phrase 'as closely
as'".38

In other words, this position recognizes

resemblence or similarity as fundamental to our experience
of objects.

But in doing so, the nominalist making use of

such an approach does not acknowledge that "resemblences•
exist, nor does resembling refer to, or name, any thing.
•To resemble" may be, thus, regarded as syncategorematic.
Under this view, a statement such as "'a' is blue"
might be translated as "'a' resembles 'b',
least as closely as 'b',
where 'b',

'c', and 'd' at

'c', and 'd' resemble each other,"

'c', and 'd' are the exemplars of the meaning of

the word "blue".39

Thus, general words are understood as

convenient ways of referring to conventional or practical
groupings of objects.

But note that resemblance under this

approach is a matter of comparison to a group of standard
objects or particular exemplars, not in terms of
"resemblance in some respect".

To speak of "some respect"

has been taken to imply or suggest a realistic
interpretation of resemblances, and so is preferably avoided
in nominalistic accounts.

An opponent of the nominalist's

appeal to resemblances might charge that resemblance is a
derivative relation requiring some reference to a universal.
The argument might go something like this:
whenever we say that A, B, and C resemble each other in a
certain respect, we shall be asked "In what respect?"
And how can we answer, except by saying "in respect of
being instances of the universal 9" or "in respect of
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being characterized by the characteristic ea? 40
The nominalist must avoid either of these alternative
expressions.

This is probably one of the greatest

difficulties for nominalism:

how to account for what appear

as observed resemblances without falling into the realistic
or platonistic language of drespects".
One attempt at solving this difficulty is to interpret
resemblance, as has already been mentioned, in terms of a
comparison to standard objects or exemplars,

(which are

themselves individuals), rather than in terms of some
universal.

It is important to recognize that, for the

nominalist, if resemblance is to be admitted into the system
at all, it must be construed either as a syncategorematic
term or as an individual, not some abstract relation, which
requires some resemblance-universal in order to explain the
phenomenon.41

For instance, the particular green of one

leaf is said to resemble the particular green of another at
a particular time, under particular circumstances, (light,
perspective, distance, etc.), by a particular observer, and
so on.

The experience of resemblance between the two leaves

is an individual experience that has nothing "in common•
with any other individual experience described in terms of
resemblance.
But a greater problem arises from within the context
of this noticed resemblance.

As noted above, it seems that

we recognize how things resemble one another only in terms
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of some "respect":

green leaf A resembles green leaf B in

respect to their color.

The green color of leaf A is not

claimed to resemble the oval shape of leaf B.

How can a

nominalist account for this aspect of such observed
resemblences?
One response is that our language reflects certain
habits of classification.

That is, the individual objects

and experiences that make up the world we experience appear
to us with certain discernable individual features, and we
observe what appear to us as more or less similar
appearances of these individual features.

But language

makes an important contribution to these observed
similarities.

Our language adopts predicates that serve to

identify useful groupings of what appear to us as similar
features.

Similarity or resemblence are themselves features

of our experience of things, but our language conditions us,
to some extent, to look for certain similarities. Thus,
"respects• are actually items of experience for which we
have predicate terms.

The two green leaves do look more or

less alike, but we need not say that this is due to some
common respect.

Rather, green leaf A and green leaf B are

experienced in ways describable as "similar• to some extent,
and our language gives us predicate terms 'green' and 'leaf'
that have proven useful in grouping and classifying such
items of experience.
What allows us to link specific predicate terms with
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specific individuals is the similarity we attribute to the
new individuals and other individuals that we take to be
exemplars of the relevant predicate terms.

We have now

returned to the earlier notion of translating general words
as predictates indicating comparisons to groups of standard
objects or individual exemplars.
Summarizing, some nominalists propose to translate or
interpret the language of recurrences not in terms of
universals or general characteristics, but instead in terms
of the resemblences and similarities.
significantly relative concept.

But similarity is a

Our experience of

similarity is greatly affected by the predicate terms we
have at our disposal, our interests and purposes for
acknowledging or attributing similarities, our individual
sensory apparatuses, etc.

Such a nominalistic approach

consists in arguing that similarity, (resemblence,
recurrence, or whatever), has less to do with the way things
are than with how we choose to describe our experiences with
language.42
Nominalism as a Limiting Theory
One final conception of nominalism I should like to
consider briefly is the capacity for a nominalistic approach
to serve the theoretical function of delimiting the range of
possible ontologies.

By this I mean that nominalism is

quite clearly an extreme position.

It represents the far
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extent to which an ontological theory might go in
restricting existence to individuality.
In any attempt to develop a theory accounting for some
phenomona, one useful way to proceed is to determine the
range of plausible theories that might do the job.

From

there, weaker theories may be eliminated and further
investigation may proceed on to more promising ones.

In

ontological matters, one of the principal questions of
concern is, to what extent is what exists individual or not?
Nominalism is the theory that takes the extreme position
that anything that can truly be said to exist must be an
individual.

Each thing that exists is a particular, there

are no non-individuals, universals, abstract entities,
kinds, etc., except as linguistic devices.

Some of the

reasons why some theorists have held out in favor of such an
ontological theoretical perspective have been examined in
what has preceded.

My purpose at present is to point out

the general theoretical value of and interest in developing
a coherent limiting theory, a theoretical perspective lying
on the far reaches of viable possibility and plausibility.
Even if one chooses in the end to reject the perspective, I
believe that the exercise is worthwhile nonetheless, if only
to contribute to a process of elimination.
Nominalism helps to •1ay out the territory• and
establish a sense of perspective with respect to certain
ontological problems.

Any investigation into the
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ontological make-up of some part or the whole of the world
must take account of the various key alternatives.

As was

discussed in the Introduction, diverse strategies and
approaches have been applied to the ontological status of
artworks.

A complete appraisal of the matter must include

an assessment of a nominalistic perspective, as well as
others.

(Consistent with this belief, I shall examine three

other theories that I take to be "limiting theories" in
Chapter IV.)
For those already inclined towards nominalistic
thinking, development of a nominalism with respect to the
subject at hand will be the first order of business.

But

for those less attracted to nominalism, or even hostile
towards it, I would suggest that consideration of this
perspective might be compared to looking at the back side of
a statue.

Although the "best" view may actually be a

frontal one, such a conclusion is better justified and more
confidently maintained only after examining such seemingly
strange perspectives as the back or even underside of the
statue.

In analogous fashion, nominalism may appear as an

"undersideM ontological perspective to some, but I think it
profitable to take a look anyway.
Summary
My intention in providing this chapter is to give some
further sense of context to the subsequent presentati9n of
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aesthetic issues.

The first chapter stated the ontological

problems associated with the arts generally and music
specifically.

I have now drawn the focus upon a decidedly

nominalistic outlook.

What I take nominalism as such to be

and to entail has been the purpose of the preceding
sections.

In what follows a nominalistic theoretical

approach will be applied to an ontological problem area in
music.

So far I have tried to explain how nominalism arises

partly from a skeptical response to claims regarding the
existence of universals and abstract entitiies, and partly
from what I have called a philosophical temperament, which
consists of a general sense or philosophical intuition that
whatever exists is an individual.
From a description of these initial tendencies or
preferences I moved on to a brief survey of some basic
theoretical reasons against belief in universals, and then
to a characterization of some rudimentary means of
construing existence and experience in terms of individuals
alone.

Finally, I described what I take to be part of the

value of nominalistic theorizing:

to search out and explore

the limits of plausibility in constructing a particularist
ontology in an area of interest that is somewhat unsettled.
This chapter has not been an attempt to defend
nominalism per se, rather it sets the stage for what I will
regard as a genuine defense of a nominalistic proposal.
hope now to provide in what follows a reasonable and

I
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defensible nominalistic ontology of musical compositions.

CHAPTER III
MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AS CONCRETE PARTICULARS
Introduction
In this chapter I shall develop in specific terms my
proposal for a nominalistic ontology of musical
compositions.

As described earlier, in Chapter I, this will

require a careful consideration and application of
nominalistic presuppositions and standards to performances,
scores, and recordings as well.

So, although the focus is

upon compositions, much will be said about the various other
products of musical activity, and thus, about music as a
whole.
A commitment to nominalism is, in large part, a
commitment to descriptions of what there is in terms of
individuals alone.

Therefore, the sense in which the

proposed theory is nominalistic is that it maintains the
view that musical compositions, (and any other musical
artwork, for that matter), are individuals and not any sort
of purported non-individual such as a universal or other
abstract entity.

In addition to the claim that compositions

are individuals, I am also claiming that compositions are
concrete, that is, they are temporally and spatially unique
individuals, and as such I thus maintain that they are
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physical objects.

Therefore, the approach developed here

not only specifies an ontology of musical works which is
particularistic, but one that is also physicalistic. In
saying this, I am not claiming that a nominalistic ontology
must be physicalistic, instead I am claiming that this
nominalistic theory of musical works is to be understood in
terms of particular physical objects.
The principal reason for holding this view is that I
take it that all artworks are physical objects.

A physical

object is something that is spatial and temporal, it can be
identified with some position in space and it can be
described as beginning to exist at one time, existing for
some duration of time, and ceasing to exist at some other
time.

Under this view, events will be treated as physical

in the sense that they occur in some locatable place and at
some identifiable time.
Physical objects can also be described as phenomenal
objects; that is, such objects can be described in terms of
the way in which perceivers perceive them.

For example, a

chair can be described as a physical object in spatial and
temporal terms such as "the chair is three feet tall and was
sitting in my room yesterday."

The chair can also be

described a phenomenal object in this manner, "the chair
appears brown and feels comfortable."
The bearing this has on art objects is that they too
can be described physically and phenomenally.

"The
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performance of Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony' last night
filled the concert hall with intense sounds."

"Last night"

gives the event its temporal location, "concert hallN gives
it its spatial location, and "intense sounds" can be
interpreted as describing the event as consisting physically
of air particles moving at a certain frequency.

The

performance can also be described phenomenally in such terms
as "The 'Ninth Symphony' was often loud, yet at times
sounded quite soft."

This latter statement describes how

the event was perceived by some listener.
It is my position, then, that all artworks are
publically accessible artifacts, that is, they are unique
physical objects that are made by some person or persons,
usually referred to as artists, and that these artifacts are
perceivable, i.e., phenomenally describable entities capable
of having spectators.

Quite simply, I am arguing that

without a perceivable artifact, artworks cannot be said to
exist.

Without going too far into the matter here, let me

call on the plausible intuition that I cannot be said to
have made an artwork if I "have nothing to show for it•;
what could my artwork be if it is not presentable for the
inspection by others.

I made this point earlier in Chapter

I, and I shall have more to say about it later.

I shall not

argue for the larger thesis regarding the physical status of
all artworks, but I shall argue the case for physical
musical artworks in what follows.
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It could be said then, that the theory under
construction, which regards musical artworks as concrete
particulars, is actually formulated on the basis of two
ontological commitments:

a nominalism that countenances

only individual entities and a physicalism with respect to
artworks that regards all genuine artworks, in this case,
musical artworks, as physical entities.
The plan for this chapter is as follows.

First, the

basic terminology which makes use of the words work,
artwork, composition, and performance must be defined and
clarified, along with other related terms such as score,
manuscript, interpretation, improvisation, and recording.
The next main objective of the chapter will be to
explain the notion of "musical elements". Musical elements
are, most simply, the materials out of which musical
artworks are made.

In other words, they are the things

which are combined or grouped together to make compositions,
performances, scores, etc.

More specifically, with respect

to compositions, musical elements are the simpler particular
items that composers select and arrange and combine together
in order to compose their musical works, which are thus
understood as compound particular wholes.

Some musical

elements will turn out to be sounds while others are not.
Following this, I shall begin to develop a
characterization of the ontological status of musical
compositions by first describing the process of composing a
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musical work.

As I shall explain it, composing a work

consists of some person (or persons) intentionally selecting
and arranging musical elements for the purpose of making
what that person (or persons) believes to be an original
musical composition.

It will be pointed out that not all

composing is composing a work, just as, for example, not all
writing is writing a book. "Composing• is, generally
speaking, an activity of selecting and arranging musical
elements in what is believed to be an original way.
"Composing a work" includes the intention to create an
original musical work.

The details of this process will

comprise a crucial portion of the specific nominalistic
theory under consideration.

This description of how a

composition is made will of course be coordinated with a
description of the product of this activity:

the

composition. The composition, under this view, will thus be
the physical (and phenomenal) artifact resulting from some
person's intentional effort to make what is believed by that
person to be a (somewhat) original combination of musical
elements into a musical work.

Since each of these musical

elements is itself an individual entity, the composition is
itself a

com~lex

of simpler parts.

whole comprised of some specifiable number
This whole is itself a temporally and

spatially unique (physical and phenomenal) individual.
Once the process of composition-making is described,
the relationship between the product of this process,· i.e. ,
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the composition, and other musical objects, (performances,
scores, etc.), will be delineated in some detail.

This

relationship will be explained in terms of what I will call
•copying" and "derivingu.

These notions will be understood

primarily in terms of an intention on the part of some
person or persons to make a musical object explicitly
associated with some already existing composition.

The

"connectiona between composition and performance, for
example, thus will be defined in terms of temporal
precedence on the part of the former entity and of beliefs
about the extent of originality with respect to each, and
not in terms of any essential similarity or common
qualities. It is believed that such a characterization of
these connections or relationships will avoid such
anti-nominalistic language of universals such as
"instantiation of", hparticipation in", or the language of
classes such as amember of".
Further development of some of these features of the
theory will be presented by way of comparisons with some
other, variably different alternative theories of
compositions in Chapter IV.

By providing such comparisons

it is hoped that the present theory will be better
understood as situated within a range of proposed approaches
to musical ontology.
Some Terminology and Distinctions
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For the sake of clarity and consistency, I shall
describe my use of certain key terms.

In doing so, my chief

concern is to explain them in a manner consistent with the
overall nominalistic theory of music I intend to construct,
and yet in a manner not particularly foreign to conventional
usage.

Thus, not only will I define some terminology, but

in so doing I hope to present some of the basic conceptual
framework required for the central thesis.
For the purposes of this dissertation, I intend to use
the words

11

artwork"

11

musical artwork•

11

compositional work

11

"composition" and "musical composition" as interchangeable
or synonymous terms.

These will refer to the products,

(artifactual objects), of a composer's act of composing a
work.

These terms are to be applied to those musical

entities regarded as having the requisite degree of
originality to qualify as genuine compositions.

What is

meant by "requisite degree of originality" will be discussed
in the relevant sections of this chapter.

Under this view,

originality will be regarded as a function of belief on the
part of the composer and not a matter of inherent novelty
with respect to the composition.
"Work", "work of art", and "musical work", on the
other hand, will be used as the more general terms for most
any kind of musical object.1

Musical works thus include

compositions, as well as any other non-compositional musical
objects that should be accounted for in a theory of music.
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In other words, some or all of performances, recordings,
scores, improvisations, etc., may be and have been regarded
as musical works of art.

In music, compositions are but one

sort of musical work--not all musical works are understood
to be compositions.

For example, it is not uncommon to

consider musical performances to be musical works of art of
a sort.

Put another way, the claim could be expanded by

saying compositions are not the only musical objects that
are art objects.

Thus, it follows, given the present

terminology, that while all musical compositions are musical
works, not all musical works are musical compositions.
Perhaps the most important distinction within the
practice of music is the one between composition and
performance.

As I shall describe them, they are not

mutually exclusive terms.

Although most of the time what is

a composition is not a performance and what is a performance
is not a composition, we shall find that sometimes a single
musical work may be referred to properly as both a
composition and a performance.
"Performance•

will be the name used to denote certain

individual musical works which are comprised largely, if not
entirely of sounds.

More specifically, performances are

events consisting of actual musical sounds occurring in a
particular sequence during some specifiable period of time.
As such, a performance will often be referred to here as a
sound-sequence-event.

But not all occasions of musical
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sounds are performances.

Performances are those musical

sound-sequence-events that are either compositions
themselves or derived, (or copied) from a composition.
perform~nce

A

is thus always either identified with a

composition, (i.e., it is a composition) or it is
associated with a composition, (i.e., derived or copied
from an already existing composition).
turn out to be of the latter sort.

Most performances

The former consist

largely of improvisations, (which I shall argue are best
understood as compositions); although I would also hold that
there are some compositions which are performances but are
not improvisations.
This point can be made as follows:

since

compositional works are defined in terms of intended
originality, and since improvisations are produced by
musical performers who believe they are selecting and
arranging musical sounds in a somewhat original way, it
seems sensible to consider improvisors to be composers, and
what they make to be compositions; (I shall return to this
point below).

Thus, improvisation is typically described as

music that is created (composed) at the same time as it is
performed; a kind of spontaneous or extemporaneous
composition.

But some composing gets done in a more

piecemeal, deliberative fashion.

A composer may compose a

musical work by playing a musical instrument and by
combining and recombining actual musical sounds made with

84

the instrument.

Unlike improvising this composing activity

need not occur all at one time, nor need it always result in
a completed work at that time.

It may involve working out

parts of the work, remembering what was played, and
eventually fitting the various parts together into a
completed whole.

I will suggest that it is the first

playing of this whole sound-sequence that constitutes the
composition.2

Such a sound-sequence is a performance and a

composition, but it is not an improvisation.

(Further

details concerning this sort of composing will be
forthcoming.)
Examples of musical sound-sequence-events which are
not performances would be recordings of performances,
(recordings of performances are not generally regarded to be
themselves performances)3; and mere practicings4, (e.g., a
musician playing scales or warm-up exercises).

The former

are generally ruled out for not consisting of sounds made
directly by the performer or performers, and the latter are
ruled out for not being associated with a composition.
Performances are defined then in terms of the
following necessary conditions:
A performance
(1) consists of a musical sound-sequence-event;
(2) is made by some person or persons with the
intention of producing a performance;
(3) is associated with a composition, i.e., a
performance is either a composition or it. is
derived from a composition.

85

The first condition states that all performances
consist of actually occurring musical sounds.

The second

condition refers to the artifactual status of any musical
work of art.

And the third condition distinguishes

performances from other musical sound-sequence-events, i.e.,
those not associated with any compositional work.
"Score" will refer to a musical work which consists of
musical inscriptions or notational symbols.

"Manuscript"

refers to a score which is a composition; it is the result
of some composer's original selection and arrangement of
musical symbols; it is the composer's autograph score.

But

most scores are not manuscripts, rather they are copies (or
most often, copies of copies), of manuscripts.
are "transcriptions•.
from performances.

Still others

Transcriptions are scores derived

A transciption is made by someone who

listens to a sounding of a work of music and represents what
is heard in terms of musical notatational symbols.
Transcribing is analogous to taking dictation.

As such, a

transcription may be derived from an improvisation or it may
be derived from a performance of a composition or it may be
derived from a recording of some musical work.
Although most scores are copies or derivations of
compositions and are not manuscripts, (i.e., compositions),
as it happens, most compositions are scores, (i.e.,
manuscripts). The most controversial claim of this
dissertation is probably the claim presently under
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consideration:

that a score can be and often is a

composition, or conversly, some compositions are scores.
Since most composers write scores, their artworks, I shall
argue, are their manuscripts.

I shall argue that it is this

written score that is the particular artifact that many
composers produce through their compositional efforts, and
so, these manuscript scores are to be properly regarded as
their artworks.
Musical "recordings• must be accommodated in any
account of music, but they create puzzling difficulties.
These difficulties arise partly because of a certain
ambiguity associated with term "recording•.

In one sense,

recordings are physical objects, (usually magnetically
charged plastic tapes, grooved vinyl discs, or etched
plastic discs), made through the use of specialized
sound-recording and -playback equipment.

In another sense,

"recording 0 is used to refer to the sounds produced by
playing the recording in the appropriate machine.
Recordings are the products of what is typically a
mechanical process consisting of converting sound-events
into some other, less transient physical medium.
is not always the case.

But this

Interestingly, recordings can be

made without producing any sounds at all.

Sounds are waves

of moving air that are perceivable by hearers; but some
electronic musical instruments can generate electronic
impulses which are not sounds, yet these electronic signals
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can be recorded and subsequently "played back" as audible
sounds.

Thus, a whole recorded piece of music could be

produced without making any sounds whatsoever, yet this
recording can later be used to produce actual musical
sounds.
Sometimes "recording" applies to the physical object
which is capable of being used to playback musical sounds.
But "recording" also is used to refer to the musical sounds
that are played back.

When I say I have a recording of

Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony" I can do so either by pointing
at my tape cassette, for instance, or by directing attention
to the sounds coming out of my stereo.

If I say that I am

"listening to a recordingM the object of my listening is not
the piece of tape, but the sounds produced by running the
tape through the proper sound-reproducing device.
These recorded artifacts are used to make musical
sound-events without the immediate or direct use of musical
instruments or voices.

The sounds resulting from the use of

recordings in conjunction with the appropriate mechanical
sound equipment are actually copies of previously occurring
sound events.

This is one way in which recordings differ

from performances.

In a performance, the performers. (the

person or persons making the performance). directly cause
the musical sounds to occur by playing their instruments,
(or singing).

The sounds resulting from the playing of a

recording are not directly caused by a performer, rather
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theY are replicas of previously occurring sounds.

To be

sure, the sounds of the recording are individual sounds
occurring at the time of playback and some of their
character is due to conditions present at this time, and
thus hRve an identity distinguishable from the sounds which
occurrad at the time of recording.

But the proximal cause

of the sounds at the time of playback is the machine and the
tape or disc inside of it and not any performer's
contemporaneous efforts.

To some extent, a sound recording

of a performance is comparable to a film of an event:

they

both are entities causally connected to prior events in such
a way that they can produce sounds and sights, respectively,
of significant similarity to those prior events. But such a
recording does not consist of the same sounds as those
that caused it; the sounds of the original event no longer
do or can exist.

The recording consists of new and distinct

sounds distally caused by earlier sounds, and thus are
noticeably similar to them.
Again, recordings involve the process of converting
transient sound events into relatively permanent physical
objects; physical objects of the sort that subsequently may
be used to make new sound events.

With this fact in mind. I

shall, for the sake of simplicity. use the term recording to
refer to the sound-sequence-events produced through a proper
use of the recorded tape or disc (or whatever).

Thus.
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recordings are sound-sequence-events that are causally
related to some earlier occurring sound-sequence-event.
Musical Elements
Musical elements are the stuff of which all musical
works are made.

They are the media or materials of music.

I say media rather than medium because musical elements
exist as differing physical entities.

Some are apprehended

by hearing them because they are sounds; others are
apprehended by seeing them because they are inscriptions.
Some groups of musical elements are appreciated for
themselves:

musical sounds; others are appreciated for what

they may refer to:
descriptions.

notational symbols and spoken

Put another way, musical elements are all

physical entities, i.e., they are concrete individuals
located spatially and temporally.
the same material.

But they are not all of

Some musical elements are sounds,

especially musical sounds, some are written inscriptions of
specialized musical notational symbols. and some are spoken
words denoting either these notational symbols or musical
sounds.

An example of a musical sound element would be an

actual sounding of a particualr pitch.

This pitch can be

described as a physical event consisting of air waves at say
440 cycles.

Phenomenally, this musical sound element may be

described as hearing an 'A' pitched sound.
An example of a musical symbol element would be the
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inscription

J

This symbol is generally used to

refer to an 'A' pitched sound, but this notational
inscription has its own status as a physical entity, (it is
an ink mark on this page of paper).

Notational symbols such

as the one above are not the only inscriptions that are
musical elements.

The written words MA sharp major• or u'A'

pitch in key of C" are also musical symbol elements.
An example of musical symbol element that is spoken
wuuld be actually uttered words "A sharp major" or "'A'
pitch in the key of

c·.

Their physical and phenomenal

status is comparable to that of musical sounds, except that
spoken words are not themselves musical sounds as such,
rather they are sounded symbols denoting actual musical
sounds.

Spoken musical symbols should not be confused with

musical sound elements which are sung words.

Sung words are

musical elements not because they are words, but because
they are voiced musical sounds, i.e., musical sounds made
with vocal cords.

That these sounds are also words is not

relevant to their status as musical sounds.5
All musical works are made of some combination of
musical elements.
or symbols.

These musical elements are either sounds

These latter exist as either written

inscriptions or as spoken words.

As I shall eventually

explain, musical works may consist of any combination of any
musical elements.
But this does not mean that just any or every

91

combination or occurrence of musical elements is a musical
work.

Two issues bear on this point.

completed whole.

First, a work is a

Admittedly, it is not clear what

constitutes a completed whole.

Somehow it is something

which involves a purported explicit beginning and a
purported explicit ending.

The sounds preceding a concert

consisting of the tunings and practicings of the musicians
are all musical sound elements, but the collection of these
sounds is not a work nor are they considered any part of the
work to be performed.

This issue concerning the notion of a

completed whole will be addressed further in the section on
composing.
A second issue related to the question as to when a
group of musical elements is a work concerns certain
evaluative notions of art status.

To raise the question as

to what makes any given collection of musical elements a
work can be, in effect, to raise questions concerning the
necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a
work of art, and some consider standards of aesthetic value
to be at least somewhat relevant.6

I shall not address

these questions and associated problems here.

Rather, I

will attempt to frame a theory that will be able to account
for whatever is accepted as a genuine musical artwork by
anyone. I shall begin with the assumptions that there are
musical works and that compositions are distinguishable from
performances and other musical objects.

I will then proceed
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from whatever is taken to be a musical artwork and address
its ontological status.

Mine is a theory about what musical

artworks there are or might be, not about how something
qualifies as a musical work of art.
The reason for making this latter point is that there
may be some disagreement about whet specific things are
genuine musical elements.

Just which sounds are musical

sound-elements, just which inscriptions are musical symbol
inscriptions, and just which verbal expressions are
musical symbol expressions are somewhat controversial
mitters.

To a large extent what counts as a musical element

is a matter of convention, that is, musical elements are
whatever things musical composers intentionally combine in
order to make their works.

This seems to suggest that

virtually any sound could be a musical element.
of fact, this is the case.

As a matter

This can be argued on the

grounds that virtually any sound has actually been used in
music:

from cannon roars to sounds of running water, from

whale calls to glass breaking;

(composers from Tchaichovsky

to Cage have used such sounds in their works).

What

aesthetic merit or value these may or may not have is an
important and interesting question, but one outside the
issues to be addressed here.

But I would at least suggest

that thure seems to be little if any reason to exclude any
sound as a possible musical element, (any attempt to do so
will probably be met with an attempt by some composer or

93

performer to include it within a musical work).

What is

more controversial and less clear is the question, which
collections or groupings of sound elements are musical
artworks?

If it is true that any sound could be a musical

element, it would seem to follow that any collection of
sounds could be a musical artwork.

In the context of

musical works the problems are amplified.

But whatever or

however we are to distinguish mere sounds from musical sound
elements, (i.e., the way in which a mere sound comes to be
regarded as a musical sound),

should also, in similar

fashion, indicate something about the distinction between
mere collections of sounds and musical artworks.

In other

words, since any sound could be used and regarded as a
musical sound, it would appear that any grouping of such
musically used and regarded sounds thus would be a
collection of musical sounds.

All that is left to argue is

whether just any collection of musical sounds is to be
regarded a musical work.

What settles this latter question

will be determined by one's art theory in so far as it
relates to the problem of defining art.
As I have said, my concern at present is not to argue
for a particular definition of art nor for a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for art status, as
narrowly or widely as this may be done; rather, it should be
made clear that what I am claiming here is that musical
artworks consist of whatever are, as a matter of fact, taken
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to be musical elements.

The point is that certain things,

certain sounds and/or notational symbols, are used as
musical elements.

I believe that these are or can be

construed as concrete particulars, and so it follows that
any combination of them are or can be construed as concrete
particulars.
Composing
I have defined composing as the activity of selecting
and arranging musical elements by some person (or persons)
who intends to make what he/she (or they) believes to be an
original musical work.

As an activity, composing need not

terminate or result in a completed composition, although
this is the usual aim of such efforts.
comparable to writing in this regard.

Composing is
Just as completing a

book, a paragraph, or even a sentence is not a necessary
condition for some activity counting as writing, neither
does composing require any such completion.

Composing is a

way of acting which implies little if anything with respect
to achievement.

It follows then, that whereas the existence

of compositions is dependent upon composing, composing is
not dependent upon the existence of compositions.

In other

words, while all compositions are to be understood as
produced by acts of composing, not all acts of composing
produce compositions.
There are two key parts to the proposed definition of
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composing:

(1) the selection and arrangement of musical

elements; and,
originality.

(2) an intention and belief about
Individually, neither of these is a sufficient

condition for composing, but taken together, I do think they
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act
counting as compositional.

Since "being composed",

(i.e.,

being the product of some act of composing), is not a
sufficient condition for something to be a composition, it
will later be argued that a further condition is required
for a compositional act to produce a composition. I shall
begin the present analysis of composing by addressing
separately these two conditional aspects of composing.
Selecting and Arranging
Composing always involves selecting and arranging
musical elements.

(Of course, this is not to say that all

selecting and arranging of musical elements is composing.
There must also be intended novelty on the part of the
person doing the composing, as we shall see.)

As has been

indicated earlier in this chapter, musical elements may be
either sounds or symbols.

Consequently, there are two

principal ways of composing:

(1) by selecting and arranging

actual musical sounds; or (2) by selecting and arranging
musical symbols.

Regardless of which approach is taken,

whether with sounds or with symbols, composing always
involves making choices about which musical elements to use
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and how they will be ordered with respect to one another.
AnY composition produced as result of these selections and
arrangements uf elements will consist just of those
particular elements so selected and arranged.

(But, again,

not just any selecting and arranging of musical elements
produces a composition.)
One way in which a person may go about selecting and
arranging musical elements and thereby composing is by
making individual musical sounds with some musical
instrument,

(including one's own voice).

An arrangement of

these sounds in a particular way results in what I have
called a musical sound-sequence-event.

Some of these

sound-sequence-events are compositions, (improvisations are
the most notable examples), but it is not uncommon for
composers to proceed in this way intending only to develop a
new tune, theme, or mere part of a whole musical work.

For

example, this may happen while at a piano or by humming a
series of notes in some desired way.

While I do not propose

to investigate very far at all into the nature of the
creative process, it should be noted that such musical sound
selecting and arranging may vary considerably to the extent
that it might be deliberative and calculated or spontaneous
and even haphazard.

The important point here is not how

composers actually decide which sounds to select and how
they are to be arranged, but to claim quite simply first,
that i t is one of the conditions of genuine composing that
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some selecting and arranging of musical elements be done,
and second, that actual sounds are candidates or objects for
such choices.

Keep in mind that by actual sounds I mean

concrete particulars, individual sounds that exist or
existed in a specific time and place.

These are what

composers who compose with sounds are selecting and
arranging.

I am not referring to "kinds" of sounds.

A

composer is not "composing with sounds", in the sense I am
explaining here, if she states her musical selections in
terms such as "the first sound is a 'C', followed by an 'A'
sound, followed by ... ,", and so on.

Someone is not

composing with sounds unless actual sounds are selected and
made.
But this first sort of composing, selecting and
arranging actual musical sounds, is significantly limited by
the fact that sounds are inherently short-lived, transient
things.

The objects produced by efforts to compose in this

way cease to exist almost as fast as they come into
existence. Memory, and the limits thereof, is thus sometimes
an important consideration in those cases when someone
chooses to compose with musical sounds.

This is so because,

as noted earlier, if some person's composing consists of
working out various parts of a relatively complex
composition and subsequently combining them together into a
complete sounded whole, a significant exercise of memory is
needed.

As the whole work becomes more complex, the
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required level of effective memory goes up.

At some point

it becomes impractical, if not impossible, to remember all
the selected sounds and the desired arrangements of them.
Memory is not the only such limitation on composing
with sounds.

If an individual person wishes to compose

multi-instrumentally, he must know how to play each of the
instruments.

(Actually, every would-be composer who chooses

to compose with sounds is limited by his or her instrumental
skills.

A person cannot very well compose on a flute if he

cannot play one.)

Also, if a composer wishes to select and

arrange sounds in harmonies, then she must use a polyphonic
instrument such as a piano or guitar, otherwise she must
enlist the help of instrumentalists to make the desired
musical sounds.

It should be kept in mind at this point in

the analysis that I am not discussing compositions made
of sounds, rather I am presently describing the activity
of composing with sounds.

Compositions are understood

as completed wholes, original musical works.
just the act of making novel musical choices.

Composing is
Therefore,

these limitations are not so great as they might be for
making compositions, since, as wholes, compositions must be
sounded out in their entirety, therefore all parts of the
composition must be remembered and sounded.

Mere composing

does not require that all parts be sounded, only that
whatever sounds are made are selected and arranged in what
is believed to be an original way.

As we shall see further,
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the limitations on composing with sounds are magnified if
the aim is to produce a composition made of musical sound
elements.
Musical notation provides a means of getting around
some of these difficulties, and permits achieving a very
high degree of compositional complexity.

Again, the person

wishing to compose in this manner is limited by knowing how
to use an appropriate notational system.

But using any such

system is no longer composing with sounds.

Sound recording,

on the other hand, does permit composing with sounds in a
way that allows virtually any degree of complexity,7 and yet
does not place such heavy demands on the composer's memory
or instrumental abilities.

I shall return to both of these

sorts of composing a bit later.
Another important way that composing with actual
sounds may be, and very often is, accomplished is by
improvising.

When composing with musical sound elements is

done all at one time in a somewhat spontaneous fashion, then
such composing may be called improvising.

Improvising music

consists of making selections of musical sound elements and
arranging them into a sound-sequence-event.
something more than merely this.

But it is

Improvising brings to

light the other crucial constituent of composing, which is
an intention to make these selections and arrangements in a
more or less original way.
improvising is composing.

I would argue that all
Before I address this intentional
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component of the definition a few more points should be
made.B
Composing by improvising is not limited by memory in
the ways described, because most improvising is done with no
intention of repetition.

That is, improvisations are

usually not intended to have copies or derivations.
Furthermore, any composition created through improvisation
simply is the improvised sound-sequence-event, but this sort
of composition does not exist beyond the time it is made.
Improvised compositions are, in this way, no different from
any other compositions made from transient sounds.

The

composition as such perishes as quickly as it is made.

Any

subsequent attempt to "repeat" the original
sound-sequence-event does not result in bringing the
composition back into existence.

Rather, the new

sound-event is what I have called a "copy" or "derivation"
of the composition, which is not itself a composition.
Composing by improvising may involve the efforts of an
individual improvising alone or it may occur with either
improvised or unimprovised accompaniment.

If an individual

improvises alone, her work counts as a compositional work,
and she is the composer of that work.

Any unimprovised

accompaniment is not a part of her composition.

The whole

performed musical work is therefore only partly a
composition; it is a heterogenous entity consisting of a
composition combined with a musical work derived from some
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other composition.

If the accompaniment is also improvised,

then the composition consists of all improvised sounds; and
50

each of the improvising musical contributors is a

co-composer of the work produced.
Summarizing thus far, selecting and arranging actual
sounds is one means of composing.

Usually such composing

takes the form of improvising, distinguished from other
sorts of composing with sounds by the degree of spontaneity
involved.

Composing with sounds is limited by memory,

instrumental skills, and the possible need for the
cooperative efforts of other persons.

These limitations

probably account, in part, for the motivation to develop
alternative techniques and materials for composing.
The larger portion of composing is not composing with
sounds, but composing with symbols.

These symbols, by

convention, refer to or denote musical sounds.

The composer

is, in effect, indicating what sounds, if made and put
together in the specified way, might produce a
sound-sequence-event as he might want to produce it.
this last point is somewhat irrelevant anyway.

But

That is,

composing by way of notation does not require that sounds
ever be made based on this written manuscript nor that the
composer have any particular interest in this regard.

Most

composers probably do wish to have their scores performed as
sound-sequence-events, and many composers actually take part
in doing so.

But it is no less an instance of composing if
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the person doing so has no interest in having her &elected
musical symbols sounded out.

By extention, a

composi~ion

is

no less a composition, it is no more or less complete, if it
is never sounded out, and even if the composer, for some
reason or other, has no wish for it ever to be performed.
Composing is not uncommonly referred to as "writing
music".

Such a comparison with writing that consists of

linguistic symbols arranged into words and sentences is a
sensible one because prose writing, for instance, also
consists of selecting and arranging certain specifiable
elements, but instead of musical symbols, words are the
objects selected and arranged in the desired way.

When used

in this way the term "write• is synonymous with the term
Hcompose", whether referring to writing prose or writing
music.

This somewhat metaphorical and colloquial sense of

"writing" is used not only for the literal process of making
inscriptions or marks on paper; instead, it

m~ans

that

someone is arranging words or musical symbols in some way.
Even further removed from the literal sense of writing, is
the sense that such writing need not make use of written
inscriptions at all. For example, a prose writer may dictate
his work as spoken words into a tape machine; while, as we
have seen, a musical writer may make her work by using
sounds.
Most Western musical composing with symbols makes use
of a conventional, standardized notational systemi i.e., the
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familiar five line staff with its various attendant symbols
for pitch, duration, rhythm, meter, key, etc.

But composing

with symbols need not make use of this system.

Alternative

symbols, systems, and schemes can be and have been
developed.9 I mentioned earlier in the chapter that included
among musical symbols are words such as "B flat",
G", "4/4 meter", and so on.

"key of

The important thing about

musical composing with symbols is that the symbols used are
musical symbols, i.e., they denote musical sounds.
Composing with symbols is of course limited by the
composer's knowledge of and facility with an appropriate
symbol system.

But such composing does not require that a

composer be even a competant instrumentalist.

A composer

who uses symbols is freed from composing only for
instruments he knows how to play well or play at all.

What

this means is that skill in musical composing may be
regarded as independent of other sorts of musical skill,
such as instrumental virtuosity.
recognized.

This fact is widely

Many composers are not good instrumentalists,

while many performers likewise do not compose nor possess
skills in this area of musical activity.

What is

interesting about this is that a music composer who uses
symbols could conceivably go about her business without ever
making or hearing any musical sounds.

A composer could be

deaf and entirely unable to play any musical instrument and
yet compose music, even what might be considered good music.

104

Thus, musical composition, under certain circumstances, can
amount to nothing more than skillful symbol manipulation.
Intending and Believing
Compositions are not just any collection of selected
and arranged musical elements.

Strictly speaking, a

performer working from a score is also selecting and
arranging musical elements.

Such a person °reads" the score

and makes decisions about what notes to play on his
instrument and what sequence they are to follow.

But no one

would consider playing music from a score, (or from memory
for that matter), to be composing, though it does involve,
in a sense, the selection and arrangement of musical
elements.

Nor is a person who transcribes a performance

into notation properly considered to be composing.

These

are not acts of composing because it is generally believed
that composing is, to a greater of lesser extent, a creative
activity of a special sort.

That is, composing is thought

to include a notable degree of originality on the part of
the composer.
Originality sometimes refers to the extent to which
something is itself new, different, unique, or novel.

This

is to define originality from the side of the thing created.
I shall refer to this sense of originality as "objective
originality.

0

Objective originality refers to whatever is

new about an object.

In a most minimal sense, every object
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that comes into existence is objectively original, since it
is a "new" object in the world.

So there are degrees of

objective originality that are a function of the extent to
which some object is unlike any already existing object.
An alternative sense of originality, and one that I
would like to emphasize, would approach originality from the
side of the maker or creator.

Looked at this way,

originality refers to the extent to which the person
involved is "coming up with something of her ownw,

making

something without direct dependence upon or conscious
reference to something with which the person is aware.

Such

originality bears upon the experience, belief and intention
of the creator, rather than upon the dependence of the
character of the thing made on the existence or
non-existence of something supposedly like it.

I shall

refer to this sense of originality as "subjective"
originality.
Given this latter, subjective sense of originality and
under the view now being presented, the actual degree of
originality on the part of the composition, (i.e., its
"objective originalityw, or the novelty with respect to the
work itself and the world within which it exists), is not
relevant to that work's compositional status, nor to the
sense in which the person who made it may be
composed it.

sai~

to hav,e

Rather, what is decisive for compositional

status is the originality believed and intended by the
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composer, that is, its "subjective originality".
Suppose two composers, unknown to one another, are
working on what they believe to be original musical
compositions.

Each proceeds by selecting and arranging

musical elements, (let us say in this case, they are both
inscribing conventional notational symbols on paper).

As

improbable as it may be, they produce a sequence of symbols
that is from all appearances indistinguishable one from the
other.

The two composers publish their manuscripts as new

and original musical compositions.

Do we now have two

compositions or one?
If we say there is only one composition, we are lead
to the strange consequence that two separate people created
the same thing.

Now two people can create the same thing if

they act jointly, but in the above scenario, the two people
did not act together.
To say instead that there are two separate
compositions is not at all strange and leads to no peculiar
consequences.

After all, manuscripts are particular

objects; there is no reason that two objects cannot be made
that coincidently look alike.

Two people could

independently build two separate chairs that turn out to
look alike in virtually every detail, would we want to say
that there is anything other than two chairs.

It might be

argued to the contrary that the two chairs manifest the same
design, and so, the makers of the two chairs have actually
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created or discovered this design.

Thus, manuscripts should

be likewise understood as manifesting the same compositional
design.

Under such a view, the design is, in effect, a

universal, something capable of having multiple examples.
What would not be clear, given this appraisal of the
situation, is whether the design existed before it was
doubly realized through the efforts of the two makers, or
whether the two makers simultaneously created the same
universal.

In the former case the makers might be said to

have discovered the universal, in the latter they might be
said to have created it.

If it is thought that the

composers created the universal, we return to the original
oddity of saying that two persons created the same thing,
that two people independently created the same universal.
(A further question is raised here regarding whether or not
universals are the sorts of things that can be created.)
If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the design
or composition was separately discovered by two different
persons, much like two chemists independently discovering
the molecular structure of some compound substance, this
would seem to imply that all compositions, past, present,
and future, always existed somehow waiting to be discovered.
This way of describing the matter leads to the kind of talk
that many nominalists object to, talk of so-called possible
objects.

It leads to the multiplication of entities so

uncomfortable to nominalistic sensibilities.

Not only is it
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claimed that there exist as many compositions as have been
composed, but there also exist all the compositions that
will be composed and all the possible compositions that
never happen to be composed (discovered).
Clearly, the nominalist wants to avoid such a
conception of the situation, and would prefer to acknowledge
that there are, in the present example, two and only two
separate, actual compositions each composed separately by
each of two separate composers.

There were two distinct

acts of composing, two distinct individual composers, and
two distinct manuscripts.

Therefore, it is the belief on

the part of the composer that distinguishes a compositional
selection and arrangement from non-compositional selection
and arrangement; more precisely, the belief that what is
being constructed is generally original, that it is not an
attempt to copy something else.
Closely allied to this belief about other musical
objects is an intention to create an original work.
Intention on the part of composer is decisive within the
present consideration of composing.

I wish to maintain that

the intention to compose is a necessary condition for a
genuine act of composing, and since compositions are defined
as the artifactual products of certain acts of composing,
intentions are constitutive of compositions.
Suppose an avant-garde composer well-known for her
peculiar combinations of traditional musical sounds with
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sounds not typically regarded as musical, (breaking glass,
cat mews, closing books, etc.), along with poly-rhythmic and
arhythmic or nonrhythmic structures.

She is a tape

composer, meaning that she records these various sounds onto
multi-track sound equipment and later mixes the sounds into
a completed recorded composition.
One evening she is alone working in her studio.

The

tape machine happens to be running while she is setting up
various musical instruments to be played and recorded.
Before she has a chance to purposely make any sounds she
wants to record, she is struck with a violent seizure that
sends her thrashing about the room pressing keys on her
electronic keyboards and piano, knocking into a drum set
that crashes to the floor making all sorts of booming and
pounding noises.

This goes on for a few horrible minutes

ending with her death.

Most of the noises she made while in

her death throes were recorded on tape.
Later that evening a collegue discovers the gruesome
scene.

The collegue was aware of the composer's intention

to do some work that evening and so several days later he
reviews the tape in order to listen to what he thinks is the
composer's last composition.

Unknown to the collegue, none

of the recorded sounds were selected and arranged for the
purpose of composing a musical work.

But the collegue

believes that the recording is a composition, and with some
very minor editing releases the tape as the famous
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composer's last great work.
Is this recording a composition?

I do not believe so;

at least it is not the work of the dead composer.

The facts

of its production would, if known, almost certainly
undermine any belief that this recording is the composer's
musical artwork.
In this second example, the would-be composer's
intentions determine whether or not a group of musical
elements is a musical work generically and a composition
specifically.

The first example of the two composers

reflects the role of belief in distinguishing between making
a compositional work of music from making a
non-compositional work of music.

The intention to compose a

work requires the belief that the selection and arrangement
of musical elements is original, that these selections and
arrangements are not significantly related to nor dependent
upon some already exisiting musical work.
In order to more fully understand the difference
between original and non-original selection and arrangement
of musical elements, it will be necessary to consider the
nature of non-original selection and arrangement, what I
shall call "copying" and "deriving".
Copying and Deriving
As noted in Chapter I, the chief difficulty for an
ontology of music, (as well as for literature,

printm~king,
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drama and others), is characterizing the relationship that
is presumed to hold between an original work of art and its
purported examples.

One way to characterize this difficulty

is to ask, what allows for the same proper name to be
assigned to a composition and to performances of it?

How is

it that an indefinite number of musical performances,
scores, and recordings can each be identified as Beethoven's
"Ninth SymphonyM?

Why are some performances,

(or scores or

recordings), called nNinth Symphony" and others "Fifth
Symphony", and still others McCartney's "VesterdayM?
Uy objective throughout has been to develop a
conception of this relationship which countenances the
existence of individuals only.

In keeping with the sorts of

nominalistic presuppositions and hypothetical restrictions
placed on the proposed theory, such a conception cannot
construe the apparent relationship in a way that requires or
permits the existence of something that composition and
performance are said to share or have in common.

To permit

this is to admit universals or non-individuals into the
theory.

Nor should the relationship be described in a way

that takes performances, (or scores, recordings, etc.), to
be examples, occurrences, or instances of some composition.
Again, such is the language of universals and abstract
entities.

But more importantly, I don't think that such

characterizations correctly account for what is going on
when we call a performance by the same name as some
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composition anyway.

It is the purpose of this section to

describe what I take to be a nominalistic account of the
presumed relationship that is thought to hold between a
composition and other objects that are assigned its name.

I

shall do so in terms of what I have called copying and
deriving.
Since copying will be understood as a species of
deriving, what I have to say initially about deriving will
apply to both; so, for simplicity, I will describe what
deriving means and it can be assumed that what is said about
it also applies to copying. The differences between them
will be discussed afterwards.
Deriving may be defined provisionally in terms of
three

~onditions:

(1)

temporal precedence;

(2)

acquaintance with an already existing work;

(3)

intention to make a work more or less like the
already existing work;

Thus, more precisely, "B is derived from A•

means,

(1) A is temporally precedent to B, (i.e., A exists
before B);
(2) the person (or persons) making B is acquainted with
A, (i.e., the person is aware of A's existence and
its temporal precedence);
(3) the person (or persons) making B intends to make it
more or less like A.
Let us examine each of these items in turn.
The first condition is quite straightforward and
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probably not controversial.

To say that something is

derived from something else is to acknowledge that the
derived thing came from, was caused by, or followed from
something that preceded it.

This first condition is

virtually analytic with respect to the notion of "derive".
The point here as it concerns compositions is that
compositions, as noted already, are originals; and, as such,
precede any of their so-called derivations,

(e.g.,

performances, score-copies, recordings, etc.).

Or, put

another way, what I am calling derivations are
distinguishable from compositions partly by the fact that
they are not originals in the ways that compositions are.
One of the ways in which compositions are originals is that
they exist before any work that is derived from them; that
is, any of a composition's derivations are works made
subsequent to the making of the original composition with
which the derived work is associated and with which it
shares a name or title.

This first condition of deriving

accounts for the sense in which all compositions may be
regarded as

"~bjectively"

original:

the object which is the

composition existed before any purported performance, score,
recording, etc. of it.

It is not being claimed that

compositions are objectively original in the sense that they
are the first objects to exist which possess a certain
combination of characteristics or qualities. According to
the theory under construction, compositions need only be
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objectively original in the sense that they precede, (exist
before), any of their derivations.
It should be made clear though that derived works need
not be derived directly from a composition in order to be
named by the same name as that composition.

Quite often it

is the case that derived musical works are derived from
other derived works.

For example, a performance of

Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony" is usually derived from a score
of the "Ninth Symphony".

It is highly unlikely that this

score is Beethoven's manuscript, instead this score is
probably itself a derivation.

In point of fact, the scores

used to derive performances of this symphony are just about
always some of the more recently derived works in a series
of derivations of derivations which eventually terminate in
Beethoven's manuscript.
The second condition follows upon what was claimed
about those who make compositions, insofar as such persons
who intend to make compositions believe that what they are
doing is original, whereas those who make works derived from
compositions do not have such a belief.

Instead they are

aware of the composition from which they are deriving their
musical works.

Obviously, if I derive B from A, I must be

somehow acquainted with A; I must know of A's existence and
something about what A is like.

In addition, this condition

compares favorably with what was stated earlier about a
subjective sense of originality.

This sense turns on
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whether a person's efforts to make a work are in any way
consciously influenced by some already existing work.
Novelty (or originality) under this conception is thus a
person-relative notion dependent upon the prior experience
of the maker of a work.

The relevant prior experience in

this context is acquaintance with an already existing or
formerly existent selection and arrangement of musical
elements from which the present deriving is taking place.
The third condition for deriving is also indirectly
related to this subjective sense of originality.

This

condition is a particularly decisive criterion for
distinguishing acts of composing from acts of deriving.
Subjective originality, as described earlier, is a function
of what a person believes about the work he is making.

This

belief amounts to someone thinking that the musical
selections being made are not significantly influenced in
any detailed way by some already existing work of which one
is aware.

It is the belief that the present selection and

arrangement of musical elements is a novel
arrangement of such elements.

selec~ion

and

This sort of belief of

subjective originality is largely constitutive for acts of
composing.

To derive a work, on the other hand, means not

to have such a belief with respect to this sort of novelty.
Deriving is thus selecting and arranging musical elements in
a non-original way.

But it is more than merely this.

More

precisely, it amounts to selecting and arranging musical

116

elements with the intention of basing these decisions on
some already or formerly existing selection and arrangement.
The act of deriving is a matter of purposely being
influenced by some other musical work, (e.g., a score, a
performance, or a recording). in the process of selecting
and arranging musical elements.

This condition thus

reflects the intentional character of deriving and parallels
a similar, yet opposite, condition for composing.
Deriving a work from another work usually consists of
selecting and arranging musical elements with the intention
of naming the resulting work by the same name as the work
from which it is derived.

I say "usually" because such

illicit work-making as plagiarism lacks this intention.
Plagiarism, quite simply, is deriving a work without
acknowledging publically the fact that the work is derived,
and going so far as to intentionally deceive others into
thinking that what one has made is original when, in fact,
it is not.

It is to claim subjective originality about a

work that is not subjectively original.

It is not

plagiarism to create a work that turns out to be quite
similar, if not apparently identical, to some other work.
This point was made earlier in the example concerning two
composers who, inadvertantly and entirely unknown to one
another, make works that look or sound virtually identical.
Such occurrences would be acts of genuine composing.

The

decisive element distinguishing composing from plagiarizing
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is therefore subjective originality.
reverse of plagiarism.

(Forgery is the

It consists rather of attributing

someone else's composership to a work that one has made
oneself.

This is also a form of illicit work-making since

it involves an intention to deceive, although it is genuine
composing. Whereas, plagiarism is a form of deriving
improperly called composing, forgery is a form of composing
falsely called deriving.)
Except under these illicit circumstances, deriving one
work from another work involves the intention of being
significantly, (most often maximally), influenced by the
earlier work in the process of selecting and arranging
musical elements; and then calling or naming the resulting
work by the same name as the temporally precedent work that
one is aware of and intends to derive the new work from.

We

shall see in further detail how names are attached to
derived works in the next chapter.
Admittedly, this third condition of deriving gives
rise to possible difficulties for the theory.

For example,

let us imagine that I had heard a performance or read the
score of a particular musical work some time in the past,
yet I have consciously forgotten about it.

Several months

later, I begin working on a composition of my own and
unintentionally make a work that is very much like the
performance I had heard earlier, (the assumption here is
that I have somehow been unconsciously or subconsciously
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influenced by the previously experienced work). Are such
efforts acts of deriving?

As a consequence of the theory I

am attempting to articulate and defend, I believe that such
acts are genuine acts of composing and not deriving. Again,
the decisive criterion distinguishing composing from
deriving is to be understood in terms of the intentions and
beliefs of the person making the work.

To the extent that a

person sincerely believes that her efforts are
compositional, (i.e., among other things, purposely novel or
minimally influenced by some other work), they are
compositional.

After the fact, it may be discovered that

the activity did not produce the sort of objectively
original work that is admired in aesthetic contexts, and
that the composer was somewhat self-deceived about the
novelty of her selection, but I think these efforts and the
products of them remain compositional nonetheless.

What is

really at issue then bears upon certain evaluative rather
than ontological considerations.

Since actual, objective

originality is particularly valued in the artworld, the
less-than-original results of someone's activity of the sort
described probably will not be as highly regarded as the
original work that preceded them.

But to say of some

activity or $Ome object that it is compositional need not be
taken as honorific nor need they be recognized as making an
evaluative judgement; it need not be meant to say that it is
"good' or "bad•.

Recall that the issue at stake here
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concerning the ontological status of co•positions involves a
classificatory rather than evaluative sense of work of art.
A second difficulty arises, which creates a deeper
problem for the description of deriving as it now stands.
suppose a person who intends to derive one work from
another, "gets it wrong•. That is, suppose that some person
believes that she is performing a work derived from a score
of so•eone else's musical composition, but she overestimates
her ability to read musical notation and plays the wrong
notes for several or even all of the symbols contained in
the score. In such a case, she is aware of the original work
and she intends to base her performance on it.

Such a

scenario satisfies the stated criteria for derivation, yet
the resulting performance does not sound anything like what
we would expect; the score is for, let us say, Bach's

0

Art

of the Fugue", but it sounds more like McCartney's
·vesterday•.

Is it proper then, since the perfor•ance is

derived from the score, to name the perfor•ance by the
original work's title?
Ves and no.

I shall describe how it is that works

acquire their na•es or titles in the next chapter, but a
question remains regarding the sense in which the resulting
performance can be said to be derived fro• Bach's work.

We

could say of what has resulted that it is an exceedingly
poor performance of Bach's original work, since, after all,
a score of his work did provide the basis for the musical
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selections made by the performer.

Typically, poor

performances have a noticeably significant number of
mistakes, but in the present instance, virtually every note
is a mistake.

In the barest sense of derive, the

performance in the present example is a derived work from
Bach's fugue because the performer did not make genuinely
original musical selections, (they were influenced and
guided by some other work, albeit in a peculiar and
distorted way), and the performer believed that what was
being made was not original; that it was somehow derived
from the Bach score.

But although the performer has

seriously misread or failed to "complyH with the score, it
remains an act of deriving nonetheless, and it was derived
from Bach's work.

The question remains though whether this

derived work should be called a performance of "Bach's 'Art
of the Fugue'" or "McCartney's 'Yesterday'"?

Though it does

not seem improper to say of the performance that it was
derived from Bach's work, it does seem quite awkward to
claim that it was a performance of "The Art of the Fugue•,
even to say that was an optimally bad or inaccurate
performance of it.

The purpose of analyzing the notion of

deriving a work is to get clearer about the way compositions
are related to their purported examples.

We want to know

what it is about some musical works that justifies
associating them with already existing compositions.
it that it seems so inappropriate to consider the

Why is
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performance described above a performance of Bach's •Art of
the Fugue•?
In order to address this sort of phenomenon, a fourth
condition for deriving seems to be in order.
to it as

0

the compliance condition•.

I shall refer

The third condition

describes an intention on the part of the person doing the
deriving to comply with the selections already made in the
original work by the composer.

This fourth condition

requires that the derived work actually comply with the
work from which it is derived.
"comply•?

What is meant here by

Before I explain this notion of compliance and

spell out its implications for deriving a work, I shall
first describe the difference between copying and deriving.
The basis of the difference between copying and
deriving is this:

in copying, the product of the process of

copying exists in the same medium as the thing copied;
whereas, in deriving, the product of the process of deriving
exists in a medium different from the original object.

In

saying that copies are in the same medium as the thing they
copy, I mean that they are each comprised of the same sorts
of musical elements.

For example, since a score consists of

musical elements that are notational symbols, a copy of a
score also consists of notational symbols.10

A copy of a

performance, on the other hand, will consist of musical
elements which are sounds because performances are comprised
of musical sound elements.
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Now the process of deriving one work from another, as
distinguished from copying one, involves using musical
elements of a different sort from the original.

A scored

transcription derived from a performance consists of
notational symbols although the performance itself consisted
of sound elements.

A performance of a scored musical work

is also a derived object because it consists of sounds
rather than notations.
Recordings create special difficulties for this
distinction.

As we have already observed, the ontology of

musical recordings is particularly perplexing.

As a musical

object, a recording is significant for the sounds it can
produce; nothing about its status as magnetic tape or a
plastic disc is of any direct musical value.

Somewhat

like a score, which is also of value largely for what it can
be used for,

(i.e., to denote a sound-sequence-event that

could be performed), a recording has no musical value other
than its capacity for being used to make musical sounds.

I

shall consider recordings of performances to be copies on
the grounds that they are musically significant for the
musical sounds that they themselves are capable of producing
and because the way they are apprehended is by being
listened to.

We typically say that we

0

listen• to

recording, whereas we "read• a score.
Copies and copying should not be understood solely in
terms of similarity.

Similarity is a problematic notion for
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a nominalistic perspective, so such a relationship should be
avoided in the present context.

Admittedly, copies are

often described as varying in degree of similarity with
respect to the objects they copy, but similarity, under the
view being considered, is not constitutive for "being a
copy".

Rather, "to copy a work" is, in addition to the

stated conditions for deriving in general:

(a) to make a

work comprised of musical elements in the same medium as
those comprising the work being copied, and (b) to attempt a
certain degree of similarity, to intend that a certain
desired degree of similarity be achieved, and to believe
that a certain degree, although not necessarily the intended
degree, has been achieved.

Thus copying, like deriving, is

fundamentally a matter of making musical selections and
arrangements that are intentionally and maximally influenced
by some other already existing work.

But again, as with

deriving, a question arises as to how we are to account for
those occasions in which, inspite of the intentions by
someone to make musical selections based on some other work,
the resulting work is quite different from the original? We
usually do talk about a comparison between a copy and an
original in terms of some degree of similarity.

How do we

avoid calling what sounds like "Mary Had a Little Lamb" by
the name "Row, Row, Row Your BoatN when the performer of the
former intended the latter?
As indicated earlier, a similar problem arose in cases

124

of derivations as well, although in a different sense.
Instead of referring to a score's similarity to a
performance of it, the term of comparison I suggested with
respect to a derivation was •compliance•.11

Since

derivations are, by definition, of a different medium than
the thing they are derived from, any sense of similarity
attached to notions of deriving are metaphorical at best and
substantially different from what goes on with copying.
Sounds cannot be similar to inscriptions and vice versa.
But there is an interest in having some term for comparison,
since people often do talk about the degree to which a
performance, for example, compares with a score from which
it was derived.

The term that I shall use to characterize

such positive comparisons is, as already stated, compliance.
To comply with a score in deriving a performance is to make
sounds that are within the range of the denotations of the
musical symbol elements contained in the score.
A performance of Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony• is
almost always derived from a score.

If the performers have

Beethoven's manuscript, then the performance is derived from
the composition.

But in either case, the degree to which

the performance is said to comply with Beethoven's work is
the degree to which the performers base their selection and
arrangement of musical sounds on the score associated with
Beethoven's composition titled •Ninth Symphony".

But there

is considerable room for variation even under these
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circumstances because Beethoven's work is nothing more than
the inscriptions on the page.

Compliance consists of making

musical sound elements in a way consistent with the
denotations of the musical symbol elements contained in the
score.

Making sounds as denoted by the symbols contained in

the score can be done in numerous ways, and the results can
vary greatly.

What determines the degree of compliance is

clearly not similarity, since sounds cannot be similar to
inscriptions; nor is compliance a matter of actualizing the
intentions of the composer or providing a sounding of
musical ideas somehow •embodied• in the score.

Compliance

is a matter of basing selections and arrangements of musical
sounds as directly as possible on the score.

This "basing•

amounts, in part, to the belief on the part of the
performers that what musical choices they make are maximally
influenced by the score, that they believe their selections
minimally original and independent.

In addition, and very

importantly, compliance requires that the musicians actually
produce musical sound elements that are within the accepted,
(according to musical conventions), range of sounds denoted
by the musical symbol elements.
For example, a symbol within a score may denote a
certain pitch, say 'A' flat, for a particular instrument,
say a bassoon, and other symbols may denote something about
the dynamics, say 'forte'

(loud), but, even given these

specifications, there is not only one way to comply with
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these symbol elements.

Conventional musical practice does

prescribe certain limitations for how to play this note, but
even this involves going outside of the score to some
extent; i.e., to make a selection with respect to a musical
element that is other than what is explicitly evident in the
score.

The point is that the performance of the note

complies with the composition in the event that the
performer does what is indicated, but there is not only one
way to do this.

It should be noted that it is just this

fact which allows for what is called interpretation.
We may now return to what I have called the
"compliance condition•.

This may be understood as the

fourth condition for deriving a musical work.

Thus,

what

it means to say that "B is derived from A• includes this
final criterion:
(4)

the person deriving B from A makes B in such a
way that it complies, for the most part, with the
musical elements contained in A; (i.e., the
musical elements which make up B are within the
accepted range of denotation of the musical
elements that make up A).

But how might this condition be applied to copies?
I believe this may be accomplished by recognizing that
as denotation may function across media, (e.g., a symbol may
denote certain sounds), so may denotation function within a
single medium.

That is, a sound may denote other sounds, or

a symbol may denote other symbols.

Therefore, the

compliance condition may be said to apply to both deriving
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and copying.

It is the condition that specifies the extent

to which copies and derivations of musical works may be
compared with their originals.

The degree of compliance is

a function of the extent to which the derivation or copy
consists of elements lying within the range of musical
elements denoted by the musical elements that go together to
make up the original work.
Let me su111111arize what I think has been accomplished in
this chapter.

Musical works may be made in one of two

fundamental ways: they may be composed or they may be
derived. To compose a musical work a person must:
(1)

select and arrange musical elements, (either sounds
or symboln); and

(2)

intend and believe that
a. this selection and arrangement produces a
musical work, and
b. this work is original, i.e., not derived
from an already existing work.

To derive a musical work a person must:
(1)

select and arrange musical elements, (either
sounds or symbols); and

(2)

intend and believe that
a. this selection and arrangement produces a
musical work, and
b. this work 'B' is related to an already
existing work 'A' according to the
following conditions:
i)
'A' is temporally precedent to 'B';
ii) the person making 'B' is acquainted
with 'A';
iii) the person making 'B' intends to
make it more or less like 'A'; and
iv) the musical elements of 'B' comply
with, (are denoted by), the musical
elements of 'A'.
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copying a musical work is one important way of deriving a
work.

It consists of deriving a work in the same medium,

(i.e., the copy-work is made of the same sort of musical
elements), as the original, copied work.

If the work

consists of musical elements in a medium other than the
original work, it is said to be a derived work.
Most acts of composing produce musical compositions,
usually consisting of musical notations, (typically
manuscript scores), or musical sounds-sequence-events,
(typically improvisations or multi-track tape recordings).
Derivations, (including copies), are usually either musical
performances, scores, or recordings.

Whereas composed works

are usually given a name or title that is intended to
uniquely identify and distinguish them from other composed
works, derived works are usually given the same title as the
compositonal work from which they were ultimately derived.
That is, a composition's title sets off the composition
from other compositions, and thereby functions as a proper
name.

On the other hand, a derivation's title associates

the derivation with a specific composition; and as such is
not a genuine name.

The title, which is the name of the

composition, attached to a derivation is thus
non-designative; it is non-referential, or
syncategoramatical, and serves only to indicate that from
which it was derived.12

More about this latter point will

be forthcoming in the next chapter.
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In this chapter the focus has been on the constituent
elements, the materials, of composing, and on the activity
of composing as such.

In the next chapter, I shall turn to

a more explicit consideration of compositions, the musical
artworks produced from these materials and by these
activities.

To accomplish this I shall describe my theory

of compositions in terms of comparisons and contrasts with
alternative views on the matter.

CHAPTER IV
MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AS CONCRETE PARTICULARS CONTRASTED WITH
THREE NOTABLE ALTERNATIVES
Introduction
As a way of further characterizing my theory of
musical compositions as concrete particulars, I shall
distinguish it from some notable alternatives.

Of course it

would be impossible to contrast my theory with all competing
theories; there are simply too many.

My approach instead

will be to discuss three important theories chosen for the
following reasons.

First, they are each reasonable and

important contributions in their own right to the
ontological discussion of musical compositions.

Second,

each theory is described by its author in language and
categories amenable to my own approach:

we are all

developing our theories from within an Anglo-American
perspective.

Third, each of the selected theories has the

effect of highlighting significant contrasts with my
construal of musical compositions.

Whereas my theory

emphasizes the physical and individual character of
compositions, the others represent varying alternative
combinations of physicality vs. non-physicality and
individuality vs. non-individuality.
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My intentions in the present chapter will be to
describe each of these theories, to point out their key
points of divergence from my theory, and to comment on their
adequacy as descriptions of musical compositions.

Following

this, in Chapter V, I will summarize this discussion in
terms of the categories of concrete, abstract, particular,
and universal as a means of identifying a proposed range of
possible ontological characterizations of musical
compositions, of which my theory represents one extreme.
Music, as was observed in previous chapters, is an
artform that presents special problems for the ontologist.
The usual practice of distinguishing compositions from
performances encourages taking the composition as some sort
of abstract entity or universal.

This is often the case

because it is customary to talk of multiple performances of
music, sound sequences of a certain sort, as instances or
occurrences of some composer's work.

The performance is

usually given the same name as the composition from which it
was derived.

Thus, the composition, understood as the sort

of thing capable of multiple instances, is often readily
construed as a universal, a type, a kind, or some such
non-individual.
Another tendency evident in discussions about the
ontological nature of musical compositions is the
description of compositions as essentially non-corporeal.
This is the notion that the actual work of art, although
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revealed through some sensory artifact, (usually a
performance or score), is not essentially this corporeal
artifact.

Rather, the artwork is some sort of non-physical,

abstract entity or phenomenon. Under such a view, the
musical composition exists, in some sense, independently of
any physical or sensory expression or occurrence.

In clear

contrast to these tendencies, my approach has been to cast
the ontology of musical works entirely in terms of physical
or sensory individuals, (i.e., concrete particulars).
As we shall see shortly, R. G. Collingwood and
Nicholas Wolterstorff describe musical works as essentially
non-physical entities.

Later, we shall see that although

William Webster's theory requires that works be physically
realized, he and Wolterstorff will construe works as
non-individuals.

Much more will be said about this in

Chapter V.
R. G. Collingwood: Compositions as
Mental Entities
Philosophers of art have devised various theories
aimed at working out the relationship between the
composition and performance that call upon the language of
universals and/or abstract entities.

One such approach is

to consider the composition as essentially an entity of
consciousness.

That is, the musical composition is

essentially an idea, a mental construction that is the
product of and existent in the mind of a composer.

The
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composition is not a physical, corporeal, or concrete entity
at all, rather it is an abstract entity of thought.
R. G. Collingwood has delineated just such a
conception of musical compositions that takes them as
fundamentally and essentially non-corporeal mental
creations.

"The work of art proper is something not seen or

heard, but something imagined."1

As he makes clear,

compositions are created in the mind of a composer and are
then communicated or expressed through some performance or
score, and thus made available to the minds of other
persons. The work remains an entity or phenomenon of human
consciousness, the performance or score is merely a vehicle
for communication of the musical ideas of the composer.
To regard the musical composition as a concrete
particular, as I do, is effectively to deny that it has
genuine status as an artwork "in the mind of the composer".
The genesis or creation of a composition may indeed involve
mental activity, but my view is that the composition as
artwork is essentially a corporeal artifact, and moreover,
it is an individual.

Compositions are in a certain sense

something like prototypes.

Prototypes may be understood, in

this context, as individual objects that serve as things to
be copied, or as models suggestive of others objects that
could be made similar to the prototype.

The point I wish to

emphasize here is that prototypes are usually some original
physical object serving as a model for making other
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physical objects.
Let us return to Collingwood's theory of artworks as
presented in The Principles of Art.

As I have said, his

is an example of the sort of view that takes musical
compositions to be some sort of mental entities, an object
of thought that is not physical or sensory.

Collingwood

describes the work of art as an "imaginary object"2.

The

section of his book that deals explicitly with this claim
conveniently uses the "making of a tune", or the composing
of music, as his paradigm case for developing his broader
theory of artistic ontology.
He begins by reminding us that, under the view
developed earlier in his book, the making of "art proper" is
not the making of an artifact; it is not a process of
"fabrication".3

Such activity is characteristic of what he

regards as mere "craft", rather than genuine artmaking.
(Whatever the merits and weaknesses of this distinction, I
shall not address the basis for his view on this issue in
any detail.

Rather, my concern here is to describe how

Collingwood understands compositions.

I am interested

primarily in the implications of his theory as they might
bear upon my central thesis regarding the ontological
conception of compositions.)
What sort of "making• is involved in "art proper"?
Strictly speaking, for Collingwood, artists do not "make"
their artworks; instead, they create them.

In order to

135

clarify this claim, he carefully lays out a distinction
between making and creating.

In so doing, he defines

creating as the special sort of activity artists as artists
perform.

Creating, unlike mere making, does not aim at

achieving a particular outcome or end, does not require any
preconceived procedure, and does not impose
a given matter•.•

0

a new form upon

To do these is to "craft• or fabricate

artifacts, not create artworks. Vet creating is, as
Collingwood points out, conscious, voluntary, and
deliberate, although the creator may not know quite what
will come of his creating.
Underlying these claims is Collingwood's expression
theory of art.

Collingwood believes that genuine artworks,

(•art proper"), are expressions of an artist's imagination
and emotions.

But an artist's expression of emotions

through aesthetic creation must not to be confused with any
intention to arouse or evoke emotions in others.

This later

intention is goal directed; it aims at producing a certain
kind of response in an audience.

Expressing emotions is not

directed toward any preconceived goal or response; rather
works of art express emotions for their own sake.

They give

articulation and form to feelings that often arise
subconsciously and inarticulately.

Purported works of art

that are intended to arouse or evoke certain emotional
responses are, for Collingwood, not products of artmaking,
but are instead products of craftmaking.

J

'
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Collingwood goes so far as to say that an artist does
not know at the beginning of her artistic endeavors just
what character the artwork will take.
No artist, therefore, so far as he is an artist proper,
can set out to write a comedy, a tragedy, an elegy, or the
like. So far as he is an arist proper, he is just as
likely to write any one of these as any other .... s
This is so because art as the expression of emotions is not
essentially a matter of communicating these emotions to an
audience or getting them to feel the same way.

The artist's

primary concern is the expression itself; the mode or form
of the expressed feelings or imaginings is secondary.
For this reason the artist's expression, the artwork,
need not be externalized in a physical or public art object
at all.

Since artworks are intended neither for

communicating to others nor for evoking responses in others,
no publically accessible object is required.

The essential

work of art is therefore sufficiently actualized in the mind
of the artist.

More specifically, the composer's musical

expression, the composition, is the musical idea created
by the composer.

It may or may not ever be sounded as a

performance or written out as a manuscript score.
In distinguishing it from mere making. Collingwood
likens creating to a special sense of planning: a planning
that does not require execution in the form of either
something written down or any sort of fabricated obiect.
Creating artworks is an activity of "imagination".

That is.
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it is a mental activity which does not require construction
of real objects.

Collingwood claims that "a work of art may

be completely created when it has been created as a thing
whose only place is in the artist's mind."5 He compares the
creating of an artwork to an engineer's planning of a
bridge.

Before any drawings are made or specifications

discussed with anyone, the plan for the bridge can be said
to exist in the imagination of the engineer.

Such a plan

for a bridge thus could be referred to as an "imaginary
bridge".

If this plan were executed, then we could refer to

a "real bridge".

But the •real bridgeH and the "imaginary

bridge" remain as distinct entities, the latter having no
dependence upon the former in any significant way.
Note how the conception of planning in this case has
the marks of Collingwood's sense of creating, rather than
mere making.

First, an engineer can plan a bridge without

any specific purpose or end product in mind.

Such planning

might be simply an engineering exercise, an example for a
textbook, a proposal for a contract, and so on.

No

intention to actualize or build the bridge need occur in
order to plan a bridge.
Second, the planning need not follow any preconceived
procedure or specifications.

Again. the result of the

planning may be merely an example or simple musings without
guiding parameters or specifications.

The engineer may

simply •start from scratch" and let her ideas come as they
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will.
And finally, planning a bridge does not consist in
imposing new form on given matter.

As an act of

imagination, no material is there to be formed.

The

execution of a plan for a bridge in the form of drawings or
actual construction would count as an instance of "making•,
not "creating".

Collingwood acknowledges the use of the

word ''plans" for actual drawings on paper; but he denies
that these are the plan as such.

They are only the means by

which the engineer's ideas are communicated to others for
practical purposes.

The drawings are not the plan, rather

they merely represent the "true" plan that exists in the
mind of the engineer.
As goes an engineer's planning of a bridge, so goes a
composer's composing of a musical piece:
When a man makes up a tune, he may and very often does
at the same time hum it or sing it or play it on an
instrument. He may do none of these things, but write
it on paper. Or he may both hum it or the like. and
also write it on paper at the same time or afterwards.
Also he may do these things in public, so that the tune
at its very birth becomes public property .... But all of
these are accessories of the real work. though some of
them are very likely useful accessories. The actual
making of the tune is something that goes on in his
head, and nowhere else.7
It should now be fairly clear as to what Collingwood means
by his claim that the genuine musical artwork, a
composition, is an "imaginary obiect•.
of "imaginative creationu.

Composing is an act

Making a tune is a mental act on

the part of the composer, the product of which is a mental
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entity. As such, according to Collingwood, the artwork is
essentially complete. This creative act does not require the
fabrication of any object, the writing of a score, nor any
sounding of instruments in order to constitute an instance
of composing a musical work.
An important implication of this view is that the
concrete public object, (score, performance, recording,
etc.), is not only inessential to a composer's art-making,
but such an object is not a genuine artwork at all.

Rather,

it is only a vehicle for communicating the musical ideas in
the composer-as-artist's imagination.
the music, the work of art, is not the collection of
noises, it is the tune in the composer's head. The
noises made by the performers, and heard by the audience
are not the music at all; they are only means by which
the audience, if they listen intelligently (not
otherwise), can reconstruct for themselves the imaginary
tune that existed in the composer's head.8
This is a striking claim.

Not only does it characterize the

composition essentally as a mental entity. but CollinQwood
goes further in denying the status of music to the actual
sounds of a performance.
imaginary.

Music is thus fundamentally

Listening to music. it appears. is merely a

matter of getting a composer's musical ideas into your own
imagination.

(Collingwood makes parallel claims for other

art forms as well).
To defend his position, Collingwood compares listeninA
to music to listening to a scientific lecture.

The upshot

of this argument by analogy is that no one confuses the

140

collection of noises uttered by the lecturer with the ideas
or thoughts that are supposed to make up the actual content
of the lecture.

What we are supposed to "get out of" the

lecture are the ideas not the lecturer's spoken sounds.

We

do not go to lectures to hear noises, but to "listen" to the
lecturer's ideas.

Likewise, according to Collingwood, we

are not to get out of the performance of a musical work the
sounds of music, but we are to "reconstruct in our own
minds• the composer's imagined composition.
This comparison seems flawed.

Collingwood's point

concerning the utterences of lecturers seems sensible
enough.

Generally speaking, the sounds of a speaker's voice

are, for the most part, irrelevant to a lecture's content.
The sounds are words that have meaning or reference.

A

lecture which did not consist of meaningful spoken words
would hardly be counted as a genuine lecture.

But musical

performances are surely quite different from lectures on
this very point.

It is not at all clear that musical sounds

refer to or mean anything in the ways that spoken words do.
Moreover, one could plausibly argue that the
relationship between imagined compositions and soundings of
the compositions should be understood as quite the reverse
of how Collingwood portrays it.

That is, compositions exist

for the purpose of aiding in the production of aesthetically
valuable performances.

It is not so much the ideas of the

composer that interest us but the aesthetic satisfaction
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that comes from hearing certain arrangements of musical
sounds.

Much composing is a deliberate effort to formalize

an arrangement of musical sounds so that these sounds may be
repeated in similar fashion over and over again. There is
aesthetic satisfaction and interest in hearing actual
musical sounds and sequences of these sound.

In this way

the composition is taken as the vehicle for making musical
sounds, rather than the sounds as vehicle for communicating
compositions.

More on this point later.

Collingwood recognizes that some listeners attend
performances only for the "sensual pleasures"9 of sounds.
He does not regard this as genuine "listening 0

•

Furthermore, such attention to these sensual pleasures will
impede the genuine appreciation of the musical artwork.
Genuine appreciation requires educated listeners; those
sorts of listeners capable of reconstructing and
understanding the composer's musical ideas.
Must the experience of music be dichotomized into
either sensual pleasure or imagined ideas?

It seems

contrary to general musical practice and experience to deny
that educated, experienced appreciators of music do not. and
indeed ought not, attend closely to the actual sounds of
music for their intrinsic aesthetic value.

Much of the

aesthetic interest in and qualities of the various rhythms.
melodies, harmonies, dynamics, timbres. etc. evident in
performances depend on actual soundings of musical

142

instruments.

The aesthetic value and appreciation of

performed musical works is vastly different from merely
remembering or imagining such works.

Why listen to

different performances of a composer's work if only to
acquaint oneself with his/her ideas?

Once I have gotten the

composer's ideas in my head, why not simply re-imagine the
piece instead of bothering with the costs and other hassles
of attending a performance?
Is it only pure sensual delight that follows from
carefully attending to the physical sounds of a performance?
Or, as Collingwood argues, are these sounds only to be
attended to for the purpose of imaginative reconstructions?
Isn't the conscientious experience of musical performances
richer than the former, yet not so rarified as the latter?
Collingwood's dichotomy might be a false one.
Performers often work very hard at Ngetting the right
sound~.

That is, they aim at aesthetically valuable actual

soundings of their instruments.

In addition. the various

instruments presumably were developed and perfected for the
purpose of creating interesting and diverse musical sounds.
Why have such potential diversity, some of which are highly
subtle, if only to aid listeners in thinking like the
composer or becoming acquainted with his expressions?

Part

of Neducated- listening is an improved ability to recognize
high quality musical sounds produced on fine instruments by
skilled performers.
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The wide ranging differences between individual
instruments and performers certainly seem to be
aesthetically relevant, and composers usually care a great
deal about such aspects of music, but under Collingwood's
view these aspects are not and cannot be significant.

The

only real issue with respect to quality of performance is to
what extent and how clearly the composer's expressive ideas
are conveyed.
But composers, first of all, cannot convey with
conventional notation the nuances of sound possible with
different instruments and by different players of those
instruments.

Secondly, composers may not have any specific

ideas or preferences in these regards anyway; they may and
often do leave these sorts of decisions to performers'
interpretations.

Does Collingwood's position imply that

such nuances are nothing but extraneous embellishments; or
worse, distractions from the "true• composition?

Is a high

quality instrument played by a virtuoso described as such by
Collingwood purely because it is better at aiding listeners
in the reconstruction of the composer's ideas?

Do

performers ever count as artists?
Performances seem to be aesthetically valuable in part
because they allow the exercise and experience of the art of
virtuosity.

Part of virtuosity is interpretive ability:

the expansion of a composer's musical work beyond what is
explicitly contained in its original presentation, usually a
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score.

At least some, if not all, of this interpetation is

expressible only in soundings of a particular instrument by
a particular performer.

The aesthetic qualities of such

performances are not merely a matter of Hsensual pleasure",
since not just any hearer of the sounds can detect their
aesthetic value.
My point here is that Collingwood not only
misconstrues the nature of compositions, but that he
misrepresents and "short-changes• the nature of performance
both from the side of the performer and the side of the
listener.

Performances do depend upon compositions in

crucial ways; but compositions depend upon performances in
ways that are not solely practical.

Collingwood's so-called

educated listener may attend to the actual sounds not merely
for their sensual satisfactions, but for unique aesthetic
experiences unavailable any other way, and these are
experiences often inaccessible to the "uneducated",
inexperienced listener.
Also the performer and her instrument do more than
merely convey the composer's ideas to other listeners.

The

a1m of virtuosity is not simply the pursuit of a more
effective communication of someone else's ideas or the
exquisite presentation of a composer's work.

It includes an

aesthetically motivated desire to make aesthetically
valuable musical sounds in their own right.

A fine

instrument in the hands of an accomplished musician is a
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worthwhile and sought after aesthetic experience somewhat
independent of the specific composition performed.
Collingwood seems to miss this important part of musical
experience.

His theory fails to account for what is

commonly taken to be a principal reason for public
performances:

listening to fine musical sounds.

There is another problem with Collingwood's conception
of musical compositions that does not involve its
implications for performance.

If the actual musical artwork

is essentially mental, something that originates and is said
to properly exist in the mind of the composer, then it would
seem that no one else can have access to the genuine artwork
except the composer.
Mental phenomena as such are private and thus not
available for public inspection.

The representation, in

whatever form provided by the composer (score, tape
recording, etc.), will always be an approximation.

This

somewhat Platonic conception, the notion that the true and
real existent is non-corporeal, the notion that what is
physical and sensuous is inferior, creates certain problems
when it comes to evaluative questions concerning the
composition.

It seems that we can never critique the actual

musical artwork.

One, because the work is, by Collingwood's

definition, private and thereby fundamentally inaccessible.
Two, unless the composer is at the performance to confirm
the adequacy of the performance in representing his/her
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ideas, we cannot know that we are hearing, and thus
reconstructing in our minds, what the composer intended.
Does such a view force us to commit the so-called
"intentional fallacy"?

How can a musical work be evaluated

or appreciated at all without continuously attempting to get
In trying to reconstruct the

at the composer's intentions?

artist's ideas in our own minds we are actively and
deliberately doing what the intentionalist criticism warns
against.

Collingwood's view, in effect, seems to be just

the view that the actual artwork consists of the artist's
intentions.
The intentional fallacy is purported to occur whenever
someone takes the artist's intentions for an artwork as
relevant, if not decisive, for an aesthetic interpretation
and/or evaluation of that artwork.

The critic of

intentionalist approaches to works of art argues that
intentions are "neither available nor desireable as a
standard for judging the success of work ....

"10

The bases

for this view are first, the recognition that artist's
intentions are essentially private and thus virtually
inaccessible to others. The artist may be unavailable
because of death or absence.
reveal his/her intentions.

The artist may choose not to
The artist might not effectively

or accurately communicate his/her intentions for all sorts
of reasons.

Or finally, the artist might not be a good

interpreter of his/her own work.

As the

originators of the
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intentional fallacy thesis, Wimsatt and Beardsley, point
out, "judgement of poems is different from the art of
producing them.u11
A second basis for the intentionalist criticism is the
claim that since intentions are external to the artwork
itself, it follows that they are of no significance to any
aesthetic interpretation of the work.

Intentions are

essentially private to the persons having them.

As private

they are external to the public artifact or public
expression that makes up the artwork under this view.

That

which is external to the actual work of art should not
intrude on an aesthetic interpretation of the work itself.
The work should be evaluated only in term of what is
internal to it; what constitutes the work itself.
Although this critique of the role of the artist's
intentions is aimed explicitly at interpretive and
evaluative considerations, it carries with it some
ontological implications.

First, the view implies that a

genuine artwork must be a public object and not a private
entity of consciousness.

To require examination of

intentions on the part of the artist suggests that the
public artwork is deficient in itself, that it is somehow
incomplete.

The position that disregards intentions takes

the work of art to be an entirely independent object wholly
or sufficiently accessible to a spectator or audience.

Such

an object must be a thoroughly public object; it cannot be a
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mental entity in any way.
A second implication of the intentionalist criticism
is that since intentions are not relevant to the evaluation
of an artwork, they cannot be constitutive of it either.

If

intentions comprised the "true" work of art, and if
intentions are fundamentally irrelevant to interpreting such
works, then there would be nothing left to interpret or
evaluate.
Collingwood's view not only makes the somewhat
uncontroversial claim that artworks somehow originate in the
artist's imagination, but he goes much further in arguing
that the essential artwork is this imagining on the
part of the artist.

In this way, Collingwood's view

implies that the artworks consist of the artist's
intentions; the artist's intentions constitute the real work
of art.

As we have seen, experiencing a work of art

actually amounts to attending to these intentions.
In saying this I have not shown Collingwood's view to
be false.

Rather I have attempted to show its

incompatibility with the intentionalist criticism.

I have

tried to show its fundamental incompatibility with any view
that identifies artworks with a public, physical artifact.
And, I have tried to show its incompatibility with any view
that focuses aesthetic attention or interest on a sensory
experience of this artifact.
in Chapter V.

I shall return to Collingwood
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Nicholas Wolterstorff: Compositions as
Norm-Kinds
In Part Two of his Works and Worlds of Art, Nicholas
Wolterstorff develops a theory of musical compositions that
construes them as what he calls "norm-kinds•.

A chief

feature of such a conception of musical works of art is that
they are to be regarded as a sort of universal, that is, as
non-individuals capable of multiple instances.
construed in this way may have any number,

Compositions

(including zero),

of particular expressions, examples, instantiations, or as
Wolterstorff puts it, occurrences.

Such occurrences may

take the form of scores, performances, or recordings, and as
such may each be referred to by the same name as the
composition.
Nacht

1
•

Thus, "performance of Schoenberg's 'Verklaerte

is to be interpreted as "occurrence- or instance of

Schoenberg's 'Verklaerte Nacht'".12
From a nominalist's perspective such talk is
unacceptable.

In this section I shall attempt to show

(1)

that an alternative nominalistic mode of discourse referring
to compositions and performances is possible and reasonable;
and (2) that Wolterstorff's construal of musical works as
norm-kinds leads to difficulties and misconceptions
concerning the practices of composing and performing music.
Wolterstorff claims that "performing some work of art
consists of bringing about A performance of it .... "13
Later he says, "a performance of a work of art is an
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occurrence of it .... "14

He calls artworks such as these

"occurrence-works", and then argues that "most if not all
occurrence-works are universals."15

From these initial

descriptions he will eventually develop his theory of
compositions as norm-kinds.

Before I comment on his notion

of norm-kinds, I shall consider these initial descriptions.
By describing performances of musical works in the
ways that he does, Wolterstorff appears to have prejudiced
the analysis in favor of a universalistic interpretation
from the beginning.

That is, the language he uses to

characterize performances presupposes that they are
instantiations of universals, and the universals that they
instantiate are the compositions from which they are
derived.

Let me explain.

Although I readily agree that performances are
occurrences, I fail to see why such occurrences must be
taken as occurrences of the work.

To speak of

performances as occurrences of the composer's work is to
presuppose that compositions are universals or abstract
entities of some kind. But we may wish to ask. is
"occurrence of• a proper and necessary interpretation of
"performance of"?

Does "perforMance of A imply "occurrence

of" in the context of music?

I shall argue that it does

not, and that an alternative interpretation is possible and
preferable.
If performances are admittedly occurrences, what then
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are they occurrences of?

When I attend a performance I

listen to the occurrences of certain sounds made in a
certain way, in a certain sequence, at a specifiable time
and place.

Performances are these actual occurrences of

actual sounds.

Therefore, musical performances are

occurrences of musical sounds.

What occurs during a

performance is usually a performance of a musical work,
not the musical work itself.

(Although later I will argue

that improvisations are compositions that are created as
they are performed, thus improvisations would be
performances that are the compositions themselves.)

Simply,

but somewhat awkwardly, put, performances are occurrences of
performances.
To speak of a musical performance as an occurrence of
the musical work, rather than the musical sound-events
that go together to comprise the performance, is to presume
that in hearing the sounds occurring during the performance
a listener is actually hearing the musical work itself, the
musical composition.

If this presumption is made, then the

composition's ontological status will tend to be resolved in
terms of abstract entities.

This is so because the musical

composition will have to be construed as the sort of entity
capable of being present in different places at the same
time.

(No one denies that it is possible if not likely that

there may be more than one performance of "Beethoven's
'Ninth Symphony'" on any given date.)

Thus a composition
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will be construed as an universal, the sort of entity
capable of such multiple occurrences.
I would like to propose a different way of
interpreting the two phrases •performance of" and
•occurrence of• in the musical context.
distinction:

Consider this

Beethoven's •Ninth Symphony• and

"Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'".

The work of art that was

composed by Beethoven can be referred to as Beethoven's
"Ninth Symphony•.

The name Beethoven refers to the

composer, identifying the maker/creator of the artwork
"Ninth Symphony•.
unique object:

Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony• names a

the original composition.

Naming a performance is a somewhat different matter.
To say,

"Last night I listened to a performance of

Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'", is to significantly
under-represent the event; that is, it is an incomplete
description of what actually happened.

A performance is

usually produced by some musician or musicians making
musical sounds.

(John Cage's "4'33°" notwithstanding.

This

is an extremely minimalistic piece comprised entirely of one
musical element, namely, silence.

See Chapter III on

"musical elements•.)
When an orchestra performs Beethoven's work, we are
actually listening to the musical sounds intentionally
produced by that group of persons.

Thus, if The Chicago

Symphony Orchestra, for example, performs the work mentioned
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above, an appropriate description for this performance would
be, The Chicago Symphony's •Beethoven's 'Ninth
symphony'".

That is, the performance, what occurred last

night, was made by The Chicago Symphony.

In this case, the

name The Chicago Symphony identifies the maker/creator
of the musical event attended and attended to last night.
Strictly speaking, "Beethoven" here does not refer to the
maker of the object of our attention; rather, his name
identifies the maker of the composition from which the
performance happens to be derived.

In effect, "Beethoven"

becomes a part of the name of the performance.

Whereas

"Ninth Symphony" names a composition,•Beethoven's 'Ninth
Symphony'" names a performance.
What occurs is not an occurrence of Beethoven's
"Ninth Symphonyu, rather what occurs is a performance of
The Chicago Symphony's "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'".
Thus, we never hear Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•, but only
some musicians' performance of "Beethoven's 'Ninth
Symphony••.

We can only hear sounds, and the composition

under consideration, (Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•), is
not itself made up of sounds, therefore this composition
is not capable of being heard.
Occurrences are events, happenings in space and time.
Wh~t

happens during a performance of Beethoven's work are

sounds and actions, but Beethoven's work doesn't happen
during a performance because his work is not sounds and
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actions, at least not at this time.

Therefore, it appears

that saying we can listen to an occurrence of
Beethoven's work of art is imprecise, since his work is not
occurring at all; it is not the sort of thing that can occur
during a performance.

What we mean when we do speak of

listening to an occurrence of this piece is that we listen
to an occurrence of "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony••, not
Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•.
Now there is a legitimate sense in which we may speak
of the occurrence of Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•.

That

would be when we refer to the occasion of Beethoven's
composing, (the actual selecting and arranging of musical
elements into an intended original).

This is a dateable

event or set of events, and resulted in a particular
artifact:

most likely a manuscript score.

In other words,

Beethoven's •Ninth Symphony• occurred when he made
composed it; "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony••, on the other
hand, occurs whenever a musical performance is created with
the appropriate connections to the original compositional
work

0

Ninth Symphony• by Beethoven.

(These appropriate

connections have been discussed earlier in Chapter III).
Does "performance of x• imply •occurrence of x• as
Wolterstorff seems to think?

I have been trying to show

that the performance of an already existng musical
composition consists of making a different object,

(or more

precisely, an event), distinct from the composition itself.
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To perform a work is not to make the work occur; to result
in an occurrence of the work. The work itself already
occurred at the time of its creation by the composer.

It

may be said to exist, if the manuscript, (or whatever sort
of artifact the original composition is, e.g., tape
composition), has not been destroyed.

We may say that the

"Mona Lisa" occurred at the time daVinci painted it, but
now, instead of saying that it occurs in the Louvre, we say
that it exists there.

In like manner, under my approach to

musical compositions, Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony• occurred
when he composed it, but now exists whereever the manuscript
resides.
To perform a work is thus to bring about a
sound-sequence-occurrence that is derived from an already
existing musical work, i.e., a composition.
(Improvisational compositions are modifications of this
formula, as was described in the previous chapter, in the
sense that, though they are performed musical works, they
are not derived from some already existing work.)
Performing a work consists, in part, of a cultural practice
that amounts to admitting that the musical event being made,
(occurring), is not fully original.

The performance of a

composition is not an occurrence of the composition, rather
it is a unique entity, (i.e., an new individual
ontologically distinct from the composition from which it
was derived), resulting from using a composition as a basis

156

for making choices with respect to musical sounds.
Again, a comparison with painting might be helpful.
If a painter were to make a copy of the •Mona Lisa", we do
not speak of it as an occurrence nor as an instance of the
"Mona Lisa•.

Instead it is called a copy, an imitation, or

possibly a forgery, depending on the circumstances of its
presentation. This painter may or may not intend to make an
indistinguishable copy of the original.

She may succeed in

accomplishing these intentions to varying degrees.

In any

case, the result is a new artifact derived, to some greater
or lesser extent, from an original work of art.

This new

artifact is not an instance nor an occurrence of the
original, daVinci's work of art.
Performing a musical work is somewhat similar.

The

performers are making a new artifact acknowledged to be
derived from some other musical object, the composition.
These performers may or may not intend to perform the work
precisely as the composer is believed to have wanted it.
They may succeed in accomplishing their intentions to
varying degrees.

In any case, their efforts result in a new

artifact, (event/object), derived from and, to some greater
or lesser extent, compliant with, an original composition.
It so happens that, in music, most performers do aim at a
high degree of compliance in doing what the composer wanted.
This is largely a matter of cultural practice, or certain
customary expectations in the musical artworld.
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I do not wish to stretch the comparison between
painting and music too far.

The practices and products of

these two arts are obviously quite different, and these
differences are important.

But I do think, as I have

explained earlier, that they are ontologically more similar
than is usually thought.

Uy thesis continues to be that

musical artworks, (compositions and performances), are
concrete particulars.
controversially so.

I take it that paintings are less
(Clearly, there are those who will

dispute even this claim. I am not concerned here with
defending the notion that all artworks are concrete
particulars.

I am maintaining that if the reader grants

that paintings, or any artworks for that matter, can be
understood as concrete particulars, then musical artworks
may be interpreted in a similar manner.)

Painting thus

provides a useful paradigm art for comparison.
An implication of Wolterstorff's view that
performances are occurrences of the musical work of art, and
that as such the work is a universal, is his claim that
recordings of performances, although not themselves
performances of the work, are nevertheless occurrences of
the work.16

This is admittedly consistent with his

"universalistic• interpretation of musical works.

Once one

has accepted that something other than the work itself can
be an occurrence of it, (as Wolterstorff has done in the
case of performances; he has not said that performances of a
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work are the work, rather they are occurrences of it), then
it

seems evident that there may be various ways that works

can occur.
But if speaking of occurrences of the work in this way
requires accepting the notion that works are universals, how
might a nominalist reinterpret the situation?

I agree with

Wolterstorff that recordings of performances are not
themselves performances. Performances are intentional acts
in which a musician or musicians produce actual
sound-sequence-occurrences. As I have explained in Chapter
III, performances of a composition consist of performers
selecting and arranging musical sounds with the intention of
making these selections based upon the composition.
(Wolterstorff requires that the performance, in addition,
exemplify •the properties normative within the workM.

I

will discuss his notion of "normative within• when I
consider his concept of "norm-kind• below). Recordings are
not performances, and Wolterstorff would concur, because
they are not themselves the results of this intentional
selecting and arranging.
But I do not follow Wolterstorff in his assertion that
a recording of a performance of "Beethoven's 'Ninth
Symphony•• is an occurrence of Beethoven's •Ninth
Symphonyn, the composition.

Indeed, in my view, it is not

even an occurrence of The Chicago Symphony's
"Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony••.

A recording of a
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performance is not an occurrence of the performance.

To

speak this way would be to construe the performance itself
as an abstract entity, since it would permit multiple
instances of this performance at the same time in
different places.

Also, since performances are events and

thus transient, they no longer exist after they have
occurred.

What does not exist certainly cannot be said to

occur.
A number of things seem to be clear about recordings
of performances.

We should distinguish between three senses

of the term "recording•:

(1) the act of recording; (2) the

physical product of that act; and (3) physical copies of
this produced object.

The first involves using certain

sorts of electronic equipment at the time of the
performance-event.

As an action, or set of actions, a

recording in this sense is an occurrence, an occurrence of
recording a performance.
The second sense refers to the object that is made as a
result of using the equipment.

It is thus a physical

"record" of the sound-sequence-occurrence that made up the
performance.

Usually today this object consists of a length

of magnetic tape that has been micro-physically altered so
as to be capable of reproducing a sound-sequence-occurrence
that sounds, to varying degrees, much like the original
performance from which it was made.
Finally, a recording may be a physical object that is
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a copy or reproduction of the original product of the act of
recording.

In this sense, a recording may be another length

of tape made by copying the original tape.

Or this

recording may be in a medium different from the original
recording, (e.g., a grooved vinyl disc).

In any case, this

sense of recording refers to some object derived from the
initial product of the act of recording which is also
capable of reproducing a sound-sequence-occurrence that
sounds, to varying degrees, much like the performance from
which it was ultimately derived.
The phrase "from which it was ultimately derived•
should be interpreted in terms of historical and causal
connections.

That is, the act of recording is an event

occurring simultaneously with the performance.

The product

of this act is, as such, caused by these events.

The

recorded copies of this product are themselves caused by
this product.

Thus, there is an historical and causal chain

of events and objects linking the performance with
subsequent recordings.
The point here is that the relationships between
performances and recording are not to be understood as any
kind of instantiation of an exemplar.

Something is a

recording of a performance not because it is an instance of
the performance, but rather because it is historically and
causally traceable back to a performance.

Furthermore, nor

is the recording an instance of the compositional work,
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since, as was explained in Chapter III, the relationships
between performances and compositions are also historical
and causal, the relationships between recordings and
compositions are also describable in terms of an extended
series of historical and causal connections.
Consider this example.

If someone is said to be

listening to "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'" on a tape
player, what is actually happening is that the person is
listening to, for example, the playback of a copy of
Philips' recording of •The Chicago Symphony•s• performance
of "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'"

Philips has made an

object, (a recording), that was derived from a performance
that was derived from a composition.
Describing the situation in this way does not require
r~ference

to any abstract entities.

The copy of the

recording, the recording, the performance, and the
composition are each concrete particulars, (objects or
events).

They are each unique entities made by different

peraons through various means or processes and in different
media.

The practice of referring to each of these items by

the same name, "Beethoven's Ninth Symphony•, is a matter of
customary shorthand.
For now, the point I am attempting to make is that
recordings in the musical context are not instances,
examples, nor occurrences of the work from which they
were derived. Rather, recordings can function in the audial
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mode the way that photographs can function in the visual
mode.

A photograph of the "Mona Lisa" is never considered

an instance of the "Mona Lisa".

A photograph of the "John

Hancock Building" is not considered an example of it.

A

photograph can •record• some visually perceptible object or
event; whereas a sound recording can •record" some audially
perceptible object or event.
(It should be recalled that, under my view, some
recordings, often on magnetic tape, are themselves
compositions.

Some composers produce "tape compositions•;

that is, they compose their works by means of recording
musical sounds directly onto tape.

Their compositions are

thus not comprised of notational manuscripts.

If a score of

this tape composition is made later, it does not constitute
a composition, rather it would have a similar status as that
of any scored

~

of a manuscript--it would not be a

composi~ion.

A tape composition as a concrete artifact is

the composer's artwork.)
So far I have presented a possible nominalistic
interpretation of discourse about musical compositions,
performances, and recordings.

Unlike Wolterstorff, I do not

see a need to regard performances and recordings as
occurrences or examples of the composition.

I have not

argued that one way of speaking, nominalistically or
"universalistically•, is inherently superior; only that a
nominalistic interpretation of the sort of language
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Wolterstorff uses is plausible and not problemmatic.
Next I shall address Wolterstorff's characterization
of compositions as norm-kinds.

My primary objective will be

to show how this conception leads to some strange, if not
undesirable, implications, and that this suggests that an
alternative conception may be preferable.

My own theory of

compositions as concrete particulars is offered as just such
a preferable alternative.
Wolterstorff believes that musical works are
"norm-kinds".

Not all kinds are norm-kinds.

Norm-kinds are

those sorts of kinds that permit the possibility of
malformed examples of that kind.

For example, the norm-kind

'Dog' allows for a meaningful distinction between
properly-formed dogs and improperly-formed dogs,

(a dog

missing a tail is still a dog, and thus an example of the
kind 'Dog', albeit a moderately malformed one).

On the

other hand, the kind 'Red Thing' is not a norm-kind, since
it is nonsense to speak of an improperly red thing.

It is

not possible to assess a red thing in terms of the degree to
which it is properly red.17
Another way to get at Wolterstorff 's conception of a
norm-kind is through an understanding of his distinction
between properties that are •essential within• and those
that are "normative withinM a given kind.

A norm-kind will

be a kind that has among its constituent properties at least
one property that is normative within it.
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A property normative within a kind is a property
that a properly-formed example of that kind must have.
Wolterstorff 's formal definition is as follows:
The property P is normative within the norm-kind K =
df K is a norm-kind, and it is impossible that there be
something which is a properly-formed example of K and
lacks P.18
By contrast, a property essential within a kind is
formally defined this way:
(Having) the property P essential within K = df P
and K are such that necessarily if something is an
example of Kit has P.19
The central feature of this distinction is represented by
the qualifying phrase nproperly-formed".

In effect, a

property essential within a kind is one that contributes
to determining whether or not some entity is an example of
the kind.

Without this property a thing cannot be an

example of the kind.

But a property normative within a

kind does not play any role in determining whether or not
something is an example of the kind in question.

It

determines rather the degree to which it is
"properly-formed•. It has something to do with how "correct•
an example it is.
Therefore, in the case of the norm-kind 'Dog', the
property of "being an animal• is a property essential
within it.

Something cannot be an example of 'Dog' unless

it possesses the property of "being an animal•.

The

property "having four legs•, on the other hand, is a
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property normative within this kind. Lacking this
property does not undermine a thing's status as an example
of 'Dog', but the lack of this property does indicate that
the example is less than properly formed, that it is
deficient with respect to four-leggedness.
In other words, possessing the property "being an
animal" is a necessary condition for something being counted
an example of the kind 'Dog'; possessing the property
"having four legs• is a necessary condition for something
being counted a properly-formed example of the kind 'Dog'.
It follows then that, "any property essential within a
norm-kind will also be normative within it; but not so vice
versa."20

After all, another property necessary for being

counted a properly-formed dog is "being an animal"; but as
should be quite clear, it is not necessary that all dogs
possess the property of

0

having four legs• in order to

qualify as examples of 'Dog'.
What of so-called •accidental properties•?
Wolterstorff does not discuss any properties accidental
within, and with good reason.

The sorts of properties he

has described are those that go toward characterizing kinds
themselves.

Any given kind will be determined only by

properties necessary to its character.

0

Normative" and

"essential" properties are properties within the kind;
they are somehow constitutive of the kind.

"Accidental•

properties, on the other hand, are not the sort of
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properties that are within the kind.

Such properties

would attach to exa•ples of a kind, but not to the kind
itself.

It would appear then that kinds as kinds do not

have properties accidental within.

Therefore,

norm-kinds have two sorts of properties:

those essential

within and those nor•ative within.

Exa•ples of norm-kinds

can have three sorts of properties:

essential, normative,

and accidental.
The norm-kind 'Dog' possesses the properties of "being
an animal" and "having four legs".

A dog must be an animal

in order to be considered an example of 'Dog'; it must have
four legs to be considered a properly-formed example of
'Dog'; but it may be virtually any color whatsoever,
(essential, normative, and accidental properties
respectively).
This theory of norm-kinds has application to music in
the following manner.

Musical works, or compositions, are

norm-kinds, according to Wolterstorff.

As such they possess

properties essential within them and properties normative
within the•.

Performances, which are examples, or

occurrences, of musical norm-kinds, must possess all the
properties essential within the work in order to count as
performances of the work.

Furthermore, they must possess

the properties normative within the work in order to count
as "correct" performances of the work.

This last feature of

the work/occurrence relationship is particularly important
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to Wolterstorff.

He takes it that an adequate theory of

musical works and performances must be able to account for
the generally accepted view that works may have incorrect
performances.

(His criticism of Nelson Goodman's theory

centers on just this issue.21)
An incorrect performance, on Wolterstorff's theory of
norm-kinds, would be any performance that lacks some
property normative within its associated work, the
composition.

It should be clear by now that, unless some

property normative within a work is also essential within
it, some performance's failure to possess a normative
property and thereby be an incorrect performance is not
decisive against a performance's status as a performance of
that work.

An incorrect performance of a work is usually

still a performance of it.
At what point divergence from the properties normative
within a work a performance ceases to be an example of the
work at all Wolterstorff does not specify.

This seems

sensible since it is not clear how it could be otherwise.
Properties normative within a kind simply do not play a role
in determining that a thing is an example of the kind.
does say that performing

He

of a work consists, in part, of

bringing about •a sound-sequence-occurrence ... which comes
fairly close to exemplifying the acoustic and
instrumental properties normative within that work .... "22
(emphasis mine).
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To summarize Wolterstorff's position thus far:
Musical works are norm-kinds, and as such possess properties
normative within them that establish criteria for evaluating
the correctness of examples of the work.

Any example of the

work may be more or less correct according to the degree to
which the example manifests the properties normative within
the musical work from which it is derived.
Let us now examine what Wolterstorff has to say about
composing and performing.

This will provide us with a

fuller understanding of the implications of his theory.
Some of these implications will provide points for criticism
later on.

Since musical works consist largely of properties

normative within them, composing consists most simply of
selecting such properties.

More specifically,

in selecting a set of properties as criteria for
correctness of occurrence the composer composes a work.
And the work composed •.• is that one which has exactly
those properties and their prerequisites as normative
within it.23
In this way, a composer uniquely determines a musical
norm-kind that may serve as a guide for making musical
sound-sequence-occurrences, (variously described as examples
of the kind or as occurrences of the work).
A few observations are in order here.

Since musical

works are norm-kinds and composers are those persons who
select the properties normative within the work,
Wolterstorff argues that composing consists of
intentionally selecting properties for the purpose
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of determining correctness of occurrence.
then is that improvising is not composing.

What this implies
Improvisation,

as was discussed in Chapters I and III, is the musical
practice of performing musical sounds, to varying degrees,
extemporaneously.

That is, the performing musician makes

sound selections at the moment of performance somewhat
spontaneously and somewhat independently of the composition.
She may go outside the specified elements of the composition
by adding embellishments; she may alter, in large measure,
various components of the piece, or she may even create
completely new passages of music on the spot.
Improvising does indeed involve selecting musical
properties, but it does not involve doing so for the
purpose of determining correctness of occurrence for some
subsequent sound-sequence-occurrence.

Wolterstorff

emphasizes this aspect of improvisation in his denial of its
status as genuine composing.

In his terminology, the

improvising musician is not selecting properties normative
within a kind, therefore she is not producing a norm-kind,
and so she is not composing a work.

Improvisations are thus

never themselves compositions. I will have more to say about
this conclusion later.
Another point to be noted is that performances are not
the only sort of examples that a musical composition can
have. Sound recordings may be examples of a work in so far
as they come "fairly closeu to exemplifying the

prope~ties
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normative within the work.
for correctness
performances.

o~

Thus recordings are evaluated

occurrence in the same way as

If a composer were to specify that "being

performedN is normative within the work, does this mean,
under Wolterstorff's view, that a recording of such a
performance is not an occurrence of the work?

Not at all;

it would only follow that the recording was a less than
correct occurrence.

But what if a composer claims that the

property "being a performanceN is essential within the work?
According to Wolterstorff 's conception of composing, a
composer cannot do this.

Composing is essentially the

selecting of properties which determine correctness of
occurrence, i.e., properties normative within, not selecting
properties essential within.

Wolterstorff does not explain

why composing should be limited only to selecting normative
properties; it appears that he merely stipulates this.
(Actually, he seems somewhat unclear on this point.)
Could a composer compose a work that is unperformable?
An interesting and important feature of norm-kinds, as
construed by Wolterstorff, is their complete independence
from any examples.

That is, a norm-kind does not need to

have any examples in order to exist.24

Therefore, a

compositional work need never be performed, recorded, or
otherwise instantiated to be counted as a genuine work.
Such a claim is justified by Wolterstorff first, on
theoretical grounds, that as a sort of universal, norm-kinds
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have the crucial characteristics of universals. One such key
characteristic of universals, as traditionally understood,
is their capacity for existence independent of
instantiation.

Wolterstorff argues that just as the

universal or idea of 'Dog' could be said to exist even if no
actual dogs existed, or just as the kind 'Unicorn' exists
uninstantiated, so a norm-kind such as 'Beethoven's Ninth
Symphony' could be said to exist even if it were never
performed.
A second justification he offers is the common sense
recognition of the fact that composers sometimes have
trouble getting their works performed, especially if these
works are highly unconventional or the composer is little
known.

Our ability to meaningfully talk about and identify

such unperformed works is evidence to their status as
genuine works.

The point is that composers can produce

works of compositional music that yet go unperformed or
unsounded.

This is not an uncommon occurrence in the real

world of musical practice.

Therefore, we can acknowledge

the existence of unperformed or even unperformable musical
works.
We now arrive at a somewhat strange element in
Wol ter·storff' s theory.

He says on page 67,

"we must not

overlook the fact that there are musical works which were
probably never composed."

He gives as an example what he

calls "works of indigenous folk music", which he claims,
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"just emerged from performances.u25

In other words, the

work is not the product of any identifiable person's act of
selecting normative properties, instead the properties are
recognized and used to determine correctness of performance
or occurrence.

Thus, he suggests distinguishing

of originators of musical works:
practitioners.
of somebody.

~wo

sorts

composers and

Further, he adds, "a work is always a work
Nothing is ever a work of music without, in

one or the other of these two ways, being the work of some
person or persons."2ti
The first peculiarity here is Wolterstorff's claim
that some works are uncomposed.

It may be that some of the

works he is referring to are not so much uncomposed, as they
are the product of some unknown composer, forgotten or
unidentified.

Alternatively, folk music of the sort he

describes may have resulted from the combined efforts of
many individuals, again with lost identities.

Such works

could still be described as composed but again by unknown
composers.

Surely the inability to identify composers

should not count against a work's status as composed.
Wolterstorff does not clearly explain the alleged process by
which practitioners generate musical works, so it is
difficult to evaluate the plausibility of his suggestions on
this matter.

But if we grant that there actually are works

that have simply "emerged• from the practice of making music
without any explicit intention of selecting normative
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properties, why must we regard these as uncomposed?
As with his objection to regarding improvising as a
form of composing, it seems that Wolterstorff is determined
to confine composing to the intentional selection of
normative properties.

That is, composers must have as part

of their intention, as they go about the selection
process, that the choices they make be taken as normative
for subsequent occurrences.

Improvisors and practitioners

are not composers because they do not explicitly propose
that their musical selections be used as instructions for
future musical products.
Nevertheless, so-called practitioners apparently do
produce musical works, describable as uncomposed norm-kinds;
whereas, improvisors apparently do not produce works, rather
they produce what might be referred to as uncomposed
non-kinds.

Although he does not say so, it would seem that

if an improvisation were recorded or rememebered and then
imitated to some degree and repeatedly so, that such an
improvisation may eventually become the sort of work that
Wolterstorff regards as the product of practitioners rather
than composers.

Thus, in this way an improvisation may

evolve into or become a work
Since, "for Wolterstorff, works are kinds, and since
kinds are the sorts of things that are capable of having
examples, and since improvisations are unique individual
events which lack the capacity for multiple instantiation,
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(although we may wonder whether Wolterstorff would consider
recordings of an improvisation occurrences of the
improvisation and thus examples of it?); therefore,
improvisations cannot be regarded as any sort of kind, and,
as such, cannot be regarded as works. Thus, not only are
improvisations not compositions, but they are not musical
works.
Wolterstorff acknowledges that improvisations may
become compositional works if the performer later goes about
making a score based upon the performed improvisation.

He

says,
Suppose that someone has improvised on the organ. And
suppose that he then goes home and scores a work of such
a sort that his improvisation, judged by the
requirements for correctness specified in the score, is
at all points correct.
In spite of that, the composer
did not compose his work in performing his
improvisation.
In all likelihood, he did not even
compose it while improvising. For in all likelihood
he did not, during his improvising, finish selecting
that particular set of requirements for correctness of
occurrence to be found in his score.27
This description of improvisation seems consistent with
Wolterstorff's theory of musical works as norm-kinds.

But

it leads to a perplexing dilemnta.
Suppose that some performer, or group of performers,
improvises an extended musical passage with a clear
beginning and ending.

Someone else, by virtue of an

excellent memory or a sound recording of the event, produces
a detailed score of this musical performance.

Clearly,

under Wolterstorff's view, we have a musical work.

The
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score allows for the production of examples of
sound-sequence-occurrences that can be judged for
correctness according to the indicated normative properties
contained within the score.
Who is the composer of this work?

According to

Wolterstorff's characterization, neither improvisor nor
score-writer can qualify as composer.

The improvisor cannot

be the composer because he never intended that his musical
selections be taken as normative for future performances.
He may never consent to this scoring, (the scoring is
unknown to him, he may die soon afterward, he may even
refuse to authorize the scoring), and so never confirm the
properties of his performance as normative.
The score-writer cannot be the composer, under
Wolterstorff's view, because, although she may intend that
the score be taken as describing normative properties for
subsequent musical occurrences, she did not select these
properties herself.

(Besides, if Wolterstorff's theory did

lead to the conclusion that the score-writer is the
composer, so much the worse for the theory.

Such a

conclusion would be quite counter-intuitive and inconsistent
with general musical custom.)
Not only is such a situation as described possible,
but it is quite probable, especially within musical idioms
that often emphasize improvisation, such as jazz, blues, and
rock.

It is not uncommon for performers in these styles to
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be:

("1) unable to score their own music, since they do not

know or use musical notation; and/or (2) uninterested in
setting their music down as compositional works.
Wolterstorff may simply argue that these works
resulting from improvisational performances are uncomposed
works.

The notion of uncomposed works may be troubling in

itself to some of us, but in this case what makes the claim
seem particularly odd is that we can clearly identify the
person or persons directly responsible for the existence of
the work.

Vet, because of certain criteria established by

Wolterstorff, namely, the intention to make a work and the
selection of normative properties, such persons are denied
the status of composers.
I would now like to consider another peculiar
consequence of Wolterstorff's theory of musical works as
norm-kinds.

On page 88, he says, "if the ontological

principles in accord with which we have been conducting our
investigation are correct, then no kinds come into or go out
of existence.•

He then adds that since musical works are

kinds, " a composer does not bring that which is his work
into existence.

Musical works exist everlastingly."28

(We

may note that by 'modus tollens', any suspicions concerning
the consequent of the above stated conditional, i.e., "no
kinds come into or go out of existence•, would have direct
bearing on the soundness of Wolterstorff's "ontological
principles".

In other words, if it is spurious that.kinds
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exist everlastingly, then the ontological theory upon which
such a claim is dependent is also spurious.)
Instead of assessing the whole of his theory of kinds,
I shall examine its specific application to music.

Is it

reasonable to accept the conclusion that •musical works
exist everlastingly"?

First of all, Wolterstorff seems to

contradict himself on this point.

As we may recall, he said

that •a work is always a work of somebody.•29

How can

something be the product of some person's efforts if it has
always existed?

If musical works exist everlastingly, then

they predated the existence of the composer.

Wolterstorff

says,
What the composer does must be understood as consisting
in bringing it about that a preexistent kind becomes ~
work--specifically, a work of his. To compose
is not to bring into existence what one composes. It is
to bring it about that something becomes a work .... The
only thing a composer normally brings into existence is
a copy, a token, of his score.30
I think this passage is somewhat confused.

If musical works

exist everlastingly, then how is it that a composer brings
it about "that a preexistent kind beco111es
work already exists?
already is.

~

work• if the

Something cannot become what it

If musical works exist everlastingly, then in

what sense does a composer select normative properties? or
is it really a matter of discovering them?
Additional strange implications of the claim that
works exist everlastingly seem to follow:
(1)

All works past, present, and future have aiways
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existed and will always exist; and a large number of these
are uncomposed.
(2)

There are an infinite number of existing

musical works, the vast majority of which will never be
composed, (i.e., no person intentionally selects properties
normative within the work), nor heard.

Since there would

seem to be an infinite variety of possible combinations of
musical properties, and it is possible that any of these
combinations could be selected and arranged by some composer
at some time, then each of these infinite combinations must
be considered a work, and furthermore, as a work, each must
be everlastingly existent.
(3) Since improvisations are not compositions and not
works, and since compositions are not created by their
composers31, does this mean that improvisations might
qualify as genuinely created by their improvisors?

Since an

improvisation is not a kind, but instead an individual,
ther~

is nothing to preclude it from being regarded as a new

and original created object.

This does not imply that

improvisations are created, only that it appears they
might be.

Could it be then that improvisors are creators,

whereas composers are not?

An odd consequence indeed.

As we have seen with Collingwood earlier and with
Wolterstorff now, it is quite apparent that the ways in
which musical compositions are construed ontologically can
lead to interesting yet problematic implications.
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Ontological commitments in musical contexts are not without
aesthetically significant consequences.
for my

examina~ion

A principal purpose

of the preceding views and the one to

follow is not so much to show the views talse, (although I
am inclined to think they are less than adequate), nor
merely provide theoretical contrasts with my own view.
Rather, I hope to reveal the sorts of implications
ontological commitments in music have, and leave the
suggestion that theoretical accuracy in this context is
partly a function of a theory's ability to fit musical
experience and practice.

So far, I think I have raised at

least some important inadequacies in this regard with
respect to the presented theories.

Let us examine one more

proposal.
William Webster: Compositions as
Abstract Particulars
One additional ontological characterization of musical
compositions that I should like to consider is a theory
developed by William Webster.

His view consists in

regarding musical works as •abstract particulars•.

Whereas

Wolterstorff has described compositions as "norm-kinds•, a
sort of universal; and I have described them as •concrete
particulars•, a sort of individual; Webster prefers to
describe musical works as "abstract particulars•, an
ontological category lying somewhere between individuals and
universals.

For Webster, compositions are not properly
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understood as either individuals or universals.
To begin with, Webster distinguishes universals from
individuals in terms of what I shall construe as four key
features:
(1) physical uniqueness and temporal specificity.
(2) spatial and temporal continuity, (or contiguity).
(3) capacity for multiple instantiations.
(4) independence from individual realization.
Individuals are identifiable as manifesting features (1) and
(2); universals manifest features (3) and (4); and as we
shall see, abstract particulars manifest, in a sense,
features (1) and (3).

Note that for each of the three

ontological categories, (universal, individual, abstract
particular), two features are affirmed for that category,
while the remaining two features are denied.

For example,

an individual may be defined positively as an entity
physically unique, temporally specific, and spatially and
temporally continuous.

Or it may be defined negatively as

the sort of entity that is not capable of multiple
instantiations and is entirely dependent upon individual
realization for its existence.

Similarly, universals may be

understood negatively as the sorts of purported entities
that do not exist in any physical, temporal, or
continuous, (i.e., contiguous), way.
The characterization of the distinction between
universals and particulars in the above manner is
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sufficiently consistent with what has preceded it in this
paper that little more need be said about it.
Webster's notion of abstract particulars?

But what of

Let us now

examine how they differ from both universals and individuals
within the context of the four features mentioned above.
As stated earlier, abstract particular may be
understood as referring to the ontological category
manifesting features (1) and (3).

At first gloss it seems

quite strange to say of a thing both that it is physically
unique and temporally specific and that it is capable of
multiple instantiations.

What Webster means by such claims

shall now be spelled out.
Under Webster's view, abstract particulars, like
universals, are themselves neither spatially nor temporally
continuous entities.

That is to say, they may be understood

as capable of existing in more than one place at more than
one time.

For example, the universal 'Dog' is supposed to

be present, in some manner or other, in each of any number
of spatially and temporally separate individual dogs.

The

abstract particular 'Beethoven's Ninth Symphony' is likewise
existent somehow, according to Webster, in each of any
number of spatially and temporally separate musical
realizations that warrant the title "Beethoven's Ninth
(What permits such warranting of a title for
Webster will be discussed below). How then is the notion of
abstract particulars to be distinguished from that of
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universals?
Unlike universals, abstract particulars, as described
by Webster, do not exist independently of their
realizations.

Whereas the universal 'Dog' requires no

instantiations in order to exist as a universal,
'Beethoven's Ninth Symphony' must be realized in some medium
or other in order to properly say of it that it exists.

As

Webster puts it,
The distinguishing feature of an abstract particular is
that it does not exist at all unless it exists at some
place at some time, but its identity is independent of
the continuity of times and places at which it exists.
An abstract particular exists wherever and whenever it
is realized, and unrealized does not exist at all.32
Thus, abstract particulars manifest feature
that they must

~e

medium or other.

(1)

in the sense

physically and temporally realized in some
Webster mentions that in the case of music

such realizations are usually either scores or performances;
but other media are availible:

"topological makeup of the

grooves on a record, radio waves traveling in space,
magnetic patterns on tape, ... ,"31 and so on.
In these latter terms, Webster's and my views are
somewhat compatible.

It would seem safe to say that in

certain respects Webster's theory of compositional works
appears to be a physicalist theory, as is mine.

When he

says that, "there is no work independent of a realization
and no realization without a medium,"32 and the examples he
gives of the various media are all physical, it seems
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justifiable to conclude that all musical works, under
Webster's view, are physical entities.
a bit unclear about this.

Actually, Webster is

He says that all works must be

realized in some medium, and that each realization is an
individual.

He has already defined individuals, in part, as

essentially "physically unique•.

Vet later on, in the

context of his discussion of authoritative realizations,
(which I will address shortly), he says, "the authoritative
realization may be in the composer's mind."34

It is not

clear how such a mental realization could be regarded as
"physically unique and temporally specific".

Webster does

not explain this.
But Webster and I diverge more significantly with
respect to his claim that musical works manifest what I have
called feature (3).

That is, Webster believes that musical

works, as abstract particulars, are capable of multiple
instantiations, or as he puts it, "discontinuous existence".
Discontinuous existence is essentially a denial of feature
(2), a definitive characteristic of individuals.

For

Webster, whatever is an abstract particular is not an
individual just because it can be said to exist in more than
one place at more than one time.
An abstract particular may exist in realizations (which
are individuals) which are discontinuous spatially and
temporally with one another. All of its realizations
are individuals, but the abstract particular is not
identical with any of its realizations, and yet is
identical in all of its realizations.33
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In this way, insofar as Webster and I might agree that
musical works must be physically actualized, we disagree
over his claims that, (a) a musical work is not identical
with any single individual, and

(b) a work may exist

equally in multiple realizations.
It is on just these points that Webster's theory is
not nominalistic, and thus distinct from my theory.

As such

this fact alone certainly does not count against its
adequacy, unless of course one is a nominalist.

My

intention at this point is merely to clarify the essential
distinctions between my approach and others; and to indicate
that what we have in Webster's theory is an approach that
appears to be physicalistic, like mine, (but unlike either
Collingwood's or Wolterstorff 's), yet at the same time,
unlike mine, (but similar to Wolterstorff 's), is not
particularistic. (Although Webster calls musical works
abstract particulars, I do not believe that his conception
of works is actually particularistic, and so "abstract
particular" may not be, in my view, an accurate name for the
ontological category he develops.

I shall examine this

question of terminology in the next chapter.)
In order to more fully understand Webster's theory, it
is necessary to examine some other aspects of his proposed
conception of musical works.
Two elements of Webster's theory are specifically
relevant and important to the context of my thesis.

First,
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his description of compositions as •two dimensionalu
abstract particulars.

Second, his notion of "authoritative

realization".
Webster states that "a work of musical composition is
an abstract particular in two dimensions.

The work exists

whenever, and only whenever these dimensions are realized in
some medium."37

These two dimensions consist of relations

organized tonally (or vertically) and rhythmically (or
linearly).

The relata of these dimensional relations may be

virtually anything as long as "they are elements of a
potential medium for work realization".38

For example, a

composition realized 1n the medium of sound as a performance
would consist of sounds related to one another in terms of
tonal intervals, (changes in pitch), and rhythmic intervals,
(changes in duration and accents of sounds over time).

A

score, on the other hand, is a realization in the medium of
notation in which various symbols, ("notational phenomena•),
are related to one another in such a way that some symbols
describe tonal intervals and others describe rhythmic
intervals.
Webster wishes to emphasize, at this point, that
musical elements, (the relata of dimensional organization),
in whatever medium, are, by themselves, minimally
significant.

What is most significant are the relations or

intervals between the elements.

More simply, the identity

of a composition is a matter primarily of the way in which
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musical elements are arranged.

A performance of a

composition, for instance, is not merely the collection of
certain musical tones and rhythms, but the proper sequence
and arrangements of these certain tones and rhythms.
Now the identity of most any compound individual is to
some extent a function of the arrangement and relations of
its constituent parts.

The relational arrangement of my

body parts has much to do with my individual identity; not
just any arrangement will do.

Clearly, Webster is saying

more than that the way the relata are related is crucial to
some work's identity.

He is indicating something about how

these relations are decisive for identifying realizations of
some given musical work, i.e., how each of several
realizations are realizations of a single work.
In attempting to clarify just how this is so, he says,
"every correct and complete realization of a work is
isomorphic with some authoritative realization of the work
with respect to the ordered sets of relations in each
dimension."39

Thus, a genuine realization is something that

manifests a set of relations specific to that work.

What

are most important are the relations, not the relata.
Webster has now introduced his notion of
"authoritative realization•.

Such a realization is defined

as that realization which serves to identify "violations of,
deviation from, and alternative work realizations."40
Authoritative realizations function similarly to
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Wolterstorff's norm-kinds: they help us distinguish correct
from incorrect performances, scores, recordings, etc.

As

was partially described above, Webster's view is that
whatever realization is taken as authoritative, any other
realization which is isomorphic with it counts as a correct
and complete realization of the work.

It should be noted

that Webster is not identifying the composition with its
authoritative realization; rather, it serves only a
practical function for identifying more or less accurate
realizations of a work.
The following characteristics of authoritative
realizations (henceforth AR) may help clarify Webster's
notion further:
(1)

ARs need not be temporally prior to any other

realization.

An AR is not necessarily the original or first

realization of a work.

Rather, the AR is whatever

realization is given or taken to have the proper authority.
Webster does not specify how this occurs; partly because
there are any number of ways that it could.

He does say

that, "The justification for considering a particular
realization to be authoritative is pragmatic, not
logical."41

In other words, there are no specifiable rules

or criteria for determining which realizations are ARs, such
as temporal priority.
(2)
AR.

The compositional work is not identified with the

The AR only provides the means for comparing and
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contrasting various realizations of the work, but the AR is
itself not the work.
(3)

Any given composition may or may not have an AR.

Or there may be more than one competing ARs.
for various reasons.

The composer may not have indicated

what would count as the AR.
or unknown.

This may be so

The composer's AR may be lost

There may be conflicting views over which of

two or more competing ARs is the true AR.

And so on.

Earlier I mentioned that Webster claims that an AR
could exist in the composer's mind.

I suspect that a

justification he might offer for this claim would be that
such an occurrence qualifies as a realization in a medium to
the extent that it is spatially unique and temporally
specific insofar as it is a mental phenomenon in the mind of
the composer.
I shall leave further commentary on Webster's theory
for the next chapter, in which the issues and the
perspective he presents will be discussed directly and in
the context of the other two theories discussed in the
present chapter.

I shall set my proposed theory in

opposition to these three by means of a typology using a
specified conception of the terms of concrete, abstract,
particular, and universal.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
I have characterized my proposal for a nominalistic
theory of compositions in terms of what I have called
"concrete particulars".

I have done so not because I

believe a nominalistic theory must consider them in such
terms; rather,

(1) since they are artifacts, I think musical

compositions are best understood as concrete pariculars;
and (2) if compositions can be construed as concrete
particulars, a nominalism with respect to musical entities
is clearly attainable.

After all, concrete particulars are

necessarily and noncontroversially individuals; and a
nominalism is just that ontological perspective that
countenances only individuals.
If this first objective can be accomplished, an
additional task, which would aim toward developing a fuller
nominalistic treatment of music as a whole, would be to show
how, in terms of individuality alone, these
compositions-as-individuals are related to what are referred
to as their performances and other so-called "examples",
(scores, recordings, etc.).

But the notion of musical

compositions as individuals is the toughest nut to crack, so
189
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to speak, on the way to a nominalistic ontology of music.
The sense in which this is the case was discussed at length
in Chapter I.

Simply put, the apparent problem is that

compositions have seemed to some to be related to their
so-called examples in a way that suggests they are best
construed as some sort of universals or other abstract
entities, i.e., non-physical entities capable of multiple
realizations or instantiations.

Typically, performances or

other occurrences of a composition appear as associated in
such a way that it is presumed that the composition itself
is somehow evident or present in its realizations.
Therefore, it may seem that compositions just cannot be
individuals in the way that, say paintings or sculptures
seem to be.

I have attempted to show otherwise.

I think I have provided, in what has preceded, a
plausible account of musical compositions, (and music
generally), that construes them as concrete particulars.

If

this is true, then I believe I have gone some distance in
accomplishing a goal I set out for myself from the beginning
of this dissertation.

I have aimed at producing an

alternative limiting theory, cast in nominalistic terms,
that fits within an array of theories that has been produced
by others.

My hypothetical adventure consisted of

developing a theory within certain parameters; that is, all
musical entities were to be described as individuals.
The three theories of musical compositions discussed

191

in Chapter IV are also, I believe, limiting theories of
sorts.

In the present chapter, I shall attempt to show more

explicitly how these four theories,

(mine and the others),

indicate four distinct directions a musical ontology may
take.

I shall do so by combining the specified uses of a

set of four terms into four main positions that may then be
applied to the sorts of ontological considerations I have
been investigating.

More specifically, these four positions

will serve to identify or demarcate what I think are four
principal ontological conceptions of musical compositions.
Four Ontological Categories
The four terms that shall provide the language for
characterizing the four ontological categories under
consideration are:
'universal'.

'concrete',

'abstract',

'particular', and

As I shall attempt to indicate, these terms

may be understood as fitting together in four important
ways.

Since 'concrete' and 'abstract' will be shown to be

contrast terms, as will 'particular' and 'universal', the
following, in no significant order, may be regarded as the
possible alternative conceptions of the ontological status
of something:
(1)

concrete particular;

(2)

abstract particular;

(3)

abstract universal;

(4)

concrete universal.
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Let me begin by briefly summarizing points I have made
earlier and throughout this dissertation about the four
elementary terms from which these categories are derived.
But before I go any further, I should make clear that
although I will be describing certain ontological
categories, such descriptions are to be understood as
entirely theoretical.

That is, I will be making no claims

as to whether or not anything exists within any given
category as described.

Part of my purpose in presenting

these categories is that I think an ontology is largely
describable in terms of which categories are taken as
identifying genuine existents.
Under the use I propose for the term 'concrete',
something is said to be concrete if it is describable as
physical or capable of intersubjective perception.

It is

identifiable as something composed of matter, (however
matter is to be understood); and/or it is perceivable with
the senses.

As I explained before, I am simply assuming for

the purposes of this dissertation that material objects
exist and that there are sensory perceptions.

My intention

is not to solve or even address any of the well-known
controversies over such matters as matter and perception.
Nothing I say turns on any conclusions about such claims
anyway.

Rather, all that is required in the present context

is the acknowledgement that we can and do at least talk
about physical objects and intersubjective sensory
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experience.

My point here is that we can distinguish

descriptions of physical objects and sensory experiences
from other sorts of descriptions, and that such physical and
phenomenal descriptions are descriptions are of what I shall
call concrete entities.

Therefore, anything that can be

described as physical (material) or capable of
intersubjective sensory apprehension can be referred to,
under the proposed terminology, as concrete.
Traditionally, the term concrete has had a use
indicating some sense of being composite, compound, coming
together, and so on.

Thus, concrete has been used, for

example, to refer to the way in which an abstract quality is
united, combined, or embodied in substance or matter.

Thus,

a thing was said to be concrete, whereas a quality or
attribute was said to be abstract.

In order to avoid the

complex metaphysics implied by such a characterization of
the meaning of this notion, I am suggesting that the term
has a genuine use referring simply to something just being
material or sensory.

Again, to describe something as

physical or perceptual is to describe it as concrete.
One proviso with respect to what I am calling sensory
or perceptual should be kept in mind.

I wish to distinguish

such notions from what have sometimes been referred to as
"internal sensations".

That is, I take dreams,

hallucinations, mental images, and any other sort of
experiences that are not purported to originate outside the
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perceiver and to be accessible through the sensory organs,
to be included among those things which I shall eventually
describe as abstract rather than concrete.

This is why I

have said that sensory experience which is concrete is
"intersubjective".

That is to say, such experience is in

some sense objective or publically accessible by means of
the senses.

But this is not to say that all concrete

things are directly and publically accessible with the
senses.

For example, atoms would seem to be appropriately

described as concrete, yet they are not sensory, strictly
speaking.

Thus, it would seem that anything that is

physical may be said to be concrete, and anything that is
intersubjectively perceptual may also be said to be
concrete; but not everything that is said to be concrete is
perceptual.
In contrast to 'concrete', the term 'abstract' will be
used to refer to what is not describable as physical or
intersubjectively perceptual.

What we usually refer to

generically as 'ideas' are prime examples of what I have in
mind for the term abstract. I shall use the term abstract in
such a way that it may serve to identify or describe such
various things,

(or purported things), as ideas, mental

conceptions, forms, structure, spirits, souls, and so on.
To the extent that such things are apprehended, it is not by
means of the sensory organs; and to the extent they may be
said to exist, they are not properly conceived as being
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material.
For the purposes of the present discussion,
'particular' shall be understood as synonymous with the term
'individual'.

Something is particular when it is singular

and not general or universal.

A key feature of a particular

is that it can be located in a specifiable place and at an
identifiable time.

A particular does not exist in more than

one place at one time; it has a definite spatial and
temporal identity.
It should be pointed out that a particular is not
necessarily concrete.

Given what was said about the notion

of abstract, and if there are such things, it could be that
something can be both particular and abstract. For example,
my memory of some event is an idea and so it is abstract,
under my view; but the occasion of having that idea is
identifiable with the time I have the memory, and with the
place where I am when I have it; thus, it is a particular
idea.

The idea is occurring here and now with me, not

nowhere at no time, nor elsewhere at many times.

We do

speak of different persons having the same idea, or the one
person having the same idea twice.

Whether such talk should

be taken literally or not as implying multiple existence of
the same thing is an important question.

(As we shall see,

such descriptions of ideas would class them as universals).
But my only point here is that we can regard or describe
certain ideas as abstract and particular. They would be
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non-concrete things that are, in a sense, spatially and
temporally locatable; thus they are particulars.

Another

example of an abstract entity which is also a particular
might be a Cartesian human soul.

Such a conception of a

person's soul would claim that a soul exists during a period
of time that is identifiable, and this soul can exist with a
body at some identifiable place.

I wiil say more about

'abstract particulars' shortly.
Finally, the term 'universal' shall be understood to
refer to entities which are not identifiable with a specific
time or place; rather, a universal is said to be capable of
multiple existence or realization.

A universal is purported

to be the sort of thing that may exist in more than one
place at one time.
'particular'.

'Universal' is thus the contrast term to

It should be made clear that it is not

necessarily the case that a universal as such, (or what is
purported to be a universal), must actually be instantiated
or realized in order to exist, only that it can so exist.
Particulars cannot exist in this way at all.
We are now in a position to combine the elementary
terms into the four basic ontological categories mentioned
above.

The four categories are again (1) concrete

particular; (2) abstract particular; (3) abstract universal;
and (4) concrete universal.

These are the four meaningful

combinations of the four terms thus far described.

Given

the ways that the terms were defined, such combinations as
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'particular universal' or 'concrete abstract' are not
possible, much like 'odd even'.
using the terms,

Besides, the way that I am

'particular' and 'universal' are generally

used as nouns, whereas 'abstract' and 'concrete' usually
function as adjectives.
A concrete particular is something which is a
physical, singular individual, and it exists and is
locatable in space and time.

Often, but not always,

concrete particulars are publically observable through an
exercise of the senses.

Some examples are such things as

rocks, trees, chairs, animals, and atoms.
As I described above, an abstract particular, like a
concrete particular, is also spatially and temporally
locatable, but it is not a physical or publically observable
entity.

It exists independent of being itself material.

Examples would be mental conceptions and images, as well as
minds or souls.
An abstract universal is the sort of thing that would
be, first, neither physical nor perceptual; and secondly,
neither is it identifiable as spatial or temporal.

It is

capable of multiple occurrence, and can be attributed to
many different individuals.

Plato's Forms are the

preeminent examples of abstract universals.

Kinds, natures,

essences, etc., are often conceived as abstract universals.
Finally, a concrete universal would be the sort of
entity that exists physically, in some sense, yet is not
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limited to individual spatial or temporal location.
appears to be a very peculiar notion.

This

But it would seem

that something akin to Aristotle's essences may be likely
candidates for examples within this category.

The reason I

think this, is that a concrete universal would amount to a
universal that depends on physical instantiation for its
existence.

For example, it might be argued that nwhite"

should be regarded as a concrete universal because while
many things many be white at the same time in different
places and in the same respect, and so may count as a
genuine universal; "white" must exist in some physical
realization in order to exist at all.

"White• has no

meaning independent of white things, things capable of being
perceived as white; though there may be an indefinte number
of them.

Therefore, so-called physical qualities may, under

some views, be considered concrete universals rather than
abstract universals.

The latter may exist independent of

any realization or instantiation, whereas the former must
exist as physically realized in order to exist at all.
The four theories of musical compositions presented in
this dissertation appear to correspond, more or less, with
the four ontological categories just described.

In the case

of my own theory, I have purposely tried to develop a
conception of compositions which construes them explicitly
as concrete particulars.

Musical artworks are thus original

physical artifacts consisting of collections of either
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actual musical sounds or inscriptions of musical notations,
which are themselves concrete particulars.

They are

intended originals made by some person from some selection
and arrangemnet of musical elements.

If these elements are

sounds, the composition itself is exceedingly short-lived;
it ceases to exist after its sounding.

Any future awareness

of the composition is dependent upon the existence of
musical works derived from it.

Subsequent attempts to make

scores or performances of a composition made of sounds
result not in instances, examples, occurrences, or
realizations of the composition.

Rather, performances,

scores, recordings, or any other entity comprised of the
appropriate musical elements, are distinct and unique
individual works that, owing to their status as genuinely
derived from the composition are entitled to the title of
the original artwork.
Compositions made from musical elements that are not
sounds have whatever durability these constitutive elements
possess.

That is, a composition which is a manuscript score

consisting of inscriptions on paper will survive as long as
the manuscript score remains in existence.
destroyed, so is the composition.

If it is

This is no different than

if daVinci's "Mona Lisa" were destroyed by fire, and we
would quite accurately say that the "Mona Lisa" no longer
exists.

Copies and derivations afford us some sense of the

nature of the original composition, maybe even to a very
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high degree of compliance, but the composition ceases to
exist when its constituents musical elements, (which are
themselves concrete particulars), cease to exist.
In sharp contrast to this proposed ontological
characterization of compositions is Nicholas Wolterstorff 's
theory of musical artworks as "norm-kinds".

As we have

observed in the previous chapter, Wolterstorff's proposal
consists in defining musical compositions as a kind of
universal.

More precisely, they are norm-kinds, an abstract

entity capable of an indefinite number of occurrences in
many different media.

This norm-kind is distinguished from

other kinds of kinds by its status as a standard for
determining the correctness of any occurrence derived from
it.

The composition as norm-kind need never be

instantiated; it exists independent of any actual
occurrences.

For example, any given musical composition

need never be performed.

According to the description

developed by Wolterstorff, it seems appropriate to
categorize compositions as abstract universals.

They are

abstract, rather than concrete, because they are not and
need never be physically or perceptually existent; they
exist independently of the material world.

Compositions are

universals, rather than particulars, simply because they are
defined as the sort of thing which may have examples or
multiple occurrences.

A composition is neither to be

identified with any given example nor is it dependent upon
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these examples for its own existence.
William Webster has articulated a theory of musical
compositions in which he refers to them as abstract
particulars. It should be apparent by now that I find this
category misapplied within hi.s theory.

I would argue that,

from what he says about musical compositions, it would be
more accurate to categorize them as concrete universals.
For Webster, a composition does not exist independent of
being realized in some medium.

That is, a composition

always exists as one or other of the following: a score, a
sounded performance, grooves on a vinyl disc, radio waves,
magnetic patterns on plastic tape, and so on.

These are all

physical media, so it seems evident that Webster takes
compositions to be necessarily dependent upon physical
existence.

Therefore, compositions, as described by

Webster, would seem to be concrete, rather than abstract
entities.
Furthermore, and I think more significantly, he does
not describe compositions in terms that I think justify
categorization as particulars.

Webster holds that the

distinguishing mark between individuals as such and what he
calls abstract particulars is that the former cannot have
"discontinuous existence•, whereas the latter can.

But what

he means by discontinuous existence has much to do with why
I think his view is not about particulars, but instead about
a kind of universal.
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I have indicated that, under my view, to be a
particular is to be, in some sense, spatially and temporally
locatable.

With this, Webster would agree.

But I do not

think this precludes at least one sort of discontinuous
existence; one that Nelson Goodman suggests is consistent
with certain individuals.

As noted in Chapter II, Goodman

argues that certain individuals may be construed as
discontinuous wholes; i.e., individual parts spatially and
temporally separated with each part going together to form a
compound whole individual.

(Though nothing about this

description of individuals is at odds with my my own views,
it should be noted that neither Goodman nor I claim that
compositions are this sort of individual.)
Now Webster's view is not that compositions consist of
realizations as parts of some one whole composition.
Rather, each realization is itself an instance of the
composition, but the composition cannot exist independent of
any realization.

In this way, Goodman's sense of

discontinuous existence and Webster's sense of the same are
quite different.

What makes Webster's sense of

discontinuous existence significant for his theory is that
it allows multiple occurrences of the composition at the
same time.

Therefore, even under Goodman's characterization

of this sort of individuality, Webster's view fails to count
as properly individualistic.
Admittedly, Webster does not want to construe
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compositions as individuals anyway; rather, they are to be
considered, according to Webster, abstract particulars.
Though Webster may choose to stipulate a specific use for
his terms, I think to do so as he does is misleading.

The

importance he gives to setting so-called abstract
particulars off from individuals is not so much because he
thinks they have discontinuous existence, but because he
thinks they may have multiple realizations.

The only sense

in which compositions as nabstract particulars 0 have
udiscontinuous existence•, according to Webster, is in the
sense of that the individual realizations of the composition
exist literally unconnected to one another; yet each, by
itself is a realization of the composition.

It seems to me,

that such a characterization is much more accurately
understood as referring to a kind of universal; namely, a
concrete universal, because they must exist concretely in
order to exist at all.
Though I do think Webster is mistaken in how he
chooses to name his view, my primary purpose for criticizing
his terminology is to set it in context, by means of a
reasonably consistent use of language, with the rest of the
theories I am examining, including my own.

Furthermore,

though he describes his theory in terms of what he calls
"abstract particulars", I want to anticipate and blunt any
temptation to regard his theory as a candidate for a
nominalistic theory.

Even if every realization of a
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composition is understood as an individual, which few would
dispute, it still would have to be to shown that the
composition itself is an individual.

As far as I know,

Webster has no interest in considering his theory a
nominalistic one; but this is somewhat beside the point.

My

purpose here is to provide examples of contrasting limiting
theories about musical compositions.

Insofar as Wolterstoff

has provided a worthy example of a theory in which
compositions are conceived as abstract universals, it seems
to me that Webster's is a good example of a theory that
construes compositions as concrete universals, regardless of
how he chooses to name his view.

It only remains for me to

provide a theoretical example which is cast in terms of what
I have defined as abstract particulars.
What might such a theory be like?

As abstract,

compositions would have to be described as essentially
non-physical and non-perceptual entities.

As particular,

they would have to be regarded as identifiable with a
specific location and time.

I mentioned before that a given

person's conscious ideas occurring at a given moment may be
the sorts of things that would count as abstract
particulars.

Assuming that there are such things, they may

be referred to as mental entities or the contents of mind or
particular ideas.

Thus, a theory of compositions that

identified the essential musical work with certain ideas in

205

someone's mind could be regarded a theory that construed
them as abstract particulars.

Although I do not think it

fits the bill perfectly, R. G. Collingwood's description of
musical compositions seems reasonably close to one which
effectively treats them as abstract particulars.
Artworks, for Collingwood, are not to be identified
with any physical or sensory artifact; rather, the artwork
is essentially an "imaginary object" existing in the mind of
the person attending to it.

He says that artworks are made

in the mind of the artist and nowhere else.

Musical

compositions, as artworks, are thus created ideas composed
in the mind of the composer.

If these musical ideas are

expressed by way of a written score or •ounded on an
instrument, it is not the composition that is being seen or
heard.

The composition-as-idea is not directly accessible

to anyone other than the person whose idea it is.

What is

required to have any access whatsoever to the musical ideas
of the composer is that the reader of the score or the
listener of the performance re-construct from what is seen
or heard an imaginary musical object of one's own.

This set

of musical ideas in the mind of the spectator is not the
same set as those of the composer's--that is impossible.
What is seen or heard are not themselves ideas, but
occasions for recreating musical ideas in one's own mind.
According to Collingwood, the composition as it
originates and exists in the mind of the composer is fully
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actualized in this state.

In other words, the composition

lacks for nothing, and is in no way deficient in its status
as a "mere" idea.

It does not depend on being physically or

perceptually realized at all.
artifactual expression,

If anything it is the

(e.g., a score or performance), of

the compositional ideas that is extraneous, and somewhat
superfluous.

There is little question then that

Collingwood's notion of compositions is one that virtually
defines them as abstract entities.
But is his view properly represented as being
particularistic; that is, are his compositions essentially
individuals?

On this point Collingwood is not so clear, and

I may be forcing my case a bit by attempting to characterize
his position in terms of particulars.

On the other hand, I

would suggest that it is at least plausible to interpret
what he says about compositions--that they are mental
entities of a sort--as implying that they are abstract
particulars.

At least it is the theory of musical works

that comes as close to such a conception as any of which I
am aware. The reason that I think this is because no other
theory so closely identifies the actual artwork with the
actual ideas in the mind of the creator of the work; and
then goes on to argue further that any given spectator's
experience with a work is also essentially a matter of
having certain ideas in his or her mind.

When he makes this

latter point he does not imply at all that spectators are
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having the same ideas as those that go to make up the
composition, i.e., the ideas in the composer's mind.
Therefore, it would seem inappropriate, under his view, to
regard compositions as any kind of universal.

He does not

describe the compositional work of art as consisting of
whatever these ideas within various minds have in common.
Rather, the ideas that he is describing are the sort that
occur in some specific person's mind at some specific time.
As such they would appear to be particulars.

It is these

particular ideas, these abstract particulars, that are
constitutive of the musical composition.
Summarizing, according to the four ontological
categories proposed at the outset of this chapter, musical
compositions may be construed as
(1) concrete particulars: compositions are physical
or perceptual artifacts; they are singular individuals
identifiable with a specific spatial location and
temporal duration. This dissertation is an attempt to
articulate the details and implications of just such a
description.
(2) abstract particulars: composition are
essentially mental entities originating and existing in
the mind of the composer, and subsequently as
reconstructed, but different, ideas in the minds of
spectators. Any physical or sensory artifact associated
with the composition is inessential to the existence and
nature of the musical artwork.
I have offered R. G.
Collingwood's theory of artworks as an example of this
sort of conception.
(3) abstract universals: compositions exist
independently of any actual occurrences--they need never
be performed or scored; yet a composition may exist in
and be attributed to multiple examples. The composition
itself is not spatially or temporally located. Nicholas
Wolterstorff's theory of compositions as norm-kinds is
provided as a noteworthy example of this approach.
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(4) concrete universals: compositions must be
spatially and temporally realized in order to exist at
all; yet the composition is not to be identified with
any one of these realizations. Thus, compositions may
have multiple existence insofar as the composition is
what is common to its many realizations. William
Webster has articulated just such a view.
According to Collingwood and Wolterstorff, the existence of
compositions does not depend upon their artifactual
realization; whereas for Webster and me, compositions do not
exist if their physical or perceptual realizations do not
exist.

Webster and Wolterstorff attempt to show how

compositions may have multiple instantiations, how they may
exist in different places at the same and different times.
But Collingwood and I emphasize the uniqueness of a
composition's existence, its identifiable place and its
individuality at the time of its creation.

Clearly,

Wolterstorff's views and my own have little in common.
are limiting theories at opposite poles.

They

On the other hand,

they do share an interest in an explicit analysis of certain
ontological issues in music.
I offer these four theories as what I hope are
creditable alternatives demarcating the ontological
landscape with respect to certain aesthetic entities.
Undoubtedly, other, and maybe better, theoretical versions
of each categorical type are possible; though I do take
these to be excellent theories.

I have let my preferences

be known in a way I hope is clear and somewhat convincing.
But I leave it to readers to judge between these
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alternatives as suits their own preferences and
philosophical lights.
I shall end this dissertation by commenting on its
origins.

It must be said that this dissertation was

initially motivated by a desire to come to terms with
Nicholas Wolterstorff 's theory of musical works.

I am

indebted to his fine work in this area of inquiry, though
his conclusions are ones with which I am temperamentally and
philosophically at odds.

My first encounter with his

impressive theoretical considerations on these matters found
them, on the one hand, attractive, insofar as he sought to
address issues about artworks that are of great interest to
me; namely, what sort of things are artworks.

On the other

hand, my own philosophical intuitions and commitments
discouraged me from accepting his characterizations and
conclusions.

Thus, I sought to develop a theoretical

approach that started with similar objectives as
Wolterstorff 's, but instead were worked out in terms more
amenable to an ontology that I found preferable.

It may be

said then that without Nicholas Wolterstorff 's work, this
dissertation would not have been written.

I only hope I

have provided an alternative that comes close to a level
comparable to its inspiration.
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(1966), pp. 147-148. Here the author describes a
distinction between "displayed qualities" and "represented
qualities". Very simply, the point is that the former
elements in artworks refer somehow to the latter. He
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Chapter III
1. This distinction between uses of "artwork" and
"work" has been adapted somewhat from comparable
applications of these terms by Nicholas Woterstorff in his
Works and Worlds of Art, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980), p. 41. As shall be indicated in Chapter IV,
Woterstorff 's theory of compositions is considerably
different from the one presented here, and so, his
description of the different uses of "artworkM and "work of
art" is significantly different from mine, although there
are some important parallels. He uses "work of art" .to
refer to artworks and their "examples•, while "artwork•
refers to compositional works only, those works that can
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have examples or occurrences. Such a way of describing
things is consistent with his ontology which takes
compositions to be a kind of universal, whereas performances
and the like are examples or instantiations of them. The
similarity of our usages is evident in the way that work of
art is the broader term applicable to compositions,
performances, etc., whereas artwork applies only to
compositions.
2. This is not much different from what a painter
does in creating her artwork. A painting may takes days or
even years to complete; and may involve all manner of
starting, restarting, working on parts of the canvas while
other parts are considered done. Musical composers do
something like this although their materials are highly
transient as so rely on memory to a greater extent.
3. This does not preclude using recorded sounds as
parts of performances, (e.g., a singer using recorded
orchestral arrangements as accompaniment or a recording of
cannon roars instead of real cannons in the "1812
Overture"), or possibly even using nothing but recordings to
produce a performance: imagine some avant-garde performer
switching various recording/playback machines on and off in
a certain way and calling the resulting sound-sequence-event
a musical performance.
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actually and directly making musical sounds.
4.
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practicing" from rehearsing, with the former not being a
case of performing whereas the latter is. Mere practicing
also involves making musical sounds but with no intentional
reference to a compositional work.
Rehearsals are
performances to the extent that they are "deriveda from a
compositional work of music. What I mean by "derived• will
be discussed a little later in this chapter.
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5. Admittedly, the words, lyrics, or libretto
associated with much music is often regarded as part of a
musical work. Many music composers "compose• these-words
for their works.
I do not consider this to be musical
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aspects of the words often have musical significance.
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evaluative and classificatory senses of art.
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Ferguson, "Tape Composition: An Art Form in Search of Its
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Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (1984), pp.
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his analysis of improvisation is not at great odds with my
own.
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arrangements of symbols to traditional notation, or by
creating entirely new symbols and schemes.
10. Nelson Goodman makes a similar point with his
well-known notion of "sameness of spelling•. See Languages
of Art, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.,
1976), pp. 115-117, 131-132.
11. Again, Nelson Goodman has contirbuted much to my
thinking on this. See Languages of Art, pp. 143-148,
233-234.
12. See Richard Rudner, "The Ontological Status of
the Aesthetic Object• in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 10, (1950), pp. 380-388.
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